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“The structure of power in the international system determines the role of institutions. 
NATO’s continued existence conveniently illustrates how international institutions 
are created and maintained by stronger states to serve their  
perceived and misperceived interests.” 
Kenneth Waltz (2000) 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Over the past decades, China has adopted a proactive attitude towards regional 
multilateral cooperation that signals a dramatic shift of Chinese foreign policy. What 
explains the rationales behind China’s activism in regional multilateralism? Based on 
neorealist, neoliberal and constructivist perspectives, the present thesis explores the 
logic of China’s growing engagement with regional multilateral cooperation in East 
Asia, Central Asia and the Eurasian landmass by conducting three cases studies 
involving the ASEAN Plus Three (APT), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This dissertation concludes that China’s 
engagement with regional multilateral cooperation is strongly motivated by an 
evolving grand strategy in search for security and great power status. First, regional 
multilateral institutions are strategically and tactically used by Beijing as a vehicle of 
soft balancing to undermine US dominance without directly provoking it, since 
regional multilateral cooperation allows Beijing to establish an asymmetric 
interdependence over other countries, to reassure them of its benign intentions, and to 
deter them from forming an anti-China coalition. Second, regional multilateralism has 
been a new paradigm for Chinese foreign policy as it provides a vital mechanism not 
merely to increase access to regional markets and ensure a peaceful international 
environment, but also institutionalize its periphery strategy and advance its 
geo-economic, geopolitical and geostrategic interests in Asia and globally. Third, 
regional multilateral initiatives provide a new path for China to build soft and 
normative power and reshape global governance in all efforts to foster its role as a 
responsible, benign and peaceful power and transform the existing international system 
in a way that reflects its values, interests and growing status. Accordingly, regional 
multilateralism presents an alternative path for Beijing to achieve its peaceful rise.   
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SUMMARY 
 
Over the past decades, China’s foreign policy has experienced a dramatic shift from 
bilateralism and multilateralism to regional multilateralism. Since the 1990s, China 
has been a major actor in initiating, developing and institutionalizing regional 
multilateral cooperation. Its active involvement in regional multilateral mechanisms 
has shifted from a strong desire to deepening regional economic integration in East 
Asia and a growing need for safeguarding its security interests in Central Asia to a 
new grand strategy for advancing its geo-economic, geopolitical and geostrategic 
interests in the Eurasian landmass and globally. When regional multilateralism has 
been a new paradigm for Chinese foreign policy, this dissertation examines the logic 
of China’s growing engagement in regional multilateral cooperation by addressing 
three main questions: What are the motivations and calculations behind China’s 
evolving foreign policy towards regional multilateralism? What are the relevance and 
significance of regional multilateralism in managing its cooperative and competitive 
relations with other major powers and its peaceful rise? And what are the success 
and limits of China’s embrace of regional multilateralism in achieving its key foreign 
policy objectives? 
 
Regional multilateralism is far from a new phenomenon in international 
relations. Although there exists extensive literature on the study of regional 
multilateralism in Asia, most of the research explored the shape and substance of 
regional multilateralism in Asia merely from a political or economic perspective that 
has limited explanatory power for two reasons. First, although the market-driven 
globalization is the primary driving force for the development of regional 
multilateralism, economic motivation fails to fully explain the proliferation of 
regional multilateral initiatives in Asia as it neglects the security dimension. Second, 
since regional multilateral cooperation involves not only economic and political but 
also security factors, it is still not clear whether they could serve as either a catalyst or 
obstacle to regional multilateral process in Asia, and how they could influence the 
formulation of the country’s foreign policy. This thesis argues that regional 
multilateralism is a complex process to collectivize interests, demand and autonomy 
of all the regional actors. And the dynamic interactions of states inside and outside 
institutions can reshape the international relations regionally and globally and affect 
the country’s foreign policy behavior. 
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By illustrating the evolution of China’s growing engagement in regional 
multilateral cooperation in East Asia, Central Asia and the Eurasian space, this thesis 
suggests that China’s involvement in regional multilateralism is an ongoing process 
with increasing intensity and velocity as China’s power continues to grow 
economically, politically and militarily. The rising role of regional multilateralism in 
Chinese foreign policy is strongly shaped by a dynamic interaction of domestic and 
international forces with a combination of economic, political and strategic 
dimensions. On the one hand, regional multilateralism provides a way for Beijing to 
expand its influence from East Asia to Central Asia and the Eurasian landmass, 
advancing its regional and global interests in various domains. On the other hand, 
while China’s rise is challenging the US-dominated order, it has triggered an 
intensifying strategic rivalry between Beijing and Washington. In addition, China’s 
growing economic and military power caused anxiety, fear and mistrust in Asian 
countries that fueled the perceptions of the China Threat. Those situations present 
Beijing with a true dilemma of how to deal with emerging security and geopolitical 
challenges and achieve a peaceful rise. Thus, regional multilateralism serves as a 
means to manage its complicated relations with Washington and other regional actors.    
 
To further develop this area of study empirically and theoretically, the present 
thesis tries to make a contribution to the literatures on Chinese foreign policy and the 
role of regional multilateralism in international relations by providing new insight into 
how ideas, interests and institutions influence the country’s foreign policy behavior 
and reshape the international relations between states inside and outside regional 
multilateral institutions. To achieve this goal, this thesis analyzes the motivations and 
calculations, the relevance and significance, and the success and limits of China’s 
evolving foreign policy towards regional multilateralism in East Asia, Central Asia 
and the Eurasian landmass by conducting three cases studies involving the ASEAN 
Plus Three (APT), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI). This research work offers a depth and breadth of understanding 
the role of regional multilateralism in Chinese foreign policy from the neorealist, 
neoliberal and constructivist perspectives and sheds some light on how China as a 
rising power attempts to advance its complex domestic and international agendas by 
proactively engaging in various regional multilateral cooperation, ensuring security, 
promoting power status, and achieving its peaceful rise.  
 
MAIN CONCLUSIONS 
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This dissertation has tried to study the logic of China’s engagement in regional 
multilateralism. It suggests that the rising role of regional multilateralism in Chinese 
foreign policy is considered a strategic adaptation process to the changing domestic, 
regional and international environment. While China’s power continues to grow, 
China has turned into an increasingly confident global actor and is keen to expand its 
influence from East Asia and Central Asia to the whole Eurasian continent. Having 
examined the motivations and calculations behind China’s approach towards regional 
multilateral institutions in East Asia by using the concept of institutional balancing, it 
finds that China’s activism in regional multilateralism in East Asia is strongly 
motivated by a strategy of institutional balancing to delay, frustrate and undermine the 
US’s dominant power. Institutional balancing is materialized in three dimensions: 
establishing asymmetric economic interdependence over its Asian neighbors; 
enhancing strategic reassurance in East Asia; and deterring the formation of any 
anti-China coalition. This strategy has proved particularly successful with Cambodia 
and Laos, and unsuccessful with states that hold territorial disputes or a strategic 
rivalry with Beijing, namely Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines before Duterte. 
Meanwhile, most East Asian states pursue a hedging strategy to maintain strategic 
balance between Beijing and Washington and prevent any single power to dominate 
East Asia.  
 
Having analyzed the rationales behind China’s strategy towards the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO) by using the concept of soft balancing, it concludes 
that China approach towards the SCO is driven by a strategy of soft balancing against 
the American hegemony. The SCO is strategically and tactically used as a vehicle of 
soft balancing to isolate, marginalize and undermine the US power and influence in 
Central Asia and beyond. This strategic maneuver is materialized in three ways: 
resisting the US’s expansion in Central Asia to ensure security and stability of its 
western frontier; promoting common norms such as ‘sovereignty’ and 
‘non-interference’ to counter the West-supported color revolutions; and forging a 
Sino-Russian strategic alliance to foster a multipolar world and counterbalance the US 
global hegemony and unilateralism. However, the Sino-Russia competition and the 
complex geopolitics of Central Asia might undermine Beijing’s attempt to use the 
SCO as an instrument of soft balancing against the US hegemony when its expanding 
influence in the former Soviet space has generated concerns in Moscow, and when 
Central Asian states are trying to diversify their relations with the western powers and 
avoid overdependence on Beijing and Moscow economically and politically. 
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Having examined the strategic calculations behind China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative, the present thesis suggests that China’s efforts to enhance regional 
multilateral cooperation across the Eurasian space through the BRI are strongly 
motivated by a multifaceted grand strategy. First, China makes use of the BRI as a 
vehicle of soft balancing to frustrate the US containment and encirclement of China, 
and undermine its dominance in Eurasia and beyond. Second, China intends to 
promote alternative ideas and norms and build its role as a normative power through 
the BRI for fostering the legitimacy of its rising power. Third, China seeks to form a 
bargaining coalition through the BRI and AIIB to reshape global governance and 
transform the existing international system in a way that reflects its values, interests, 
and status. Overall, the BRI serves as a decisive strategic maneuver for China to 
ensure security and promote power status in the international order, moving from a 
rule-taker to rule-maker. Although the BRI has significance for strengthening 
Beijing’s global role, this ambitious initiative faces potential challenges including 
geopolitical rivalry, security threats, territorial disputes and political risks that would 
undermine its efforts to promote interconnectivity and regional multilateral 
cooperation along the Silk Road. 
 
Based on the evidence from explorative case studies, the main conclusions are 
derived that regional multilateralism as a new paradigm can reshape the international 
relations between states inside and outside institutions. China’s growing engagement 
in regional multilateralism is strongly motivated by an evolving grand strategy in 
search for security and great power status. First, regional multilateral cooperation and 
institutions are strategically and tactically used by Beijing as a vehicle of soft balancing 
to undermine US dominance without directly provoking it, since regional multilateral 
settings allow Beijing to establish an asymmetric interdependence over other countries, 
reassure them of its benign intentions, and deter them from forming an anti-China 
coalition. Second, regional multilateralism has been a new paradigm for Chinese 
foreign policy as it provides a mechanism not merely to increase access to regional 
markets and ensure a peaceful international environment, but also institutionalize its 
periphery strategy and advance its geopolitical and geostrategic interests in a regional 
and global context. Third, regional multilateral initiatives offer a creative way for 
Beijing to build soft and normative power and reshape global governance in all efforts 
to foster its role as a responsible, benign and peaceful power and transform the existing 
international system in a way that reflects its values, interests and international status. 
Accordingly, regional multilateralism presents an alternative path for Beijing to 
achieve its peaceful rise.  
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RESUMEN  
 
En las últimas décadas la política exterior china ha experimentado un giro dramático 
del bilateralismo y el multilateralismo al multilateralismo regional. Desde la década 
de los 90 del siglo pasado, China se ha convertido en un actor central a la hora de 
iniciar, desarrollar e institucionalizar mecanismos de cooperación multilateral 
regional. Su involucración activa en procesos multilaterales regionales ha virado de 
un fuerte deseo de profundizar la integración económica regional en Asia Oriental y 
salvaguardar sus intereses en materia de seguridad en Asia Central a una nueva gran 
estrategia para avanzar sus intereses geoeconómicos, geopolíticos y geoestratégicos 
en el continente euroasiático y a escala global. El multilateralismo se ha convertido en 
un nuevo paradigma de la política exterior china y esta tesis analiza la lógica detrás de 
la creciente involucración de China en la cooperación multilateral regional abordando 
tres preguntas principales: ¿Cuáles son las motivaciones y los cálculos detrás del 
papel cambiante del multilateralismo regional dentro de la política exterior china? 
¿Cuál es la relevancia y el significado del regionalismo multilateral en la gestión de 
sus relaciones cooperativas y competitivas con otras grandes potencias y su ascenso 
pacífico? Y ¿cuáles son los éxitos y los límites del abrazo de China del 
multilateralismo regional para conseguir sus objetivos de política exterior?  
 
El multilateralismo regional no es un fenómeno nuevo dentro de las relaciones 
internacionales. Aunque existe una amplia literatura sobre el estudio del regionalismo 
multilateral en Asia, la mayor parte de esa investigación explora este fenómeno desde 
una óptica política y económica que tiene una capacidad explicativa limitada por dos 
motivos. En primer lugar, a pesar de que la globalización impulsada por la lógica del 
mercado es la principal fuerza motriz del desarrollo del multilateralismo regional, la 
motivación económica no es capaz de explicar en su totalidad la proliferación de 
iniciativas multilaterales regionales en Asia al obviar su dimensión securitaria. En 
segundo lugar, no queda claro si esa dimensión de seguridad es un catalizador o un 
obstáculo para los procesos multilaterales regionales en Asia ni cómo influyen en la 
formulación de la política exterior de los países involucrados. Esta tesis sostiene que 
el multilateralismo regional es un proceso complejo de convergencia de intereses y 
demanda de autonomía para todos los actores regionales involucrados; y que las 
interacciones dinámicas de los Estados que están dentro y fuera de esas instituciones 
pueden transformar las relaciones internacionales dentro y fuera de la región toda vez 
que afectan a la acción internacional de los Estados.  
 
X 
 
Ilustrando la evolución del creciente compromiso de China con el 
multilateralismo regional en Asia Oriental, Asia Central, y el espacio Euroasiático, 
esta tesis sugiere que la involucración de China en el multilateralismo regional es un 
proceso en marcha de velocidad e intensidad creciente a medida que el poder 
económico, político, y militar de China va aumentado. El creciente papel del 
multilateralismo regional en la política exterior china está fuertemente condicionado 
por la interacción dinámica de factores domésticos e internacionales en los ámbitos 
económico, político y estratégico. Por un lado, el multilateralismo regional ofrece a 
Pekín una vía para expandir su influencia desde Asia Oriental y Asia Central a todo el 
espacio euroasiático, avanzando sus intereses en varios marcos geográficos y 
dominios temáticos. Por otro lado, a medida que el ascenso de China desafía el orden 
internacional dominado por Estados Unidos, ha detonado e intensificado una rivalidad 
estratégica entre Pekín y Washington. Además, las crecientes capacidades económicas 
y militares de China han avivado la percepción de China como una amenaza, 
causando ansiedad, miedo y desconfianza en diferentes países asiáticos. Estas 
situaciones presentan un verdadero dilema para Pekín sobre cómo tratar con desafíos 
de seguridad y geoestratégicos a la vez que consigue un ascenso pacífico. En este 
contexto, China recurre al multilateralismo regional como un instrumento para 
gestionar sus complicadas relaciones con Washington y otros actores regionales.   
 
Para profundizar a nivel teórico y empírico en esta área de estudio, esta tesis 
aspira a contribuir a la literatura sobre política exterior china y el papel del 
multilateralismo regional en las relaciones internacionales aportando nuevas 
perspectivas sobre cómo diferentes ideas, intereses e instituciones influencian la 
acción exterior de China y conforman las relaciones entre China y otros Estados que 
participan o se mantienen al margen de diferentes mecanismos multilaterales 
regionales en los que participa activamente Pekín. Para alcanzar este objetivo, esta 
tesis explora las motivaciones y los cálculos, la relevancia y significación, y los logros 
y fracasos del posicionamiento cambiante de China hacia los mecanismos 
multilaterales regionales en Asia Oriental, Asia Central y el continente euroasiático a 
través de tres casos de estudio: ASEAN +3, la Organización de Cooperación de 
Shanghái (OCS), y la Iniciativa de la Franja y la Ruta (IFR). Esta investigación ofrece 
así un análisis amplio y profundo del papel del multilateralismo regional en la política 
exterior china a partir de diferentes paradigmas teóricos: neorrealista, neoliberal y 
constructivista. De esta manera se arroja luz sobre la forma en que una potencia 
emergente como China avanza su compleja agenda doméstica e internacional a través 
de una participación proactiva en varios marcos de cooperación multilateral regional.   
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CONCLUSIONES PRINCIPALES 
 
Esta tesis ha intentado estudiar la lógica detrás del posicionamiento cambiante de China 
hacia el multilateralismo regional. El creciente protagonismo del multilateralismo 
regional dentro de la política exterior china se interpreta como una adaptación 
estratégica a un contexto nacional e internacional cambiante. A medida que las 
capacidades de China van creciendo, Pekín se convierte en un actor internacional cada 
vez más confiando y dispuesto a expandir su influencia desde Asia Oriental y Central al 
conjunto del espacio euroasiático. Habiendo usado el concepto de balance institucional 
para analizar las motivaciones y los cálculos detrás del posicionamiento de China hacia 
los mecanismos multilaterales regionales, se evidencia que el activismo de China en 
este campo está fuertemente motivado por una estrategia de balance institucional para 
obstaculizar, frustrar y socavar el poder dominante estadounidense. Este reequilibrio 
institucional se plasma en tres dimensiones: estableciendo una interdependencia 
económica asimétrica sobre sus vecinos asiáticos; ofreciendo garantías estratégicas en 
Asia Oriental; y disuadiendo la formación de cualquier coalición anti-china. Esta 
estrategia ha sido particularmente exitosa con Camboya y Laos e ineficaz con los 
países que mantienen disputas territoriales o rivalidad estratégica con Pekín, 
especialmente con Japón, Vietnam y Filipinas antes de la llegada al poder de Duterte. 
Por su parte, la mayor parte de países de la región siguen una estrategia de 
diversificación orientada al mantenimiento de un equilibrio estratégico entre Pekín y 
Washington que evite que una sola potencia domine Asia Oriental.  
 
Habiendo utilizado el concepto de reequilibrio blando para examinar la lógica 
detrás de la estrategia de China hacia la OCS, se concluye que el posicionamiento de 
Pekín hacia dicha organización viene motivado por una estrategia de reequilibrio 
blando frente a la hegemonía norteamericano. La OCS es utilizada táctica y 
estratégicamente como un instrumento de reequilibrio blando para aislar, marginar y 
socavar el poder y la influencia de Estados Unidos en Asia Central. Esta maniobra 
estratégica se materializar de tres maneras: resistiendo la expansión de Estados 
Unidos en Asia Central para garantizar la seguridad y estabilidad de la frontera 
occidental de China; promoviendo normas comunes como soberanía y 
no-interferencia para contrarrestar las revoluciones de colores apoyadas por Occidente; 
forjando una alianza estratégica sino-rusa para promover un mundo multipolar y 
contrapesar la hegemonía global y el unilateralismo estadounidense. Sin embargo, la 
competencia sino-rusa y la compleja geopolítica de Asia Central pueden obstaculizar 
los intentos chinos de usar la OCS como un instrumento de reequilibrio blando frente 
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a la expansión de la influencia estadounidense en el espacio post-soviético en un 
contexto en el que los países centroasiáticos intentan diversificar sus relaciones con 
las potencias occidentales y evitar una sobre-dependencia política y económica de 
Pekín y Moscú. 
 
Habiendo analizado los cálculos estratégicos detrás de la IFR, esta tesis 
sugiere que los esfuerzos de China para potenciar la cooperación multilateral regional 
a lo largo del espacio euroasiático están fuertemente motivados por una estrategia 
nacional multidimensional. Primero, China utiliza la IFR como un instrumento de 
contrapeso blando para frustrar la estrategia estadounidense de contención y 
circunvalación de China y erosionar su posición preeminente en Eurasia y en la 
escena global. Segundo, China pretende promover normas y valores alternativos para 
presentarse como una potencia normativa a través de la IFR para legitimar su 
creciente poder. Tercero, China aspira a formar una coalición de negociación a través 
de la IFR y del Banco Asiático de Inversión en Infraestructuras para transformar la 
gobernanza global y el sistema internacional existente de manera que refleje sus 
valores, intereses y estatus. En resumen, la IFR sirve como una maniobra estratégica 
para China para garantizar su seguridad y promover su estatus en el orden 
internacional, pasando de ser un actor que adopta las normas a otro que las crea. 
Aunque la IFR tiene un gran potencial para reforzar el papel de Pekín en la escena 
global, también enfrenta posibles desafíos como la rivalidad geopolítica, amenazas de 
seguridad, disputas territoriales y riesgos políticos que pueden erosionar sus esfuerzos 
para promover la interconectividad y la cooperación regional a lo largo de la Ruta de 
la Seda.   
 
A partir de la evidencia extraída de los casos de estudio exploratorios, las 
principales conclusiones que se derivan son que el multilateralismo regional es un 
nuevo paradigma que pueda modificar las relaciones internacionales entre los estados 
que participan y que quedan fuera de dichos procesos. El creciente compromiso de 
China con el multilateralismo regional está fuertemente motivado por una gran 
estrategia nacional dinámica que busca seguridad y estatus de gran potencia para 
China. Primero, la cooperación y las instituciones multilaterales regionales son 
utilizadas tácticamente y estratégicamente por Pekín como instrumento de contrapeso 
blando para socavar el dominio estadounidense sin provocar directamente a este país, 
gracias a que los mecanismos del multilateralismo regional permiten a Pekín establecer 
una relación de interdependencia asimétrica con otros países, reasegurarles de sus 
intenciones benignas, y disuadirles de formar una coalición anti-china. Segundo, el 
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multilateralismo regional sirve de nuevo paradigma dentro de la política exterior china 
gracias a que incrementa su acceso a los mercados regionales, mantiene un orden 
internacional pacífico, y le permite institucionalizar su estrategia de vecindad y avanzar 
sus intereses geopolíticos y estratégicos tanto en un contexto regional como global. 
Tercero, las iniciativas multilaterales regionales le ofrecen a Pekín una forma creativa 
de aumentar su poder blando y normativo, presentándose como potencia responsable, 
benigna y pacífica, lo que favorece que pueda transformar la gobernanza global de 
manera que refleje mejor sus valores, intereses y estatus. De esta forma, el 
multilateralismo regional le ofrece a Pekín un camino para conseguir su ascenso 
pacifico.  
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CHAPTER ONE  
 
INTRODUCTION: REGIONAL MULTILATERALISM: A NEW PARADIGM 
FOR CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY       
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
While the balance of global power is shifting from the West to East, the rise of new 
powers is prompting a fundamental transformation of the international system. 
China’s rise is one of the most prominent events of international relations in the 21st 
century. Two hundred years ago, Napoleon Bonaparte once said: “China is a sleeping 
giant. Let her sleep, for when she wakes she will move the world.” It seems that 
Napoleon was quite right.1 After the decline of the ‘Middle Kingdom’ in the 19th and 
20th century, a rising China has waked up and shaked the world. At present, there is a 
little doubt that after experiencing rapid growth and development in the past three 
decades, China has emerged as a global power with increasing prominence. When 
China’s growing power starts to reshape the existing international order, many 
scholars come to believe that since its foundation in 1949, China has a persistent and 
coherent grand strategy to gain its great power status and restore its rightful position 
in the world from the ‘century of humiliation’.2 But some questions remain unclear: 
is China a status quo or revisionist power? How can China achieve its peaceful rise in 
the US-dominated international system? And how does China’s rise transform the 
existing global system and shape the future world order?3  
                                                
1 . David Scott, China and the International System, 1840-1949: Power, Presence, and 
Perceptions in a Century of Humiliation (New York: Suny Press, 2008). 
2. Suisheng Zhao, ‘Rethinking the Chinese World Order: The Imperial Cycle and the Rise of 
China,’ Journal of Contemporary China 24, no. 96 (2015): 961-982. 
3. Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Is China a Status Quo Power?,’ International Security 27, no. 4 
(2003): 5-56; John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in 
Asia,’ The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3, no. 4 (2010): 381-396; William C. 
Wohlforth, ‘Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,’ World Politics 61, no. 1 
(2009): 28-57; Huiyun Feng, ‘Is China a Revisionist Power?,’ The Chinese Journal of 
International Politics 2, no. 3 (2009): 313-334; G. John Ikenberry, ‘The Rise of China and the 
Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?,’ Foreign Affairs 87, (2008): 23-37. 
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After the end of World War II, Westphalian sovereignty and the birth of the 
modern international system shaped the cornerstone of today’s world order and made 
attainment of a lasting peace. As the neoliberal globalization extraordinarily increased 
economic interdependence between countries and regions since the end of the Cold 
War, it is impossible for any rising power to establish its global power status or global 
‘empire’, like the rise of great powers in the 19th century, through territorial and 
military expansion as well as political domination. The history also tells that power 
transition stemming from the rise and fall of the great powers often leads to a 
hegemonic war between established power and rising power. 4  Thus, it is not 
surprising that while China’s rise is challenging the US-dominated international order, 
it triggered an intensifying strategic rivalry between Beijing and Washington. This 
presents Beijing with a true dilemma of how to deal with emerging security 
challenges and achieve its peaceful rise. In this context, China turned to ‘regional 
multilateralism’ in an endeavor to increase its comprehensive national power, manage 
its cooperative and competitive relations with major powers, and advance its regional 
and global interests.5     
 
Regional multilateralism is driven by a complex mixture of economic, 
political, and strategic motivations as it reflects the common interests of governments, 
bureaucracies, and societal actors. Since regional multilateral mechanism facilitates 
cooperation, coordination and collaboration towards shared interest and objective, it 
provides a new approach to effectively tackling contemporary problems on a regional 
level, managing cooperative and competitive relations between small, middle, and 
great powers, and shaping a new geopolitical landscape in a regional and global 
context. In particular, regional multilateral cooperation that enhances a nexus of 
economics, politics and security6 offers a way to reshape the balance of power 
regionally and globally. Since 1967, when the ASEAN was founded to promote 
regional multilateral cooperation in Southeast Asia, regional multilateralism gained 
ground in Asia. After the 1997 Asian financial crisis, regional multilateralism 
                                                
4. Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017). 
5. See Guoguang Wu and Helen Lansdowne, China Turns to Multilateralism: Foreign Policy 
and Regional Security (London: Routledge, 2011); Marc Lanteigne, China and International 
Institutions Alternate Paths to Global Power (London: Routledge, 2005).  
6. Avery Goldstein and Edward D. Mansfield, The Nexus of Economics, Security, and 
International Relations in East Asia (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2012).  
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prevailed and proliferated in Asia and every state almost participated in one or more 
regional multilateral mechanisms.7  
 
Since the 1990s, China has become a major actor in initiating, developing and 
institutionalizing regional multilateral mechanisms such as the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), ASEAN Plus 
Three (APT), ASEAN Plus China, Trilateral Cooperation, and the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI). 8  During the period from the 1990s to the 2010s, China’s 
involvement in regional multilateral institution has shifted from a desire to deepening 
regional economic integration in East Asia and a growing need for safeguarding its 
security interests in Central Asia to a grand strategy for advancing its geopolitical and 
geostrategic interests in the Eurasian landmass and globally. Today regional 
multilateralism has been a new paradigm for Chinese foreign policy, since regional 
multilateral cooperation not only provides a way for Beijing to promote growth, 
ensure security, build power and influence, but also offers an alternative path to its 
peaceful rise. Given its rising global role, China’s activism in regional multilateralism 
has attracted considerable attention among scholars and policymakers.  
 
What explains China’s growing enthusiasm for regional multilateralism? The 
present thesis aims to explore the logic of China’s engagement with regional 
multilateral cooperation in East Asia, Central Asia and Eurasia, and the role of 
regional multilateralism in Chinese foreign policy. To achieve this objective, the first 
chapter presents the motivation, research questions, hypotheses and the outline of the 
dissertation. The rest of this chapter is divided into three sections. Section one 
analyzes the origin, background and evolution of China’s foreign policy shifting from 
bilateralism and multilateralism to regional multilateralism during the 1990s-2010s 
and highlights China’s activism in regional multilateral cooperation in East Asia, 
Central Asia and Eurasia. Section two underlines the importance of exploring the 
logic of China’s engagement with regional multilateral cooperation and the role of 
regional multilateralism in international relations and provides the preliminary ideas 
and arguments by raising the main research questions and hypotheses of thesis. 
                                                
7. Douglas Webber, ‘Two Funerals and a Wedding? The Ups and Downs of Regionalism in 
East Asia and Asia-Pacific after the Asian Crisis,’ The Pacific Review 14, no. 3 (2001): 
339-372; Peter J. Katzenstein, ‘Regionalism and Asia,’ New Political Economy 5, no. 3 (2000): 
353-368. 
8 . Chien-Peng Chung, ‘China’s Approaches to the Institutionalization of Regional 
Multilateralism,’ Journal of Contemporary China 17, no. 57 (2008): 747-764. 
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Section three looks into the structure of full dissertation and gives an overview of six 
individual chapters.   
 
 
China’s turn to regional multilateralism 
 
Over the past decades, China’s foreign policy has experienced a dramatic shift from 
bilateralism and multilateralism to regional multilateralism. The rising role of regional 
multilateralism in Chinese foreign policy is strongly shaped by a dynamic interaction 
of domestic and international forces with a combination of economic, political and 
strategic dimensions. Since the 1990s, China’s evolving foreign policy in regional 
multilateral cooperation has undergone four phases as follows: 1) a passive stance 
from 1978 to 1991; 2) a positive stance from 1991 to 2001; 3) an active stance from 
2001 to 2013; and 4) a proactive stance from 2013 to present. China’s activism in 
regional multilateral cooperation and institutions is not only associated with its 
changing international role, emerging security challenges, and shifting balance of 
global power, but also linked to an evolving grand strategy for great power status. 
This section presents a vivid picture of the origin, background and evolution of 
China’s turn to regional multilateralism.     
 
A passive stance (1978-1991) 
 
China adopted a passive stance towards regional multilateralism during the period 
from the 1970s until the end of Cold War. In the two decades since its foundation in 
1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) remarkably adhered to bilateralism and 
unilateralism in its foreign policy during the era of Mao Zedong while engaging in 
confrontation with two superpowers, the US and Soviet Union.9 Chinese leaders 
thought that the global multilateral institutions established and dominated by the 
superpower serves as a tool to push for the hegemonism and power politics, dominate 
the ‘Third World’10 and overthrow the socialist China under the ruling of the 
                                                
9. Robert S. Ross, China, the United States, and the Soviet Union: Tripolarity and Policy 
Making in the Cold War (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1993); Jian Chen, Mao's China and the Cold 
War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010); Klaus Mehnert, ‘Soviet-Chinese 
Relations,’ International Affairs 35, no. 4 (1959): 417-426. 
10. The Three Worlds Theory was developed by Mao Zedong, the main founder and leader of 
the Communist Party of China (CPC), the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the People’s 
Republic of China. Mao’s theory suggests that the world is economically and politically 
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Communist Party of China (CPC). Thus, Beijing was actively involved in the 
Non-Alignment Movement and adopted a non-alignment policy since the 1950s.11 
But China began embracing multilateralism after replacing the Republic of China 
(ROC) to recover its permanent seat at the UN Security Council in 1971.12 Since then, 
the UN is the only multilateral organization which China considered as ‘legitimate’ 
despite different ideologies and political systems among the members. As the 
ideology played a vital role in making Chinese foreign policy during the early 1970s, 
China’s return to the UN marked a great victory in its struggle against the American 
imperialist. Therefore, China maintained a ‘pragmatic’ position towards 
multilateralism and its involvement in international affairs and multilateral 
cooperation was largely inspired by the anti-colonism, anti-hegemonism and 
anti-imperialism sentiment.  
 
After the end of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), Chinese leader Deng 
Xiaoping took power and began reconsidering China’s national development strategy. 
The Third Plenary Session of the CPC, convened in December 1978, signified a 
fundamental shift of China’s domestic and foreign policy. At the Session, Deng 
Xiaoping stressed that a strategic decision was made to shift the focus of the Party’s 
work from the socialist ‘society class struggle’ to socialist modernization and the 
Chinese people should be dedicated and steadfast in the development of national 
                                                                                                                                      
divided into three worlds: “the US and Soviet Union belong to the first world. The Middle 
elements, such as Japan, Europe, Canada and Australia belong to the second world. All Asian 
(except Japan), African and Latin American countries belong to the third world”. See Mao 
Zedong, Mao Zedong on Diplomacy (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1998), p. 454; Jiang 
An, ‘Mao Zedong’s “Three Worlds” Theory: Political Considerations and Value for the 
Times,’ Social Sciences in China 34, no. 1 (2013): 35-57. 
11 . For example, in 1955, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai participated in the Bandung 
conference in support of the newly independent states in Asia and Africa against colonialism 
and imperialism. Despite its active role in the Non-Alignment Movement of the third world, 
China did not join this organization as a member state. In addition, China was actually allied 
with Soviet under the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, 
which was signed in 1950 and expired in 1979. See Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya, ‘The 
Non-Aligned Movement and International Relations,’ India Quarterly 33, no. 2 (1977): 
137-164. 
12. Michael Yahuda, Towards the End of Isolationism: China’s Foreign Policy after Mao 
(London: Macmillan Education UK, 1983). 
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productive forces and socialist modernization.13 This event was a preface of a new 
era for China’s reform and opening. While reorienting national development strategy, 
a priority of China’s foreign policy was to reestablish political and diplomatic ties 
with those Asian states who still remained hostile to Beijing due to support for the 
communist movements in Southeast Asia during the 1960s and 1970s. 14  In 
meanwhile, China formally established diplomatic relations with the US in January 
1979 in an effort to end Sino-US confrontation and break out of its diplomatic 
isolation in the international community. Because Chinese leaders realized that 
improving relations with the US and Asian neighbors was essential for ensuring a 
peaceful and stable international environment, exploiting trade and investment 
opportunities, and achieving socialist modernization.   
 
Although regional multilateralism had gained ground in Asia after the creation 
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 1967,15 China kept developing its 
relations with Asian countries at a bilateral basis and adopted a passive stance towards 
regional multilateral cooperation due to three factors. First, domestic politics shaped 
China’s policy preference. While the ten years of ‘Cultural Revolution’ engendered 
lasting economic disorder and political chaos across the nation, Beijing was fully 
dedicating to restore order from the turmoil in the late 1970s in order to pave the way 
for embracing the new path of national development. To implement the reform and 
opening policy towards socialist modernization with Chinese characteristics, China 
prioritized its transition from a planned economy to socialist market economy 
throughout the 1980s in all efforts to deepen domestic reforms and promote economic 
development. When domestic policy goals were given a high priority by Chinese 
leaders, Beijing did not pay any attention to regional multilateral cooperation during 
the early stage of reform and opening policy. 
 
Second, as the ideology played a key role in shaping international relations of 
East Asia during the Cold War, the external factor limited China’s foreign policy 
options. In the era of Cold War, the world was divided into two blocs: the 
                                                
13. Deng Xiaoping, Build Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (Beijing: Foreign Languages 
Press, 1985). 
14. Alice D. Ba, ‘China and Asean: Renavigating Relations for a 21st-century Asia,’ Asian 
Survey 43, no. 4 (2003): 622-647. 
15. Amitav Acharya, ‘How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and 
Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism,’ International Organization 58, no. 2 (2004): 
239-275. 
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Moscow-led communist camp and the Washington-led capitalist camp. Despite its 
broke ties with Moscow in the 1960s16 and rapprochement with Washington in the 
1970s and 1980s,17 the red China stayed in the communist camp, whereas the most of 
Asian countries joined the capitalist camp and maintained close ties with Washington. 
Even when China normalized diplomatic relations with its Asian neighbors after 
stopping supporting the communist movements in the region, mutual political trust 
was still low and fragile during the Cold War. In particular, the establishment of the 
South East Asia Treaty Organization and succeeded by the ASEAN, was originally 
motivated by a common desire to form a coalition to counter the expansion of 
Communism in the region.18 Given the existing ideological difference, China still 
remained isolated and marginalized politically in Asia. Moreover, regional 
multilateralism still stayed at the experimental stage in Europe (European 
Communities) and Asia (ASEAN),19 thus the precondition for China’s involvement 
in regional multilateral cooperation was not matured.   
 
Third, China’s diplomatic strategy during the Cold War shaped its passive 
stance towards regional multilateralism. Since the beginning of the Cold War, China 
pursued an independent foreign policy by adhering to the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence and non-alignment policy and refused to participate in any military 
alliance or bloc.20 In a bipolar international system, except the UN, all types of 
                                                
16. Lorenz M. Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2010), p. 1. 
17. In February 1972, US President Nixon made a historical visit to Beijing and two countries 
issued the Shanghai Communiqué that marks a starting of the Sino-American rapprochement. 
See Yukinori Komine, Secrecy in US Foreign Policy: Nixon, Kissinger and the 
Rapprochement with China (London: Routledge, 2016). 
18 . Shaun Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 2002); Leszek Buszynski, ‘Southeast Asia in the post-Cold War Era: Regionalism and 
Security,’ Asian Survey 32, no. 9 (1992): 830-847. 
19 . Walter Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and beyond (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999); Philomena Murray, ‘East Asian Regionalism and EU 
Studies,’ Journal of European Integration 32, no. 6 (2010): 597-616; Philomena Murray, 
‘Comparative Regional Integration in the EU and East Asia: Moving beyond Integration 
Snobbery,’ International Politics 47, no. 3-4 (2010): 308-323. 
20. For example, China had neither join the Washington-led NATO or the Moscow-led 
Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. See Jian Chen, Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010). 
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multilateral initiatives either at the global or regional level were directly or indirectly 
linked to the competition between the two superpowers. Beijing feared that 
participation in those multilateral organizations could seriously infringe its state 
sovereignty, which remains the highest principle in Chinese foreign policy, and 
undermine its non-alignment policy that allowed Beijing to chart an independent 
foreign policy and maintain a strategic balance between Moscow and Washington. A 
good example is that when the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was 
created in 1989 to promote free trade among the Asia Pacific countries,21 China did 
not join the first regional multilateral organization in the Asia-Pacific region prior the 
end of Cold War. Because Chinese policymakers feared that these supranational 
institutions erode state sovereignty. 
 
A positive stance (1991-2001) 
 
After the collapse of Soviet Union, the international system underwent a fundamental 
shift from bi-polarity to unipolarity and the US became the only superpower. Since 
the emergence of the unipolar system after the end of Cold War, the neoliberal 
globalization gained momentum in establishing a liberal international order in which 
the US played a global leadership role. This also resulted in a readjustment of Chinese 
foreign policy.22 In 1991, China formally joined the APEC as full member that marks 
its first step marching towards regional multilateralism. Chinese policymakers 
perceived that three preconditions were vital to the success of China’s modernization 
process. First, China should accelerate the market-oriented transition and deepen the 
Reform and Opening policy for promoting domestic growth. Second, China should 
integrate itself into the world economic system in order to learn advanced experiences 
and technologies and attract investment from the western countries for catching up 
with them. Third, while Washington sought to transform the remaining communist 
                                                
21. The APEC was originally created to promote free trade in the Asia-Pacific region in order 
to reduce economic tensions between Japan and the US and encourage political transition of 
the communist regimes in the region. See Hugh Patrick and Peter Drysdale, ‘An 
Asian-Pacific Regional Economic Organization: An Exploratory Concept Paper,’ 
(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, July 1979), prepared for the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations by the Congressional Research Service, Library of 
Congress.  
22. Zhao Quansheng, ‘Chinese Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era,’ World Affairs 159, 
no. 3 (1997): 114-129. 
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regimes through the US-led globalization,23 China’s APEC membership not only 
reflected its willingness to ‘socialize’ and integrate itself into the US-led liberal 
international order for its domestic agenda, but also to avoid becoming the next 
‘targeted adversary’ of Washington after the Soviet Union.  
  
After becoming a member of APEC, China gradually adopted a positive 
stance towards regional multilateral cooperation. China joined the Northeast Asia 
Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) in 1993 and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as 
a founding member in 1994 for promoting regional security cooperation. In 1996, 
China also joined the Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific 
(CSCAP) as full member that reflected China’s growing interests in regional 
multilateral mechanisms.24  On the one hand, after the 1989 Tiananmen Event, 
Beijing suffered economic sanction and diplomatic isolation and thus aspired to 
diversify its relations with Asian neighbours by actively participating in regional 
multilateral fora.25 On the other hand, since Beijing regarded East Asia as its primary 
geo-economic and geopolitical focus after its opening-up in the 1980s, developing 
good relations with its Asian neighbours bilaterally and multilaterally was given a 
high priority by Chinese leaders. Accordingly, pursuing ‘good neighbour policy’ 
could not only boost its political and diplomatic relations with East Asian countries 
but also bolster its economic development. 26  Especially while most of Asian 
countries remained the allies and partners of Washington, maintaining a good 
relationship with its Asian neighbours was essential for Beijing to avoid being 
isolated and marginalized and improve strategic environment in its periphery.        
 
                                                
23. Ralph A. Cossa, ‘US Approaches to Multilateral Security and Economic Organizations in 
the Asia-Pacific,’ US Hegemony & International Organizations (2003): 193-215; Amitav 
Acharya and E. Goh, Reassessing Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: Competition, 
Congruence, and Transformation (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2007). 
24 . Taek Goo Kang, ‘Assessing China's Approach to Regional Multilateral Security 
Cooperation,’ Australian Journal of International Affairs 64, no. 4 (2010): 406-431; 
Cheng-Chwee Kuik, ‘Multilateralism in China's ASEAN Policy: its Evolution, Characteristics, 
and Aspiration,’ Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, no. 1 (2005): 102-122. 
25. Joseph Fewsmith, China since Tiananmen: The Politics of Transition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
26. Xiaoming Zhang, ‘The Rise of China and Community Building in East Asia,’ Asian 
Perspective 30, no. 3 (2006): 129-148. 
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When the Asian financial crisis erupted in 1997, most Asian economies that 
were loosely interconnected within the East Asian production network suffered 
serious damage. The existing multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the 
IMF failed to provide either financial assistance or alternative solutions to countering 
the crisis. After China refused to depreciate the RMB, it successfully prevented 
proliferation and spread of currency crises in the region. Given its rising economic 
weight, Beijing’s move not only stabilized the East Asian economy but also 
accelerated recovery of regional growth that was highly recognized by other Asian 
countries. The leaders of East Asian countries including China came to realize that 
there was a necessity for East Asian countries to establish a regional multilateral 
mechanism for promoting regional cooperation and resisting financial volatility.27 In 
1997, the ASEAN plus Three process, including the ASEAN and China, Japan, and 
South Korea, was formally launched to institutionalize regional multilateral 
cooperation in East Asia. The APT was the cornerstone of promoting regional 
economic integration towards building an East Asian community.28 Since then, 
regional multilateral initiatives began to proliferate in Asia.29 
 
It is undisputed that the 1997 Asian financial crisis served as a catalyst for 
Beijing to firmly embrace regional multilateralism. On the sidelines of the ASEAN 
Plus Three process, China launched the China-ASEAN summit (ASEAN plus One) to 
boost its ties with Southeast Asian countries. Also in 1999, the leaders of China, 
Japan and South Korea attended a trilateral meeting for fostering cooperation in 
Northeast Asia that laid a foundation as the first step for establishing a Trilateral 
Cooperation mechanism.30 In 2001, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji first proposed 
                                                
27. John Ravenhill, ‘A Three Bloc World? The New East Asian Regionalism,’ International 
Relations of the Asia-Pacific 2, no. 2 (2002): 167-195. 
28. Yunling Zhang, ‘Emerging New East Asian Regionalism,’ Asia Pacific Review 12, no. 1 
(2005): 55-63; Richard Stubbs, ‘ASEAN Plus Three: Emerging East Asian 
Regionalism?,’ Asian Survey 42, no. 3 (2002): 440-455; Amitav Acharya, ‘Ideas, Identity, and 
Institution-building: from the ‘ASEAN Way’to the ‘Asia-Pacific Way?,’ The Pacific 
Review 10, no. 3 (1997): 319-346; Baogang He, ‘East Asian Ideas of Regionalism: A 
Normative Critique,’ Australian Journal of International Affairs 58, no.1 (2004): 105-125. 
29. John Ravenhill, ‘The ‘New East Asian Regionalism’: A Political Domino Effect,’ Review 
of International Political Economy 17, no. 2 (2010): 178-208. 
30. In 1999, the Japanese Prime Minister Keizō Obuchi proposed a meeting of leaders of the 
three countries on the sidelines of the ASEAN plus Three Summit. The first Trilateral 
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establishing a China-ASEAN free trade area for promoting trade and growth. Beijing 
was convinced that while the globalization process prompts increasing economic 
interdependence among states, regional multilateral cooperation provides a vital 
mechanism not merely to counter the external risks but also to promote regional 
economic integration in East Asia that serves common interests of the involved 
parties. For Beijing, regional economic integration promises a new trade agenda for 
boosting its export growth and stimulating the development of its industrial sectors. 
Because regional economic integration not only expands market access but also 
increases productivity and competitiveness. For other Asian countries, China not only 
remains a huge export market but also the most attractive destination of FDI given its 
low labour costs. More importantly, regional economic integration can further 
consolidate the East Asian production network, promoting regional growth and 
prosperity.       
 
As a matter of fact, China’s growing engagement in regional multilateral 
initiatives was motivated by an effort to institutionalize its periphery strategy, since 
regional multilateral mechanism provides a venue to combine economic, political and 
strategic dimensions. First, deepening and broadening regional multilateral 
cooperation was essential for Beijing to fully integrate into the East Asian production 
network, increase market access and promote export growth for its sustaining 
economic growth in the incoming three decades.31 Second, Beijing sought to build 
political trust and friendly relationship with its Asian neighbours through regional 
multilateral mechanism, calming fears and suspicions of those Asian neighbours and 
reassuring them of the peaceful nature of its rising power given its past support for 
communism revolution in the region. 32  For instance, Beijing’s participation in 
regional multilateral institutions allowed it not only to block any agenda detrimental 
to its interests but also reaffirm its commitments to regional peace and stability. Third, 
regional multilateralism provided a way for Beijing to preserve its national security 
and create a stable and favourable international environment for its modernization 
                                                                                                                                      
Summit was formally held in 2008 in Fukuoka. The Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat was 
established in 2011 for promoting cooperation in Northeast Asia. 
31. Yang Jiang, ‘China's Pursuit of Free Trade Agreements: Is China Exceptional?’ Review of 
International Political Economy 17, no. 2 (2010): 238-261. 
32. David Shambaugh, ‘China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,’ International 
Security 29, no. 3 (2005): 64-99. 
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process.33 Among those, the economic factor was the primary driving force for 
Beijing’s embrace of regional multilateralism during this period.           
 
 
A proactive stance (2001-2013) 
 
Since the beginning of 2000s when Chinese economy started to take off, Beijing took 
a proactive attitude towards regional multilateralism. In April 1996, the leaders of 
China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan created the Shanghai Five 
mechanism in order to enhance cooperation on the demarcation of boundaries, 
confidence-building measure, and regional security.34 In June 2001, China, Russia 
and five Central Asian states formally founded the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization to institutionalize regional multilateral cooperation in Central Asia after 
admitting Uzbekistan as full member. During the Saint-Petersburg summit in June 
2002, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Charter that defines the structure, 
purpose and tasks of the organization was approved by the six SCO members. By 
expanding membership and enlarging the scope of cooperation, the SCO has become 
                                                
33. Yunling Zhang and Shiping Tang, ‘China’s Regional Strategy,’ Power Shift: China and 
Asia’s New Dynamics (2005), p. 48. 
34. The Shanghai five was only a very loose grouping with limited scope of cooperation, 
limited degree of institutionalization, and limited influence. China's involvement in Shanghai 
five was also limited to problem-solutions such as territorial disputes and reduction of 
military deployment in the border area among five states during the 1996-2000 when Beijing 
was keen to woo Washington for approving China's accession to the WTO and mitigating 
strategic pressure in East Asia after Taiwan Strait crisis. In attempting to join the NATO and 
integrate into Europe, Moscow also adopted a very pro-western foreign policy during the era 
of Yeltsin until Putin took power in 2000. The creation of SCO happened to coincide pretty 
nearly with Washington’s invasion into Afghanistan and increased military presence in 
Central Asia. That was a vital catalyst for Beijing and Moscow to intensify efforts to 
institutionalize regional multilateral cooperation within the SCO. Both Beijing and Moscow, 
on the one side, supported Washington's anti-terror war in a moral sense and on the other 
side, strengthened cooperation within the SCO to counter the US’s expanding influence in 
Central Asia. Thus, the Shanghai five is only included as a part of the historical background 
of the SCO. See Matthew Oresman, ‘Catching the Shanghai Spirit,’ Foreign Policy 142, 
(2004): 78-79; Dmitri Trofimov, ‘Shanghai Process: From the Five ‘to the Cooperation 
Organization. Summing up the 1990s and Looking Ahead,’ Central Asia and the Caucasus 2, 
no. 14 (2002): 86-92. 
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the most influential regional multilateral organization across the region. China played 
a leading role in initiating, promoting and institutionalizing regional multilateral 
cooperation35 as the SCO offers a vital mechanism to advance its interests in Central 
Asia and manage its cooperation and competitive relationship with major powers: 
Russia and the US.   
 
Xinjiang issue is the primary factor for China to promote reginal multilateral 
cooperation within the SCO. Since the 1990s, Xinjiang, sharing a long boundary with 
the former Soviet republic states, suffered the flourishing of ‘Three Evils’, namely 
extremism, separatism and terrorism, that posed a serious threat to the border security 
and political stability in the western frontier of China.36 In particular, separatist and 
terrorist activities conducted by the Turkic-speaking Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang, 
who struggle for Xinjiang interdependence, endangered stability and security of 
Xinjiang. As the three evils have a close linkage with Pan-Turkic separatism, Islamic 
extremism and terrorism across the border of Central Asian states, they require a 
multilateral mechanism to strengthen cooperation on combating them. After the 
launching of the SCO, the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) was established 
in Tashkent to coordinate multilateral cooperation on counterterrorism, intelligence 
sharing and regional security. Multilateral cooperation within the SCO already 
expanded from traditional security to non-traditional security, such as cross-border 
crimes and drug trafficking, mitigating the threats of three evils and fostering security 
and stability in the western frontier of China.     
 
The energy factor also plays a crucial role in China’s active attitude towards 
the SCO.37 Central Asia is one of the richest areas of energy resources in the world. 
As one of the world’s largest energy consumer, China desires to consolidate energy 
ties with Central Asian states. In 1997, China and Kazakhstan signed an agreement to 
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Jing-Dong Yuan, ‘China's Role in Establishing and Building the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO),’ Journal of Contemporary China 19, no. 67 (2010): 855-869. 
36. Colin Mackerras, ‘Xinjiang at the Turn of the Century: The Causes of Separatism,’ Central 
Asian Survey 20, no. 3 (2001): 289-303; Ariel Cohen, The Dragon Looks West: China and the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Washington D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 2006). 
37 . Thrassy N. Marketos, China's Energy Geopolitics: The Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization and Central Asia (London: Routledge, 2008). 
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construct the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline running from Kazakhstan’s Caspian 
shore to Xinjiang. The construction of the pipeline was completed in May 2006 and 
became operational in September 2009.38 During Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit 
to Kazakhstan in June 2003, both countries agreed to construct the Kazakhstan–China 
gas pipeline along the Kazakhstan–China oil pipeline. In April 2007, China and 
Uzbekistan signed an agreement to construct the Uzbekistan section of the 
China-Central Asian gas pipeline. Three months later, Turkmenistan announced to 
join the pipeline project that connects Xinjiang and Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan. The whole gas pipeline became operational in December 2009. While 
rapid economic growth drives China’s mounting need for energy, 
Chinese-Central Asia energy cooperation has strategic importance for Beijing to 
diversify its energy suppliers and routes, reduce its dependence on energy imports 
from the Persian Gulf and increase its energy security.39   
 
China’s approach towards the SCO is also driven by geopolitical factors. 
Central Asia is geographically located at the heart of the Eurasian landmass that 
makes it a geopolitical battlefield of the Great Game. After the end of Cold War, there 
existed a vacuum of power in Central Asia when Russia and former Soviet republics 
suffered either economic collapse or social disorder and political chaos. But China 
was prudent to expand its influence in Russia’s traditional sphere of influence as 
Beijing saw Moscow as a strategic ally to counter the American hegemony in the 
aftermath of the Cold War. 40  When the US launched an anti-terror war in 
Afghanistan against the Taliban regime after the attack of 11 September 2001, 
Washington greatly increased its military presence in Central Asia. The US not only 
deployed a number of troops in Central Asia, but also gained a permit to use the air 
bases of Karshi-Khanabad in Uzbekistan and Manas in Kyrgyzstan. It was the first 
time for Washington-led NATO to expand its military presence surrounding the 
boundary of China that caused serious concerns in Beijing. Moscow also regarded the 
NATO’s military presence in Central Asia as a threat to its security interests even if 
                                                
38. Xuanli Liao, ‘Central Asia and China’s Energy Security,’ China and Eurasia Forum 
Quarterly 4, no. 4 (2006): 61-69. 
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both Beijing and Moscow supported Washington’s anti-terror war. In this respect, the 
SCO serves as a key platform for Beijing and Moscow not merely to enhance 
multilateral cooperation within the SCO to counter the spreading of terrorism in 
Afghanistan in Central Asia,41 but also forge a stronger strategic alliance to resist 
Washington’s expansion in the region.42     
 
China also seeks to promote regional economic integration through the SCO. 
At the Bishkek summit in September 2003, the SCO member states signed a 
framework agreement to enhance economic cooperation in the SCO. Chinese premier 
Wen Jiabao proposed establishing a free trade area within the SCO but it was not fully 
supported by other members. Despite that, Beijing has become the largest trading 
partners and investor of Central Asian states that greatly expanded its influence across 
the region. 43  Since the foundation of SCO in 2001, the scope of multilateral 
cooperation expanded from security to military, defense, foreign affairs, economic, 
cultural, banking areas. And the SCO already established relations with other 
international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS). 44  While Pakistan, India, Iran, Mongolia, Belarus 
Afghanistan subsequently received observer status in the SCO, Armenia, Azerbaijan 
Cambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Turkey were granted dialogue partner status. Among 
those, Turkey is a member of NATO. At the historic Astana summit in June 2017, 
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India and Pakistan have officially joined the SCO as full members. The expanded 
membership allows Beijing to increase its influence from Central Asia to South Asia, 
West Asia and Middle East, advancing its strategic interests in a wider context.    
        
A proactive stance (2013-present) 
 
Having experienced rapid economic growth over three decades from the 1980s to the 
2010s, China has emerged as a regional and global power. When China’s global 
profile is changing dramatically, Beijing has adopted a proactive stance towards 
regional multilateralism. In September 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed 
establishing the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ during his visit to Kazakhstan. When 
addressing to the Indonesian Parliament during his visit to Jakarta in October 2013, 
President Xi proposed the 21th Century Maritime Silk Road. The two proposals are 
collectively termed as the Belt and Road Initiative. One month later, the BRI was 
formally put into the Decision concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform 
which was approved by Chinese leadership during the third Plenum of the 18th 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in Beijing.45 Obviously, the 
BRI has been given a top priority in Chinese foreign policy since its inception. 
Regional multilateralism has become a new paradigm for Chinese foreign policy as 
the institutionalization of regional multilateral cooperation provides an innovative 
approach for Beijing to advance its regional and global interests.  
  
Geoeconomic factors are the primary driving force for the BRI. Since the 
1980s, the eastern coastal regions have become the most dynamic area of Chinese 
economy due to their geographical advantage and facilitated access to resources and 
regional markets. When labor, capital and resources moved to the eastern regions over 
time, the landlocked western regions remained underdeveloped.46 The increasing 
imbalance of regional development posed a great challenge to the sustainability of 
economic growth and social stability in China. Moreover, China launched a ‘Go out’ 
strategy since 1999 to promote overseas investment of Chinese firms and increase its 
global economic presence, but it only achieved limited success due to the lack of a 
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coherent strategy at a national level.47 Also since 2012, Chinese economy underwent 
a dramatic fall because of global recession while suffering serious industrial 
overcapacity due to shrinking global demand. This marked the most serious economic 
challenges facing China in the past three decades. In order to resolve these problems, 
China sought to shape a mega geoeconomic agenda to promote development of 
underdeveloped western regions, boost trade and investment across Eurasia, tackle 
industrial overcapacity, and revive its sluggish growth by establishing the BRI and 
exploring new markets in Asia, Africa and Europe. 
 
The BRI is shaped by geopolitical factors. Since the 1980s, the periphery 
diplomacy is at the core of Chinese foreign policy. At the October 2013 Work Forum 
on Foreign Affairs,48 President Xi stressed the importance of periphery diplomacy in 
strengthening relations with the neighboring countries on the basis of intimacy, 
honesty, benefaction, and inclusiveness. The BRI that enhances regional multilateral 
cooperation in Eurasia offers a way for Beijing to ‘institutionalize’ its periphery 
strategy. In pursuing the common development through a new model of win-win 
cooperation, China’s endeavor to broaden economic relations with the BRI countries 
not merely deepens political ties with those Eurasian countries and ensures security 
and stability surrounding its periphery, but also enables Beijing to translate its 
economic power into political power and expand its geopolitical influence across the 
landmass. Historically, the ancient Silk Road connected the Chinese and Roman 
empires through Mesopotamia and Central Asia had considerably spread the Chinese 
civilization to the rest of world through trade and cultural exchanges during the 3rd – 
15th century BC.49 The BRI, a modern vision for ancient Silk Road, demonstrated 
Beijing’s aspiration not only to reaffirm its geopolitical interests in the heartland of 
the world, but also to recover the glorious moment of the ‘Middle Kingdom’ and 
regain its position in the world.    
 
China’s approach towards the BRI is shaped by geostrategic factors. When 
China’s growing power is reshaping the international relations of East Asia, its rising 
clout is perceived by Washington as a great challenge to its dominance in the region. 
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After Obama took office in 2009, Washington devised a ‘Pivot to Asia’ to reaffirm its 
strategic interests in Asia and contain the rise of China. This policy not only limited 
Beijing’s ability to project power in the region but also seriously undermined its 
security environment. The substance of such a pivot is to constrain Beijing’s ambition 
for regional hegemony and to preserve Washington’s preeminence in East Asia. In 
this context, the BRI can be a ‘Pivot to Europe’ strategy for Beijing not merely to 
counterbalance the ‘Pivot to Asia’ and avoid a direct confrontation with Washington 
in East Asia, but also a geostrategic imperative to expand its influence from East Asia 
to other parts of Eurasia.50 In an effort to establish an infrastructure web of ports, 
roadways, railways and power grids and energy pipelines along the Silk Road and 
promote the interconnectivity of Asian, European and African continents, Beijing 
seeks to build a network of global partnership with all the BRI countries for 
enhancing its economic and political presence across the continent and expanding its 
strategic hinterland. In particular, the sea-based Silk Road allows Beijing to transform 
from a continental power to a strong maritime power and undermine American 
maritime dominance in the Indo-Pacific region.51       
 
The BRI is a new grand strategy for Beijing to promote its great power status 
and achieve its peaceful rise.52 Since Xi Jinping took power in 2012, Chinese foreign 
policy experienced a significant shift from the ‘Keeping a low profile’ to ‘Striving for 
achievements’.53 In his article on Xi Jinping’s Thought on Diplomacy, China’s State 
Councilor Yang Jiechi mentioned the strategic goals for China's external work in a 
new era: “General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out in explicit terms that we are closer 
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than ever to the center of the global stage, that we are closer than ever to fulfilling the 
Chinese dream of national renewal and that we are more confident and able than ever 
to realize this goal”.54 It is not surprisingly that while emerging as a global force, 
China desires to assume a more prominent role in regional and global affairs. To 
achieve this goal, China has been increasingly involving in multilateral diplomacy at 
regional and global levels in all efforts to build a global network of partnership and 
improve global governance system. 55  Professor Yang Baoyun of Thailand's 
Thammsat University points out that: “China seeks to reinforce its role in 
strengthening international cooperation, maintaining global security and building a 
fairer and more reasonable international order.”56 The BRI proposed by President Xi 
can be a strategic maneuver to advance China’s global ambition.  
 
 
Research questions and hypotheses 
 
Regional multilateralism is far from a new phenomenon in international relations. 
Although there exists extensive literature on the study of regional multilateralism in 
Asia, most of the research explored the shape and substance of regional 
multilateralism in Asia merely from a political or economic perspective that has 
limited explanatory power for two reasons. First, although the market-driven 
globalization is the primary driving force for the development of regional 
multilateralism,57 economic motivation fails to fully explain the proliferation of 
regional multilateral initiatives in Asia as it neglects the security dimension. Second, 
since regional multilateral cooperation involves not only economic and political but 
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also security factors,58 it is not clear whether they could serve as either a catalyst or 
obstacle to regional multilateral process in Asia, and how they could influence the 
formulation of a country’s foreign policy. In this dissertation, it argues that regional 
multilateralism is a complex process to collectivize interests, demand and autonomy 
of all the regional actors.59 And the dynamic interactions of states inside and outside 
institutions can shape the international relations regionally and globally and affect the 
country’s foreign policy behavior.  
 
To further develop this area of study empirically and theoretically, the present 
thesis tries to make a contribution to the literatures on Chinese foreign policy and the 
role of regional multilateralism in international relations by exploring the logic of 
China’s increasing engagement with regional multilateralism, and by providing new 
insight into how ideas, interests, and institutions influence the country’s foreign 
policy behavior and reshape the international relations between states inside and 
outside regional multilateral institutions. The importance of studying the logic of 
China’s activism in regional multilateral cooperation and the role of regional 
multilateralism in its foreign policy can be grasped by China’s growing role in global 
affairs and its implications for a new world order. In order to establish a research 
framework, this section raises the main research questions and provides some 
preliminary ideas and arguments to understanding the logic of China’s growing 
enthusiasm for regional multilateralism in East Asia, Central Asia and Eurasia.  
 
 
Research questions 
 
Chart 1 illustrates the evolution of Chinese foreign policy in regional multilateralism 
during the period from 1978 to present.60 It is observed that China has become 
increasingly active in establishing, developing and institutionalizing regional 
multilateral cooperation in the surrounding regions. While China’s power is 
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continuing to grow, its foreign policy towards regional multilateralism also shifted 
from a passive stance to a positive, active and proactive stance in the past three 
decades. At the same time, the geographical scope of China’s involvement in regional 
multilateral cooperation also expanded from East Asia to Central Asia and the 
Eurasian landmass. It means that China’s rising power is closely correlated to its 
growing engagement with regional multilateral cooperation through which China 
seeks to advance its varied national interests. In essence, China’s activism in regional 
multilateralism is strongly shaped by a synthesis of domestic, regional and global 
factors involving various geo-economic, geopolitical and geostrategic interests. 
 
In the first phase, China adopted a passive stance towards regional multilateral 
cooperation during the Cold War when the country was fully dedicated to handle 
domestic problems at the early stage of reform and opening policy, including 
recovering from the political turbulence of the ‘Cultural Revolution’ and transitioning 
from a planned economy to market economy. The ideological ‘struggle’ between the 
communist and capitalist blocs and China’s ‘isolationist’ foreign policy during the 
Cold War considerably shaped China’s prudent attitude towards regional multilateral 
cooperation. With its fear of the potential erosion of the state sovereignty and 
autonomy, Beijing consistently adhered to a Non-alignment policy and rejected to 
join any forms of multilateral organizations dominated by Washington and Moscow. 
In addition, China was considered an autocracy and long isolated by the international 
community diplomatically and politically. Accordingly, China developed its foreign 
relations with the world at a bilateral level.  
 
In the second phase, China adopted a positive stance towards regional 
multilateralism during the 1991-2001 and participated in various multilateral fora 
such as the APEC, ASEAN plus three, ASEAN plus China, and Trilateral 
Cooperation. Chinese policymakers believed that the success of ‘four modernizations’ 
lies in two main preconditions: establishment of market economic system and 
integration into the US-dominated global system. As China was only a regional power 
with limited global interests, East Asia was given a strategic priority in its foreign 
policy agenda. Thus, China strived to integrate self into the regional and world 
economic system to boost domestic reforms and economic growth by proactively 
participating in regional multilateral cooperation and institutions in East Asia. During 
this period, the economic motivation played a central role in shaping China’s positive 
stance towards regional multilateralism as it enabled Beijing to increase market access, 
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promote trade and investment and deepen regional economic cooperation and 
integration.  
 
In the third phase, China adopted an active stance towards regional 
multilateralism during the 2001-2013 and created the first regional multilateral 
organization, namely the SCO. For a long time, East Asia was given a high priority in 
China’s periphery strategy to establish its dominant role in the region. When China’s 
power grew dramatically since the early 2000s, the country intended to advance its 
strategic interests in a wider context and expand power and influence in its periphery 
by promoting regional multilateral cooperation. Given the strategic importance of 
Central Asia, the institutionalization of regional multilateral cooperation within the 
SCO not only helps Beijing to combat the ‘three evil’ and ensure the border security, 
but also increase market access, diversify energy supplies and expand its power and 
influence from East Asia to Central Asia. With its growing economic and military 
power, the SCO is considered to be the first attempt of Beijing to take its leadership 
role in multilateral institution. 
 
In the fourth phase, China adopted a proactive stance towards regional 
multilateralism since the beginning of early 2010s and initiated the BRI and the 
AIIB.61 Since 2013, China has replaced the US’s position as the world’s largest 
economy and become the largest partner of all Asian countries.62 While China’s 
rising power continues to grow, the country aspires to play a greater role in 
international affairs. After Chinese foreign policy underwent a dramatic shift from the 
‘Keeping a low profile’ to ‘Striving for achievements’ in the era of Xi Jinping, 
establishing the BRI and AIIB is part of China’s efforts not only to expand its power 
and influence in Eurasia and globally, but also to enhance the legitimacy of its rising 
power and strengthen its global leadership role. Especially when the world order is 
experiencing a dramatic change, the BRI is a new grand strategy for Beijing to regain 
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its great power status and restore its rightful place in the world, achieving its peaceful 
rise.    
 
The above analysis suggests that China’s involvement in regional 
multilateralism is an ongoing process with increasing intensity and velocity as 
China’s power continues to grow economically, politically and militarily. Regional 
multilateralism has been a new paradigm for Chinese foreign policy. Such a change of 
Chinese foreign policy has attracted global attention among scholars and 
policymakers. What explains China’s growing activism in regional multilateralism? 
What is the role of regional multilateral institutions in Chinese foreign policy? Can 
regional multilateralism be conductive to China’s peaceful rise? Building on the 
international relations theories, this dissertation will address three main questions:        
 
(1) What are the motivations and calculations behind China’s evolving foreign policy 
towards regional multilateralism in East Asia, Central Asia and Eurasia?  
 
(2) What are the relevance and significance of regional multilateralism in managing 
the cooperative and competitive relationship between China and other major powers 
and its peaceful rise?  
 
(3) What are the success and limits of China’s embrace of regional multilateralism in 
achieving its key foreign policy objectives?  
 
Research hypotheses  
 
The rising role of regional multilateralism in Chinese foreign policy has triggered a 
widespread debate among scholars and policymakers. In addressing the above 
questions, the main purpose of this dissertation is to explore the logic of China’s 
growing engagement with regional multilateral cooperation in East Asia, Central Asia 
and Eurasia from a perspective of International Relations by conducting three case 
studies involving the ASEAN Plus Three mechanism (APT), the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In particular, 
this work aims to shed some light on how ideas, interests and institutions affect the 
country’s foreign policy behavior and reshape the international relations between 
states inside and outside regional multilateral institutions. To achieve these objectives, 
this section provides some preliminary ideas and arguments on explaining China’s 
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approaches towards regional multilateralism in East Asia, Central Asia and Eurasia 
that will be further examined in the three individual chapters devoted to case studies. 
This research intends to offer a depth and breadth of understanding of the role of 
regional multilateralism in international relations, particularly in China’s foreign 
policy.   
 
 
Case I: China’s approach towards the APT 
 
In East Asia, China has become a major actor in regional multilateral institutions 
since the early 1990s. Prior to the 1997 Asian financial crisis, China has participated 
in various regional multilateral fora such as the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation 
in 1991, the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) in 1993, the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994, and the Council for Security and Cooperation in the 
Asia Pacific (CSCAP) in 1996. After the 1997 Asian financial crisis, China actively 
engaged in regional multilateral mechanisms such as the ASEAN Plus Three process 
in 1997, ASEAN Plus China in 1997, Trilateral Cooperation in 1998, and East Asian 
Summit in 2005. The APT process is a new East Asian regionalism driven not only by 
common demand and interest of East Asian countries to counter their vulnerabilities 
to external financial risk and shocks and the consciousness to build an East Asian 
identity, but also by a reactive strategy to establish a regional multilateral mechanism 
against other regional blocs such as the European Union (EU) and the North America 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).63 
 
After the international system underwent a shift from bipolarity to unipolarity 
at the end of the Cold War, the wave of globalization and trade liberalization created 
today’s liberal international economic order based on the ‘Washington Consensus’. 
Such a transformation of the global system had resulted in a change of China’s 
foreign policy from bilateralism and multilateralism to regional multilateralism. 
While regional multilateral cooperation in East Asia became more institutionalized 
over time, China adopted an active attitude towards deepening and broadening 
regional multilateral cooperation in various domains. It was widely believed that 
China’s activism in regional multilateralism in East Asia is driven by a strong desire 
to integrate itself into the regional and global economy, create a peaceful and 
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favourable international environment, and accelerate domestic reforms, economic 
growth and modernization process.64 But it is not a full story. In essence, China’s 
growing engagement in regional multilateral cooperation serves as a means to manage 
its complicated relations with Washington and other Asian countries as its rising 
power is transforming the existing order and creating a new power structure in East 
Asia65 that has caused anxiety, fear and mistrust.        
 
 
Case I: Preliminary arguments 
 
After reviewing the existing literature on regional multilateralism and highlighting its 
theoretical foundations in chapter two, chapter three uses the concept of institutional 
balancing to address the following questions: what are the motivations and 
calculations of China’s approach towards regional multilateralism in East Asia? How 
does China reshape the international relations of East Asia by leveraging asymmetric 
economic power? How does China advance its geo-economic, geopolitical and 
geostrategic interests in East Asia through a regional multilateral approach? How is 
regional multilateral cooperation strategically and tactically used by Beijing as a 
vehicle of institutional balancing to undermine the US primacy without causing a 
hegemonic war? What are the success and limits of China’s use of regional 
multilateralism as a tool to advance its strategic interests in East Asia and manage its 
cooperative and competitive relationship with Washington and its Asian neighbors? 
 
Since the end of Cold War, the ultimate goal of American foreign policy is to 
acquire and maintain preeminent power over various rivals regionally and globally.66 
In East Asia, Washington’s hub-and-spoke system of bilateral military alliances and 
its forward-deployed military forces has played a vital role in preserving the US 
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primary in the region since the Cold War.67 When China’s growing economic and 
military power is upsetting the status quo of the Asian security architecture, it has 
triggered off a strategic competition between Beijing and Washington for power and 
influence.68 The former sees in the latter a major threat to its rise and core interests, 
while the latter considers the former a challenger to its dominant status in East Asia. 
In particular, China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea has not merely 
increased the perceptions of China’s threat in the region but also altered geopolitical 
environment in its periphery.69 On the one hand, Washington’s unchallengeable 
military power and its strategic containment present a security dilemma for China’s 
peaceful rise.70 On the other hand, China’s expanding power and influence arouse 
serious concerns of other Asian countries about its hegemonic aspiration even if 
Beijing reiterated its commitments to peaceful rise.71  
 
When East Asian countries’ perceptions of the China threat have consolidated 
the US military presence in Asia and seriously endangered China’s security 
environment, it presents Beijing with a security dilemma for its peaceful rise. In this 
context, Beijing pursues a strategy not only to ensure its security, mitigate its strategic 
pressure, but also build its influence and reshape the geopolitical balance of East Asia 
to its strategic interests. As indicated in Chart 2, the third chapter argues that China’s 
approach towards regional multilateralism in East Asia is motivated by a strategy of 
institutional balancing to deal with its cooperative and competitive relationship with 
Washington and other Asian countries. As China as a rising power does not possess 
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the military might to challenge American dominance in East Asia through hard 
balancing, regional multilateral institutions are used strategically and tactically as a 
vehicle of institutional balancing,72 a new form of soft balancing, to counter coercion 
and threats from Washington and undermine its dominance. More importantly, 
Beijing’s embrace regional multilateralism in East Asia allows it to build its 
prominent role without directly provoking Washington.  
 
Regional multilateral regimes provide a vital platform to facilitate cooperation 
among the participating actors towards common objectives. In particular, the 
institutionalization of regional multilateral cooperation is helping Beijing to establish 
asymmetric economic interdependence over other Asian countries, reassure those 
countries of the peaceful nature of its rising power, and deter those countries to form 
any anti-China coalition or join a US-led alliance against China. First, regional 
multilateral cooperation will enhance asymmetric economic interdependent linkage 
between China and other Asian neighbors that enables Beijing to translate its 
economic power into political power and build its leadership role in East Asia. 
Second, Beijing’s proactive engagement in regional multilateral cooperation serves as 
a ‘self-restraint’ strategy to reassure its Asian neighbors that China’s rise is not a 
threat instead of an opportunity to regional prosperity and stability, underlining its 
role as a peaceful and responsible power. Third, regional multilateral cooperation that 
enhances asymmetric interdependence allows Beijing to leverage its power and 
influence to its strategic interests and deter the formation of anti-China coalitions at 
the expense of Washington’s influence. Accordingly, regional multilateral institutions 
provide a creative way for Beijing to reassure friends and balance foes, undermining 
the US dominance.   
 
By examining the success and limits of China’s approach towards regional 
multilateralism in East Asia, it can be argued that China’s use of regional multilateral 
institutions as a vehicle of institutional balancing against the US has its limits. First, 
those countries (for examples, Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines) that have 
geostrategic rivalry and territorial disputes with Beijing are prone to ally with 
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Washington to counter Beijing’s rising power.73 Second, while China emerges as a 
regional and global power, most East Asian countries adopted a hedging strategy to 
maintain strategic balance between Beijing and Washington to their interests, 
establishing a close economic link with Beijing but a strong security tie with 
Washington to attain autonomy and prevent any single power to dominate the 
region.74 Third, when China adopted assertive actions to advance its territorial claims 
in the East and South China Seas, it not only legitimized Washington’s military 
presence in East Asia but also caused those claimants to form a balancing coalition 
against China.75 This would undermine Beijing’s strategy of institutional balancing to 
enhance strategic reassurance over other Asian countries and deter them to join a 
US-led alliance against China.       
 
 
Case II: China’s approach towards the SCO  
 
In 2001, China founded the Shanghai Cooperation Organization together with Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to institutionalize regional 
multilateral cooperation in Central Asia. The origins of the SCO can be traced to the 
‘Shanghai Five’ group, which was established in 1996 to settle the border issues, 
promote mutual confidence-building, and combat the three evils in the region. Under 
the organizational structure of the SCO, several permanent organs such as the SCO 
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Secretariat in Beijing, Regional Anti-terrorist Structure (RATS) in Tashkent, SCO 
Business Council, SCO Interbank Consortium, and SCO Forum were established. The 
SCO are considering setting up the SCO Energy Club and the SCO Development 
Bank to reinforce energy and financial cooperation among the members.76 The SCO 
offers a key process to strengthen multilateral coordination through diverse types of 
high level meetings and dialogues on a regular basis. Since the foundation of SCO, 
Beijing has played a vital role in deepening and broadening multilateral cooperation 
in Central Asia in a wide range of areas. As a major power in Eurasia, China has 
certainly stake in advancing its geo-economic, geopolitical, and geostrategic interests 
across the region and the SCO serves as a vital tool to achieve its goals.   
 
The institutionalization of regional multilateral cooperation within the SCO 
reflected common demand and interest of all the members in promoting regional 
security, stability and prosperity. For Beijing, the SCO is a new model for regional 
cooperation and state-to-state relations. At the 2002 SCO Summit in St. Petersburg, 
Chinese President Jiang Zemin delivered a speech titled ‘Develop Shanghai Spirit, 
Promote World Peace’. 77  President Jiang stressed the importance of promoting 
Shanghai Spirit of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, coordination, respecting 
diversity of cultures and seeking common development. When the Five Principle of 
Peaceful Co-existence became the fundamental element of the SCO charter, the 
Shanghai spirit helps promote new norms of international relations and global security. 
In addition to manifesting the ‘Shanghai spirit’, China and Russia strongly supported 
the solidarity of the SCO in building a multipolar world order that was considered an 
opposition to the US global hegemony and unilateralism. Accordingly, the SCO 
serves as a key instrument for Beijing not only to combat ‘three evils’ and diffuse 
common norms but also to institutionalize its periphery strategy, expanding its 
influence and undermining American predominance in Central Asia and beyond.    
 
 
Case II: Preliminary arguments 
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To explore the driving force for China’s approach towards the SCO, the fourth 
chapter employs the concept of soft balancing to address the following questions: 
what are the motivations and calculations of China’s approach towards the 
institutionalization of regional multilateral cooperation in Central Asia? How does 
China reshape the international relations of Central Asia by promoting common 
interests towards common objectives within the SCO? How is the SCO used 
strategically and tactically by Beijing as a vehicle of soft balancing against the 
American hegemony? How does China advance its geo-economic, geopolitical and 
geostrategic interests in Central Asia through the SCO? How does Beijing manage its 
cooperative and competitive relationship with Moscow and Washington through the 
SCO? What are the success and limits of China’s use of the SCO as a means to 
advance its strategic interests in Central Asia and counterbalance the threats from the 
American hegemony?   
 
The SCO emerged as the first regional security organization on the scene 
when the former Soviet Central Asian republics were undergoing a profound 
transformation in the economic, political and security arenas that might influence 
Beijing’s interests in Central Asia and beyond. First, economic deterioration, poor 
governance and political chaos in the former Soviet republics led to regional 
instability since the 1990s. The spreading of three evils across the region and the 
‘color revolutions’ sponsored by the West posed a great challenge to security and 
stability of the western frontier of China. Second, after the end of Cold War, Russia 
adopted a very pro-Western foreign policy in the era of Boris Yeltsin that caused 
serious concerns in Beijing. The Chinese policymakers believed that Russia’s 
leanings towards the West might reshape the strategic balance of trilateral relations 
among Washington, Moscow and Beijing and undermine China’s strategic 
environment regionally and globally. Third, after the terror-attack of 11 September, 
the US-led NATO expanded its military presence in Central Asia that severely 
damaged geostrategic interests of both Moscow and Beijing. In particular, the military 
presence in Central Asia enables Washington not only to threat Beijing’s energy 
security but also to shape strategic encirclement of China.    
 
While facing uncertain geopolitical situation in Central Asia, Beijing’s efforts 
to institutionalize regional multilateral cooperation through the SCO are essential to 
confront with emerging security challenges, manage its cooperative and competitive 
relationship with Moscow and Washington, and advance its strategic interests in 
Central Asia. As shown in Chart 2, the fourth chapter argues that China’s approach 
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towards the SCO is motivated by a strategy of soft balancing against the hegemon.78 
When regional multilateral institution offers a mechanism to overcome the collective 
action problem and facilitate cooperation towards common interest and objective, 
rising powers like China have strong incentive to shape an interest-based coalition 
within the institution to counter the threats from American hegemony. Indeed, as it is 
too costly and risky for any rising power to directly challenge the American 
hegemony through traditional hard balancing, China makes use of the SCO as a 
vehicle of soft balancing to exclusively delay, frustrate and undermine the US 
predominance across the region. Accordingly, the SCO serves as a key instrument for 
Beijing to reshape the international relations of Central Asia and geopolitical 
landscape to its strategic interests.        
 
As the institutionalization of regional multilateral cooperation provides a 
mechanism to collectivize demand, interests and autonomy of all the members, the 
SCO is strategically and tactically used by Beijing to undermine the US hegemonic 
power. First, the SCO that enhances multilateral cooperation among the members is 
the key to resist the US’s expanding influence in Central Asia as this region has 
economic and geopolitical importance for both Beijing and Moscow. The SCO is also 
considered a counterbalance to the NATO’s expansion. Second, Beijing seeks to 
promote norms and values of the ‘Shanghai spirit’ such as ‘sovereignty’ and 
‘non-interference’ within the SCO in all efforts to counter the ‘Color Revolutions’ 
supported by Washington in Central Asia, ensuring regional security and stability. 
Promoting common norms within the SCO is clearly an opposition to increasing 
American intervention in the region, including ‘interference in other countries’ 
internal affairs’ and ‘export of models of social development’.79 Third, the SCO 
serves as a tool for Beijing and Moscow to forge a global strategic alliance for 
countering the American hegemony and shaping a multipolar world order.80  
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The SCO offers a new approach for Beijing to undertake a strategy of soft 
balancing to undermine the US global domination without directly challenging the 
hegemon. But such a strategy has its limits. First, although Beijing and Moscow has 
shared interests in countering the US predominant power in Central Asia and globally, 
Beijing’s expanding influence in the post-Soviet nations caused anxiety in Moscow. 
As Putin has aimed to regain Russia’s lost status as a great power and restore its 
influence over the post-Soviet space, it might weaken the basis of Sino-Russian 
alliance within the SCO.81 Second, when Beijing and Moscow maintain dominant 
influence in the SCO, the Central Asian countries aspire to develop their relations 
with the EU and US in order to reduce economic and political dependence on Beijing 
and Moscow. Those two factors would undermine Beijing’s efforts to isolate and 
marginalize the American influence in Central Asia. 82  Third, after India and 
Pakistan’s accession to the SCO, the territorial disputes and geopolitical rivalry 
between Beijing, Islamabad and New Delhi pose a great challenge to the solidarity of 
the SCO. In particular, the growing strategic ties between India and the US will limit 
Beijing’s attempt to undermine Washington’s influence in the region.83   
 
 
Case III: China’s approach towards the BRI 
 
In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 
21st Century Maritime Silk Road, now known as the BRI. The land-based Silk Road 
links China’s western and central regions and West Europe through Central Asia, 
West Asia, Middle East and East Europe While the sea-based Silk Road connects 
China’s eastern coast and Europe through the South China Sea, Indian Oceans, and 
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Mediterranean Sea. According to the vision and action plan for the BRI released by 
the State Council of China in 2015, the BRI aims to strengthen regional multilateral 
cooperation in the Eurasian landmass on five priority areas: “(i) policy dialogue, (ii) 
regional connectivity, (iii) trade facilitation, (iv) monetary cooperation, (v) 
people-to-people exchanges.”84 Along with the BRI, Beijing created the AIIB and the 
Silk Road Fund to provide financial support to the BRI projects.85 By establishing an 
interconnected network of economic corridors and various infrastructures projects 
such as ports, road, railway, power grid and energy pipelines along the Silk Road, 
Beijing seeks to create a mega integrated Eurasian market across Asia, Europe and 
Africa to promote continental economic integration and realize the common 
development and prosperity.   
 
 Since the launching of the BRI, China has achieved great progress towards 
the implementation of the BRI. When the first Belt and Road Forum for International 
Cooperation took place in Beijing in May 2017, China signed more than 270 
cooperation agreements with more than sixty countries and international organizations 
on jointly building the BRI.86 At the Inauguration Ceremony of Chinese Embassy in 
Panama that has just broke off diplomatic relations with Taiwan and established 
diplomatic ties with Beijing, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi delivered a speech 
and said: “as Latin America is an important natural extension of the 21st Century 
Maritime Silk Road, the joint construction of the "Belt and Road" will bring new 
opportunities for the development of China-Latin America relations.”87 It is the first 
time that Beijing made an attempt to extend the BRI as the ‘Project of Century’ from 
the Eurasian continent to Latin America that demonstrates China’s global ambition. 
Given the scope, content and significance of the BRI, the Initiative is not just a project 
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involving roads, ports, and railways, but a bold geo-economic imperative to advance 
Beijing’s geopolitical and geostrategic interests in Eurasia and globally. 
 
 
Case III: Preliminary arguments 
 
To explore the strategic calculations behind China’s approach towards the BRI, the 
fifth chapter considers the BRI a grand strategy to address the following questions: 
what are the motivations and calculations of China’s approach towards regional 
multilateral cooperation in the Eurasian landmass? How does China advance its 
geo-economic, geopolitical and geostrategic interests across the continent through the 
BRI? How are regional multilateral initiatives like the BRI used strategically and 
tactically as a vehicle of soft balancing against the US? How does China promote its 
soft power and build its role as a normative power through the BRI? How does China 
reshape global governance, transform the existing international system and enhance 
its role as a global great power through the BRI and AIIB? How does Beijing manage 
its cooperative and competitive relationship with the US and other major powers 
through the BRI? What are the success and limits of China’s use of the BRI as a 
means to advance its interests across Eurasia and achieve its peaceful rise?   
 
In essence, China’s idea of revitalizing the ancient Silk Road through the BRI 
is linked to complex interaction of domestic and international forces with a 
combination of economic, political and strategic dimensions. On the domestic level, 
China’s economy has entered a ‘new normal’ status since 2012, characterized by a 
decline of global demand and domestic industrial overcapacity. While facing new 
challenges, Xi Jinping pointed out that “China’s development is in a period of 
strategic importance. We should consolidate confidence to adapt to the new normal 
state featuring the characteristics of the current development phase of the Chinese 
economy, and keep calm while making strategies.” 88  As maintaining domestic 
growth is the key to enhancing the legitimacy of CPC and ensuring social and 
political stability in China, the BRI is given a top priority in Chinese foreign policy. 
During his inspection tour in Henan in October 2014, President Xi made the remark 
that: “The government must continue to coordinate the relations of stabilizing growth, 
promoting reforms, adjusting structure, improving people's livelihood and preventing 
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risks so as to ensure sound economic growth and social stability”.89 In this context, 
The BRI is a new economic strategy for China to readjust economic structure, 
eliminate developmental imbalance, boost overseas investment, and stimulate 
economic growth.  
 
On the international level, when the shift in the global power balance 
continues, the international system is undergoing a fundamental transformation. The 
creation of the G20 after the 2008 global financial crisis not only signaled the decline 
of US global hegemony but also reflected the urgent need to improve global 
governance. Such a global change is viewed by Chinese leadership as a period of 
strategic opportunity for China to reshape global governance system and enhance its 
leadership role in the international economic and political order. At the 2017 World 
Economic Forum in Davos, President Xi delivered a speech, saying: “the global 
economic landscape has changed profoundly in the past few decades. However, the 
global governance system has not embraced those new changes and is therefore 
inadequate in terms of representation and inclusiveness… Only when it adapts to new 
dynamics in the international economic architecture can the global governance system 
sustain global growth. Countries, big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, are all 
equal members of the international community. As such, they are entitled to 
participate in decision-making, enjoy rights and fulfill obligations on an equal basis. 
Emerging markets and developing countries deserve greater representation and 
voice.”90 In this context, the BRI put forward by Xi Jinping is not merely considered a 
strategic reaction to a rapidly transforming global order, but also a bold attempt to 
take the lead for the new globalization.      
 
As the BRI is designed with the aim of achieving complex domestic and 
international agendas, the fifth chapter argues that China’s approach towards the BRI 
is strongly motivated by a multifaceted grand strategy. Since regional multilateral 
cooperation provides a new way to transform the existing international system and 
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avoid a classic ‘Thucydides Trap’ between rising and established powers,91 the BRI 
serves as a strategic maneuver for Beijing to advance its foreign policy objectives in 
Eurasia and globally. First, the BRI is strategically and tactically used as a means of 
soft balancing to delaying, frustrating and undermining the US power in Eurasia and 
beyond92 as regional multilateral cooperation enables Beijing to establish asymmetric 
interdependence over other Eurasian partners, to reassure those partners of the 
peaceful and benign nature of its rising power and to deter the formation of any 
anti-China coalition or ‘all but China’ club. Second, China’s endeavor to promote 
alternative ideas and norms and soft power through the BRI helps delegitimize 
normative authority of the US-dominated international system but legitimize Beijing’s 
normative power, reducing perception of China threat and fostering its profile as a 
benign and responsible power. Third, China’s efforts in reshaping global governance 
system through the BRI and AIIB is driven not only by an attempt to transform the 
existing international system and promote its international status, but also by a desire 
to shape an interest-based coalition to enhance its bargaining power over Washington 
and foster its leadership role in the emerging international order. 
 
While the BRI has received a very positive response from many countries 
along the BRI, it is believed that the Initiative will considerably enhance Beijing’s 
influence in Eurasia and beyond. However, this ambitious initiative is confronted with 
several problems and challenges. First, as the BRI could expand China’s influence 
and alter the geopolitical balance across the continent, it would lead to a geopolitical 
competition between China and other regional powers and pose a great challenge to 
the implementation of BRI even if Beijing repeatedly stressed the common 
development and prosperity under the win-win model. Second, as the BRI covers 
several unstable and conflicted regions such as Central Asia and the Middle East, 
where Beijing has limited influence and military presence, it presents security threats 
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to regional connectivity and multilateral cooperation within the BRI. Third, the 
territorial disputes that Beijing holds with several countries along the Silk Road 
would undermine Beijing’s efforts to promote regional multilateral cooperation within 
the BRI.93 A good example is that the South China Sea disputes between China and 
ASEAN members might affect regional multilateral cooperation within the Maritime 
Silk Road. Fourth, political turbulences and economic dysfunction in many 
developing countries along the BRI might bring risk and political uncertainty to the 
implementation of BRI projects.       
 
 
Overview of the dissertation 
 
The rising role of regional multilateralism in Chinese foreign policy is considered a 
strategic adaptation process to the changing domestic, regional and international 
environment.94 Such a process has coincided with China’s rising power and influence. 
While its power continues to grow, China has turned into an increasingly confident 
global actor and is keen to expand its influence from East Asia and Central Asia to the 
whole Eurasian continent. Regional multilateralism has become a new paradigm for 
Chinese foreign policy as it not only provides a way for Beijing to increase security, 
assure survival and expand influence in the US-dominated international system but 
also presents an alternative path to transform the existing global system and achieve 
its peaceful rise.95 In addressing the main research questions and hypotheses, the full 
dissertation is divided into six chapters to explore the logic of China’s growing 
engagement with regional multilateralism in East Asia, Central Asia and the Eurasian 
landmass. Among those, three cases studies involving the APT, the SCO and the BRI 
have been conducted to shed some light on the role of regional multilateralism in 
international relations. To provide a brief overview of the research, this dissertation is 
structured and outlined as follows.       
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Chapter One presents an introduction of the full dissertation by providing 
some insight into the main motives, objectives, questions, and hypotheses of this 
research work. In doing so, this chapter is divided into three sections. The first section 
highlights the origin, background and evolution of China’s growing engagement in 
regional multilateral cooperation in East Asia, Central Asia and the Eurasian space 
throughout the past three decades. It argues that since the launching of reform and 
opening door policy in the 1980s, China has been growingly involving in regional 
multilateral cooperation and institutions that are closely interrelated with its complex 
domestic and international agendas. Regional multilateralism has become a new 
paradigm for Chinese foreign policy, as regional multilateral mechanism provides a 
new approach for Beijing to advance its geoeconomic, geopolitical and geostrategic 
interests in a regional and global context. The second section raises the research 
questions and provides some preliminary arguments by focusing on the three cases 
studies: (1) what are the motivations and calculations behind China’s evolving 
foreign policy towards regional multilateralism in East Asia, Central Asia and 
Eurasia? (2) What are the relevance and significance of regional multilateralism in 
managing the cooperative and competitive relationship between China and other 
major powers and its peaceful rise? And (3) what are the success and limits of 
China’s embrace of regional multilateralism in achieving its key foreign policy 
objectives? The third section gives a brief overview of the structure of dissertation 
and outlines the key element of six individual chapters of the dissertation.  
       
Chapter Two highlights the theoretical foundations of regional multilateralism 
and reviews the existing literatures. This chapter is divided into two sections. The first 
section illustrates the basic concept of regional multilateralism and the role of 
regional multilateralism in international relations from the perspectives of neorealism, 
neoliberalism and constructivism in order to provide some insight into how ideas, 
interests and institutions shape the country’s foreign policy behavior. The second 
section examines the role of regional multilateralism in Chinese foreign policy to 
address three main questions: what are China’s key foreign policy objectives behind 
China’s engagement in regional multilateralism? And what are the security and 
geopolitical dilemmas of China’s peaceful rise in a changing world? How does 
regional multilateralism play a role in Chinese foreign policy and shape the country’s 
foreign policy behavior? It argues that in pursuit of an evolving grand strategy for the 
rise of China, the four dimensions, including maximizing material power, pacifying 
the periphery, securing core interests, and promoting international status, have 
significantly shaped Chinese foreign policy in growingly engaging in regional 
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multilateral cooperation since the end of Cold War. Beijing’s activism in regional 
multilateral cooperation in East Asia, Central Asia and the Eurasian continent is 
strongly motivated by a desire to raise its national comprehensive power in both 
economic and military capabilities, ensure a stable and peaceful environment along its 
periphery, secure its core interests such as the Taiwan issue, the South China seas and 
national security, and promote its great power status in the international system.             
 
Chapter Three copes with China’s approach towards regional multilateralism 
in East Asia. By using the concept of institutional balancing, this chapter explores the 
rationale behind China’s approach towards regional multilateral cooperation in East 
Asia. It argues that China’s endeavor to promote regional multilateral cooperation in 
East Asia is motivated by a strategy of institutional balancing to delay, frustrate and 
undermine the US’s dominant power. Institutional balancing is materialized in three 
dimensions: first, China seeks to establish asymmetric interdependence overits Asian 
neighbors through the deepening of regional multilateral cooperation, leveraging its 
power and influence to its strategic interests. Second, China intends to enhance 
strategic reassurance in East Asia, as promoting regional multilateral cooperation can 
reassure its Asian neighbors of benign and peaceful nature of China’s rise and reduce 
the risk and costs of achieving its peaceful rise. Third, China attempts to deter East 
Asian states to form or join any anti-China coalitions through regional multilateral 
cooperation, undermining the American power and influence in East Asia. However, 
China’s soft balancing strategy might be constrained when it involves a complicated 
power game between Beijing, Washington and other Asian states. As East Asian 
states pursue a hedging strategy towards Beijing and Washington for preserving 
autonomy and preventing to be dominated by any single power, it is likely to 
undermine Beijing’s attempts to isolate and marginalize the American influence. In 
particular, the territorial disputes and geostrategic rivalry between China and several 
Asian states have ‘legitimized’ the US presence in East Asia.  
 
Chapter Four studies China’s strategy towards the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization. By employing the concept of soft balancing, this chapter explores the 
strategic calculations behind China’s approach towards the institutionalization of 
regional multilateral cooperation in Central Asia. It argues that China’s efforts to 
institutionalize regional multilateral cooperation within the SCO are driven by a 
strategy of soft balancing against the American hegemony. The SCO was strategically 
and tactically used as a vehicle of soft balancing to isolate, marginalize and 
undermine the US power and influence in Central Asia and beyond. This strategic 
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maneuver is materialized in three ways: first, Beijing seeks to form an interest-based 
coalition within the SCO to resist the US’s expansion in Central Asia and ensure 
security and stability of its western frontier. Second, Beijing intends to promote 
common norms such as ‘sovereignty’ and ‘non-interference’ within the SCO in all 
efforts to counter the US-supported ‘Color Revolutions’ in Central Asia. Third, 
Beijing attempts to forge a Sino-Russian strategic alliance through the SCO to foster a 
multipolar world and counterbalance the US global hegemony and unilateralism. 
However, complex geopolitics of Central Asia and the Sino-Russia competition might 
limit Beijing’s attempt to use the SCO as a tool of soft balancing to undermine the US 
hegemonic power when Beijing’s expanding influence in the former Soviet space has 
generated concerns in Moscow, and when Central Asian states are trying to diversify 
their relations with the western powers and avoid overdependence on Beijing and 
Moscow economically and politically.   
 
Chapter Five deals with China’s strategy towards regional multilateral 
cooperation in the Eurasian continent. Based on neorealist, neoliberal and 
constructivist thoughts, this chapter explores the motivations and calculations behind 
China’s approach towards the BRI. It argues that China’s efforts to promote regional 
multilateral cooperation within the BRI are strongly motivated by a multifaceted 
grand strategy in three ways. First, the BRI is used strategically and tactically by 
Beijing as a vehicle of soft balancing to frustrate the US strategic containment of 
China and undermine its predominance, as promoting regional multilateral 
cooperation within the BRI enables Beijing to establish strategic interdependence for 
reassuring friends and balancing foes. Second, China tends to promote alternative 
ideas and norms through the BRI in all efforts to foster the normative legitimacy of its 
rising power and build its role as a normative power, as Beijing believed that its rise 
relies not only on hard power but also soft power. Third, China seeks to form a 
bargaining coalition through the BRI and AIIB to reshape global governance, 
transform the existing system and boost its global role from a rule-taker to rule-maker. 
When China’s rising power is continuing to grow, the country’s interests become 
global. Logically, China aspires to play a greater role in regional and global affairs. 
Accordingly, the BRI is part of Beijing’s efforts not only to increase its security and 
expand its geopolitical influence, but also promote its great power status. However, 
the potential challenges arising from geopolitical rivalry, security threats, territorial 
disputes and political turbulence might undermine Beijing’s efforts to implement the 
BRI.  
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Chapter Six presents the main conclusions of the dissertation and further 
discusses the limited role of regional multilateralism in international relations. By 
conducting the three case studies involving the APT, the SCO and the BRI, it 
concludes that China’s approach towards regional multilateralism is strongly shaped 
by an evolving grand strategy in search for security and status, as regional 
multilateralism provides a new approach not merely to expand its power and 
influence but also reshape the international relations regionally and globally towards 
achieving its peaceful rise. First, China’s efforts to institutionalize regional 
multilateral cooperation is strongly motivated by a strategy of soft balancing to 
counter the US threats and undermine its dominance, as regional multilateral 
mechanism serves a vital instrument to establish a strategic interdependence, reassure 
partners and balance rivals. Second, regional multilateral cooperation provides a 
mechanism for Beijing to advance its geoeconomic, geopolitical and geostrategic 
interests regionally and globally, since regional multilateral regimes facilitate 
cooperation, coordination and collaboration among the involved actors towards 
common interests and objectives. Third, Regional multilateral initiatives provide 
Beijing an alternative path to build normative power and reshape global governance 
in all efforts to enhance its role as a responsible, benign and peaceful power and 
transform the existing international system in a way that reflects its values, influence 
and desired status. However, territorial disputes, complex geopolitical competition 
and dynamics of great power politics have limited Beijing’s attempts to achieve its 
foreign policy objectives through regional multilateralism. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
 
THE ROLE OF REGIONAL MULTILATERALISM IN INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS: A THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Since the Cold War, global multilateral institutions have played a central role in 
enhancing the governance of global commons and tackling global challenges in 
various areas such as trade, development, environment, climate change and security. 
Although multilateralism remains the foundation of the contemporary global system, 
multilateralism is an underdeveloped and neglected concept in the study of 
international relations.96 Indeed, multilateralism is far from a core concept as anarchy, 
sovereignty, or interdependence in the International Relations theory. James A. 
Caporaso described this subject as “a cocktail of sociology, experimental psychology, 
organization theory, and game theory”. 97  The relevant literature provides 
explanations to why multilateralism is so poorly conceptualized in the theory of 
international relations. Some scholars argue that the International Relations is an 
American-dominated discipline98 and the theory always follows from practice. But in 
practice, the US foreign policy does not have a preference for ‘multilateralism’ since 
the end of Cold War.99 Other scholars point out that multilateralism as the antique 
artwork of the Cold War is already dead100 since the WTO-based multilateral trading 
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system does not work anymore in countering rising global protectionism after the 
failure of the Doha Round Negotiations; and multilateral disarmament agreements, 
like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, have not succeeded in deterring India, 
Pakistan, and North Korea from developing nuclear weapons.101    
 
Multilateralism often refers to a variety of different forms of cooperation, 
arrangements, and institutions. In a realist world, it seems ‘clear’ that the great power 
favors unilateralism over multilateralism in advancing its global interests, whereas 
multilateralism is considered a ‘weapon of the weak’ to ensure national security 
interests.102 The main reason is that multilateralism, in the form of international 
regimes or institutions, serves to bind the great power and discourage unilateralism to 
the middle and small power’s interests. However, the great power can exert power 
and influence over the middle and small power by establishing and dominating 
multilateral institutions through rules and norms. When global multilateralism is 
experiencing a ‘crisis’, regional multilateralism emerges as a new form of 
multilateralism to strengthen dialogue and cooperation in solving regional issues. 
After the EU had great success in achieving economic and political integration since 
the end of Cold War in the 1990s, regional multilateralism gained prominence in the 
rest of the world from Asia to Africa and Latin America, making it a new paradigm in 
the international relations. In East Asia, regional multilateral cooperation proliferated 
rapidly since the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The prevalence of regional 
multilateralism triggered the theoretical debates over the role of regional multilateral 
institutions in shaping the country’s foreign policy behavior and reconstructing the 
international relations between states in a regional and global context.  
 
As observed in the previous chapter, China’s foreign policy experienced a 
dramatic shift since the 1990s, moving from bilateralism and multilateralism to 
regional multilateralism. As a rising power, China has gradually expanded its regional 
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multilateral ties from East Asia and Central Asia to the Eurasian continent. In East 
Asia, China has actively participated in regional multilateral institutions such as the 
ASEAN plus Three, ASEAN-China, East Asia Summit, and Trilateral Cooperation to 
deepen and broaden regional multilateral cooperation. In Central Asia, China has 
played a leading role in institutionalizing regional multilateral cooperation within the 
SCO in all efforts to strengthen cooperation between China, Russia and Central Asian 
states in a wide range of areas. In the Eurasian landmass, China initiated the BRI in 
order to forge its political, economic, social, and cultural ties with other Eurasian 
counties along the Silk Road and promote regional multilateral cooperation across the 
continent. China’s growing enthusiasm for regional multilateralism has attracted 
global attentions. What explains the role of regional multilateralism in Chinese 
foreign policy from the perspective of International Relations? What are the 
theoretical foundations for China’s turn to regional multilateralism? 
 
 As regional multilateralism has become a new paradigm for China’s foreign 
policy, it has triggered wide debates about the theoretical rationale for its engagement 
with regional multilateral cooperation and institutions. The purpose of this chapter is 
to illustrate the theoretical foundations of regional multilateralism and provide some 
insight into the role of regional multilateralism in shaping China foreign policy 
behavior. To achieve this objective, this chapter is divided into two sections. Section 
one highlights the concept of regional multilateralism from the perspectives of three 
international relations theories: neorealism (power-based approach), neoliberalism 
(interest-based approach), and constructivism (idea-based approach). Section two 
examines the role of regional multilateralism in Chinese foreign policy. It sheds some 
light on how the four dimensions, including maximizing material power, pacifying the 
periphery, securing core interests, and promoting international status, shape China’s 
foreign policy behavior in proactively engaging in regional multilateral cooperation in 
East Asia, Central Asia and the Eurasian landmass in pursuit of an evolving grand 
strategy for the rise of China. This helps us better understand the role of regional 
multilateralism in the international relations and provides new insight into how ideas, 
interests and institutions influence the country’s foreign policy behavior.     
 
 
Regional multilateralism and the IR theories  
 
Conceptualizing regional multilateralism  
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How do we conceptualize regional multilateralism? What makes regional 
multilateralism different from multilateralism, bilateralism, and unilateralism? What 
explains the emergence of regional multilateralism? What explains the states’ foreign 
policy preferences for multilateralism and regional multilateralism? According to 
Robert O. Keohane,103 multilateralism is defined as the practice of coordination, 
cooperation and collaboration in certain policy areas among three or more states 
through ad hoc agreements, conventions, and arrangements under the provisions of 
international institutions, organizations and regimes. John G. Ruggie argues that 
coordination, cooperation, and collaboration occur on the basis of the constitutive 
principles of indivisibility, generalization, and reciprocity among those states.104 
Although there are the different forms of multilateralism, this work only focuses on 
regional multilateralism and its role in international relations. As a subset of 
multilateralism, regional multilateralism underlines cooperation, collaboration and 
coordination among states in a specific region or continent to facilitate collective 
action towards common goals and interests under the provision of a regional 
multilateral mechanism, regime or institution.   
 
Multilateralism originally stemmed from the international organizations such 
as World Trade Organization (WTO) and United Nations (UN). A multilateral 
institution is set to bind various actors including great powers, middle powers and 
small powers to collectively coordinate the relevant policy areas. Such a multilateral 
setting serves the common interests, common demands, and common autonomy105 of 
all the involved parties under the provision of multilateral regime. Bilateralism is 
characterized with the bilateral agreements and arrangements between two states and 
it is thus described as a discriminatory setting against those actors who are excluded 
from it. Unilateralism is conceptualized as “any doctrine or agenda to support 
one-side action and measure” while multilateralism is set to pursue the multilateral 
solutions by discouraging, deterring, and countering any unilateral actions and 
measures. Accordingly, unilateralism is an antonym for multilateralism in terms of 
political philosophy and any actions and measures that are unilaterally adopted benefit 
only unilateralists’ own ‘self’ instead of a common interest. Conversely, the solutions 
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that are achieved under the multilateral coordination, cooperation and collaboration 
benefit all the involved actors. In the contemporary international system, great powers 
often act unilaterally while middle and small powers tend to resort to multilateral 
arrangements and resolutions.  
 
In a comparative perspective, multilateralism is committed to strengthen a 
much wider scope and scale of cooperation beyond any geographical limitations for a 
global agenda under the provision of multilateral institutions while regional 
multilateralism is set to foster a regional agenda within regional multilateral regimes. 
Regional multilateralism can be complementary and alternative to multilateralism 
under certain circumstance when the international system undergoes a profound 
transformation,106 when global power structure experiences a significant shift,107 and 
when great power turns to unilateralism.108 In this respect, regional multilateralism 
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can not only facilitate regional multilateral cooperation in a wide agenda but also 
effectively remedy the increasing imperfection, uncertainty and inefficiency of 
unilateralism, bilateralism and multilateralism. Raimo Väyrynen argues that 
contemporary issues and problems can be solved more effectively and efficiently at 
the regional level rather than bilateral or multilateral (global) level.109 Although 
regional multilateralism is imperfect too, it is a more pragmatic process than 
bilateralism and multilateralism as it provides a more intensive and multidimensional 
framework interconnecting various actors to facilitate dialogue, build cooperation, 
and reach consensus on tackling regional issues.    
 
Multilateralism also refers to “international governance or global governance 
of the ‘many’” in international relations and its core principle is “opposition of 
bilateral discriminatory arrangements that were believed to enhance the leverage of 
the powerful over the weak and increase international conflict”.110 In an international 
system comprising of great, middle, and small powers, the great power always resorts 
to unilateralism for its own interests when multilateralism poses a ‘barrier’ to its 
global domination. 111  On contrary, the middle and small powers prefer 
multilateralism as it serves as a key instrument to limit ‘unilateralism’ and 
‘exceptionalism’ of great power to their interests in three factors. 112  First, 
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multilateralism allows the middle and small powers to shape a bargaining coalition 
within a multilateral arrangement to oppose any form of unilateralism of the great 
power. Second, when multilateralism does not work effectively, the middle and small 
power are likely to turn to regional multilateralism as it provides a new paradigm to 
collectivize common interest, demand and autonomy for solving regional issues with 
the absence of great power’s involvement and intervention. Third, the middle power 
favors regional multilateralism over (global) multilateralism as regional multilateral 
cooperation offers a creative way not merely to reshape the international relations 
inside and outside institutions and the global balance of power, but also build its 
power and influence regionally and globally.  
 
Over the past decades, China’s evolving foreign policy experienced a dramatic 
shift from bilateralism and multilateralism to regional multilateralism that is closely 
associated with the shifting global balance of power, China’s changing role in the 
international arena and dynamic power politics in Asia and globally. As the rise of 
China is reshaping regional and global balance of power, it has triggered off a power 
competition between Beijing and other major powers that poses security and 
geopolitical challenges for its peaceful rise. In particular, when China’s rising power 
and influence is transforming the US-dominated international order, it has intensified 
Sino-US strategic competition in Asia and beyond, presenting a security dilemma to 
Beijing on how to manage its complicated relations with Washington and its rise. 
Accordingly, the questions of how to ensure a stable and peaceful international 
environment, how to legitimize its rising power, how to promote its international 
status, and how to advance its global interests in various domains without triggering a 
confrontation with established power like the US remain a top priority in China’s 
foreign policy and strategy. This thesis contends that regional multilateralism offers a 
new approach for Beijing not only to secure access to regional markets and expand its 
power and influence, but also enhance the political legitimacy of its rising power and 
reshape the balance of power regionally and globally. The three major theories of 
International Relations such as neorealism, neoliberalism and constructivism provide 
the theoretical foundation for understanding the role of regional multilateralism in 
China’s foreign policy and international relations.      
 
A neorealist hypothesis 
 
According to Kegley and Wittkopf, realism refers to “a paradigm based on the 
premise that world politics is essentially and unchangeably a struggle among 
49 
 
self-interested states for power and position under anarchy, with each competing state 
pursuing its own national interests”.113 As a power-based approach, power politics is 
at the heart of realist paradigm and highlights the nature of the domination between 
states in international relations. Kenneth Waltz argues that the anarchy is the principle 
of international system. In an anarchic world, the states struggle for the ‘relations of 
super- and subordination’ with the absence of central authority and the individual 
states are the dominant actor in international relations. The ultimate objective of a 
state’s behavior is to safeguard, maintain and maximize its power to other states for 
security and survival, seeking to dominate and influence other states to its own 
interests through military, diplomatic, economic, political and cultural means. The 
states that seek to maximize power and ensure security mainly depend on military 
capability due to the absence of rules, laws and enforcement mechanisms. 114 
Accordingly, the international system and order is shaped by power politics amongst 
and between actors, states and institutions, which are struggling for power, security 
and survival in an anarchic world.   
 
Realists assume that cooperation may happen but it is not the norm. Instead, 
the conflict is the norm in international relations. As international cooperation 
between states is limited, joining an alliance and maintaining a balance of power are a 
neorealist approach for states to advance their interests in the international system. 
Accordingly, institutions or regimes only embody the distribution of power in the 
international system and they are created only by powerful states to maintain their 
dominance over other weak states and advance their economic, security and political 
interests. For example, multilateral institutions such as the UN, GATT, World Bank 
and IMF were established by the US as a vital instrument to maintain its global 
hegemonic status and consolidate the unipolar international system.115 However, 
when the rise of new powers like the BRICS states is shifting the balance of global 
power and creating a new international order, global multilateral system might 
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become increasingly ineffective due to two factors. First, the US might prefer 
bilateralism and unilateralism over multilateralism in its foreign policy for preserving 
its global domination and unipolar moment while its hegemonic status is being eroded 
by rising powers.116 This would undermine the effectiveness and legitimacy of 
multilateral institutions. Second, as the US-dominated global system cannot reflect 
new realities in global power structure and the malfunction of multilateral governance 
system occurs, rising powers tend to create new regional multilateral regimes and 
institutions117 not merely for resolving contemporary issues at a regional level and 
remedying the effectiveness of multilateralism, but also for building power and 
influence. This has partly explained the rationales behind China’s turn from 
multilateralism to regional multilateralism. 
 
From a neorealist perspective, international institutions are often viewed as a 
means of statecraft of powerful states, underlining the role of the institutions in 
shaping the power structure of the international system.118 The existing literature 
provides explanations for China’s proactive engagement in regional multilateral 
cooperation in three aspects: bargaining power; 119  soft balancing; 120  and 
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rebalancing.121 The first argument emphasizes the importance of material power in 
increasing China’s bargaining position over other actors. Given its great size and 
enormous economic power, establishing and promoting regional multilateral 
cooperation enables Beijing to establish a relationship of asymmetric interdependence 
between China and other regional actors, enhancing its bargaining power over other 
actors inside and outside institutions and leveraging its power and influence to its 
interests. The second argument assumes that China’s engagement in regional 
multilateralism is strongly driven by a soft balancing strategy. Due to its limited 
military capability, it is too risky and costly for China to adopt a traditional hard 
balancing strategy to counter American hegemony. Regional multilateral institutions 
can be strategically and tactically used by Beijing as a vehicle of soft balancing to 
undermine the US power and influence without provoking it directly. The third 
argument finds that China’s efforts to establish, promote and institutionalize regional 
multilateral cooperation is motivated by a rebalancing strategy to counterbalance the 
negative effect of being excluded from other international institutions. For example, it 
is generally recognized that the BRI was conceived to rebalance the negative effects 
of the US-led TPP and TTIP.  
 
A neoliberal hypothesis 
 
In the IR theories, neoliberalism is an interest-based approach, supposing that states 
pursue absolute gains rather than relative gains to other states and the international 
institution facilitating cooperation and compromise between states can produce 
absolute gains for all the actors. According to Robert Keohane, neoliberal 
institutionalism is a paradigm, assuming that states pursue their overall interests by 
relying on international institutions or regimes to promote cooperation between states. 
As regimes and institutions are defined as a wide set of rules, norms and the 
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decision-making processes to connect various actors and shape policy preference,122 
it helps overcome collective action problem without eroding collective autonomy 
while pursuing collective interests towards a common objective in international 
cooperation.123 In practice, the actors adopt a common position, action and measure 
in order to achieve a common objective such as financial, trade, energy and security 
cooperation under the provisions of regional multilateral regimes with a set of explicit 
or implicit norms, rules, and processes. International institutions and regimes can 
reduce costs, form preferences, monitor processes, facilitate problem-solution and 
achieve common goals. In addition, cooperation, coordination and collaboration that 
occur between states prompt the growing interdependence that is the key incentive for 
the actors to create new regimes and institutions. 124 
 
Regime theory assumes that international cooperation is possible in the 
anarchic system. Regimes are created to institutionalize international cooperation.125 
Neorealist thought appear more pessimistic about the prospects for peace, cooperation 
and compromise in the international system whilst neoliberalists are optimistic about 
multilateral cooperation that generate absolute gains. Consequently, war and conflict 
of power politics in the international system can be substituted by the doctrine of 
peace and cooperation between states based upon an interest-based approach: 
neoliberalism. From a perspective of neoliberal institutionalism, regional multilateral 
institution can be depicted as ‘federation of liberal states’ to facilitate multilateral 
cooperation towards a convergence of interests of states. The shared interests between 
actors, states and institutions generate the complex interdependence to promote 
international cooperation that tend to build peace and cooperation, and deter war and 
conflict. The war and conflict between states can be reduced through the 
interest-based cooperation and compromise that produce mutual wins. However, 
regional multilateral regimes have a limits role when structural conflicts such as 
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territorial disputes, security, geopolitical rivalry amongst and between states exist. For 
example, the East and South China Sea disputes may impede regional multilateral 
cooperation between China and other East Asian states.  
 
From a neoliberal perspective, China’s growing involvement in regional 
multilateralism is driven by an attempt to deepen and broaden regional multilateral 
cooperation with other regional actors in a wide range of areas. It enables Beijing not 
simply to expand market access and promote economic growth but also forge stronger 
political and diplomatic ties with its Asian neighbors and advance its periphery 
strategy. Regional multilateralism provides a new paradigm for Beijing to enhance its 
periphery strategy and advance its key foreign policy objectives. As regional 
multilateral regimes and institutions facilitate cooperation towards common interests 
and goals of all the regional actors, Beijing’s participation in regional multilateral 
cooperation can be understood as a way to fortify its commitments to regional peace, 
stability and prosperity, reassure other actors of the benign nature of China’s rise, and 
reduce the perceptions of China threat arising from China’s growing power and 
influence. Since the rule- and norm-based regional multilateral regimes help enhance 
a structural and systematic interdependence between China and other actors with the 
following principles: collective objective, collective demand and collective autonomy, 
it allows Beijing to leverage its power to deter its Asian neighbors to form an 
anti-China coalition, undermine the US’s dominant influence and reshape regional 
geopolitical balance, creating a peaceful and stable international environment for its 
domestic development and modernization. Accordingly, regional multilateralism 
plays a role in reshape the international relations inside and outside institutions and 
the balance of power regionally and globally.      
 
A constructivist hypothesis 
 
In the IR theories, constructivism is a paradigm with the discipline claiming that the 
relations between states strongly rely on shared ideas, rules and norms, rather than 
material power, that determines interests and actions of actors, and the international 
relations between states are socially and historically constructed. 126  Thus, the 
construction of the international system is a dynamic process of social evaluation of 
the world that can shift over time. Constructivism is an idea-based approach with a 
focus on the convergence of ideas, norms and identities that are recognized as 
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essential for the states to shape preferences for international cooperation. International 
regimes and institutions embody the core elements of constructivist thought such as 
normative, ideational and structural dimensions between actors and underline the 
common idea, norm and identity:127 how institutions and regimes shape the identity 
of actors; how identities influence the actions and behaviors amongst and between 
actors; how norms are made to shape the relations between actors inside and outside 
institutions and the structure of the international system. Constructivists argue that the 
interaction between actors, states and institutions tends to create relatively stable 
concept of ‘self’ and ‘other’, forming the common position and preference,128 
building relationships of either friends or foes, creating a collective identity, and 
promoting common rules and norms through international organization and institution, 
even if the questions of whether and when normative convergence demands the 
creation of institutions remained disputed.129  
 
While neorealist and neoliberalist underline the role of ‘war and power’ and 
‘interest and cooperation’, constructivists take into consideration two key elements 
shaping the international order: identity and norm.130 The interactions between actors, 
states and institutions can construct the political identity of power at national, regional 
and international levels and enhance the normative legitimacy of actors, states and 
institutions in the international system. Stephen Krasner argues that as international 
institutions and regimes possess a set of rules, processes, and procedures to facilitate 
the convergence of interest, objective and action,131 it helps enhance the normative 
authority and legitimacy of power in the international system. As international 
cooperation is not only related to power (neorealist) and interest (neoliberalist), but 
also to ideas (constructivist), international institutions and regimes can reshape the 
relations amongst and between states and influence states’ foreign policy behavior. 
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For example, the creation of the Single Common Market and the European Union 
have built its European identity throughout Europe. European institutions such as the 
European Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament strive to 
build a united Europe through a set of rules, norms and treaties towards achieving 
common interests and goals of EU member states. The interaction between EU and 
other international actors will not only enhance its European identity but also build its 
role as a global actor in the international system. Another example is that the 
foundation of ASEAN has considerably fostered its regional identity.  
 
As China is considered an authoritarian state not sharing western values and 
norms, its rising power and status is hardly to be recognized by the liberal 
international order created and dominated by the West. Many western scholars 
suggest that China’s rising power poses a threat to the existing order and system, 
debating that China’s  authoritarian capitalism would undermine the western values 
of democracy and end the liberal world order.132 Indeed, the neoliberal economic 
order based on the Washington Consensus has been accepted and adopted for decades 
as the most effective model to achieve economic growth and development in the 
developing world and globally.133 That also provides the normative foundations for 
political authority and legitimacy of the US global leadership. But it presents a major 
challenge to Beijing on how China as a non-western power to construct its political 
identity and legitimacy of its rising power in the US-dominated global system. As 
regional multilateral regimes and institutions help build the political identity of power 
and strengthen the legitimacy of power in the existing international order, they 
provide a new venue for China not only to construct political identity and legitimacy 
of its rising power in the global system, but also promote a normative transformation 
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of the global system, fostering a multi-polar world order and shaping a fair, just and 
peaceful international order.  
 
 
The role of regional multilateralism in China’s foreign policy  
 
A very long time in the history, China, as one of the most ancient civilizations of 
mankind, remained at the Centre of the world stage and maintained prominent 
influence in East Asia and globally. After the Opium War in 1839, the decline and fall 
of the Qing Dynasty in the 19th and 20th century caused the infamous “century of 
humiliation”. The history also tells that: “The strong do what they can and the weak 
suffer what they must.”134 Since the Xinhai Revolutions in 1911, Chinese people 
persistently endeavored to rebuild a powerful nation and regain its historic place in 
the world as they understood a permanent doctrine of international politics: weakness 
invites aggression, and strength begets security, prestige and international status. On 1 
October 1949, Chairman Mao Zedong stood in the Tiananmen rostrum and declared 
to the world: “the Chinese people have stood up.” There is a little doubt that since the 
foundation of the PRC, Beijing has an evolving grand strategy, regaining great power 
status and achieving its rise. There is also a consensus under the leadership of Xi 
Jinping that the rise of China is a narrative equal to the rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation and China’s great power status. But if China does not rise to a global great 
power, the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is not complete. Hence, the rise of 
China that underlines the growth of material power has been the most important 
discourse in the formulation of China’s foreign policy and strategy. 
 
In pursuit of an evolving grand strategy for the rise of China,135 regional 
multilateralism has played a crucial role in China’s foreign policy and strategy since 
the end of Cold War. This thesis argues that the four dimensions, including 
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maximizing material power, pacifying the periphery, securing core interests, and 
promoting international status have strongly shaped China’s foreign policy preference 
in increasingly engaging in regional multilateral cooperation and institutions.136 First, 
China’s involvement in a set of regional multilateral cooperation and institutions 
helps Beijing to integrate into the East Asian production network and world economic 
system, promote economic growth, and raise its national comprehensive power. 
Second, regional multilateral regimes that interconnect various regional actors help 
Beijing not only to reduce regional anxiety and ensure a stable and peaceful 
international environment, but also build its power and influence in its periphery. 
Third, regional multilateralism serve as a means for Beijing to reshape the 
international relations inside and outside the institutions, and manage its complicated 
relations with Washington and other major powers and secure its core interests. 
Fourth, regional multilateral regimes provide a new approach for Beijing to legitimize 
its rising power and international status and transform the existing global system in an 
endeavor to achieve a peaceful rise. Overall, China’s foreign policy in regional 
multilateralism has been strongly shaped by an evolving grand strategy for security 
and great power status.     
 
Maximizing material power  
 
Maximizing material power is the fundamental to the rise of China. When Deng 
Xiaoping launched the reform and opening policy in 1978, China’s national 
development strategy underwent a dramatic shift from the ideological struggle and 
communist revolution to the economic development and socialist modernization with 
Chinese characteristics, ending its international isolation and returning to the 
international society. The strategic calculation behind the reform and open policy is 
shaped by a strong motive to integrate into the regional and global economic system, 
raise national comprehensive power, and achieve the rise of China.137 This strategic 
statecraft was set out by Deng Xiaoping and has been constantly propelled by the 
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successive Chinese leaderships. Chinese policymakers strongly believe that China 
could neither become a global great power without increasing its comprehensive 
national power at a global level, in particular the growth of power in economic, 
military, and technological dimensions, nor achieve these goals without reestablishing 
its economic, political, and diplomatic ties with the rest of world. As economic 
development is the fundamental underpinning of accelerating China’s modernization 
process and increasing its material power, establishing and developing economic 
cooperation at bilateral, regional and global levels was given a top priority in China’s 
foreign policy agenda. Such a persistent and consistent diplomatic strategy has driven 
China’s foreign policy and foreign relations throughout the entire reform era. 
 
At the Central Conference on Work Related to Foreign Affairs in 2006, Chinese 
President Hu Jintao stressed the importance of carrying out all-around diplomacy to 
enhance economic diplomacy and coordinate domestic and international situations.138 
It seems that the economic logic fully dominated the course of China’s domestic and 
foreign policy, since Beijing sought to “create a pattern of opening to the outside 
world in all directions, at all levels, and in broad areas”139 in all efforts to integrate 
itself into the world economic system for promoting economic development and 
increase its material power. After President Hu proposed ideas of building a 
‘harmonious society’ (heping shehui) and ‘harmonious world’ (hexie shijie),140 the 
“peace, development, and cooperation” have been the “basic principles” (jiben yuanze) 
of China’s foreign relations as Beijing desired to create a favorable domestic and 
international environment for expanding its regional and multilateral ties and 
promoting economic cooperation. Since the end of the Cold War, the open and reform 
policy and economic globalization significantly accelerated the pace of China’s 
reintegration to the Asia and world economy. In particular, China’s growing 
engagement in regional multilateral institutions and cooperation under three 
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successive Chinese leaders Jiang Zeming, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping has not only 
considerably enhanced its political and diplomatic relations with Asian neighbors, but 
also facilitated China’s integration into the East Asian production network and world 
economy. More importantly, China’s efforts to deepen regional multilateral 
cooperation in Asia and beyond greatly helped expand market access, attract FDI, 
increase productivity, promote growth and raise its comprehensive power.141 
 
As a matter of fact, maximizing material power has become the primary objective of 
China’s domestic and foreign policy agendas since the foundation of the PRC in 1949, 
not only for avoiding being invaded, conquered and exploited by stronger powers, but 
also for recovering its historic greatness and standing at the centre of the world. 
Because Chinese leadership had learnt a painful lesson from the ‘century of national 
humiliation’, that backward countries are naturally subjected to invasion and 
exploitation (luohou jiuyao aida). Along the same lines, Ashley J. Tellis, a Senior 
Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, argues that maximizing 
its national comprehensive power is the fundamental element of China’s evolving 
grand strategy for recovering the primacy and dominance it once enjoyed in Asia 
prior to the Columbian era. 142  According to the IMF, the Chinese economy 
experienced an average growth of 9.6 percent per year between 1990 and 2010. 
China’s economy in 1980 was less than 10 percent the size of the US’s economy, but 
Beijing replaced Japan as the world’s second largest economy in 2010.143 Today, 
China has overtaken the US as the world’s trading nation, the world’s largest 
industrialized nation and the world’s largest economy.144 Its growing economic 
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power has allowed Beijing to hugely increase its military budgets to strengthen the 
military buildup, modernize the PLA, and expand its global outreach on land and 
sea.145 Along with its steady economic growth, China’s military budget/spending has 
constantly increased from $14.6 billion in 2000 to $175 billion in 2018146 that 
accounts for about 25% of that of the US ($692 billion)147 and is ranked second in the 
world’s military spending. A concerted modernization of the PLA has considerably 
raised its military deterrence capabilities to confront internal and external security 
challenges.148  
 
The economic success in the past three decades has largely increased China’s 
material power in both economic and military dimensions. China’s growing 
involvement in regional economic cooperation in Asia and beyond since the early 
1990s played a major role in achieving this goal. Evan S. Medeiros, the former chief 
advisor to President Obama in Asian affairs, argues in his book on China’s 
international behavior that continued reform, development and modernization have 
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been China’s core foreign policy objectives over the past three decades.149 China’s 
activism in regional multilateral cooperation is part of its economic diplomacy to 
exploit new markets, promote trade and investment, secure energy and material 
resources in an endeavor to  boost economic development and increase 
comprehensive national power. Richard Stubbs further points out that the proliferation 
of regional multilateral arrangements in Asia since the 1997 Asian financial crisis has 
soundly increased the intra-regional trade and investment that makes it the world’s 
most dynamic region and benefits China and its Asian partners mostly.150 Beijing’s 
efforts to deepening and broadening regional multilateral cooperation not only helped 
it successfully integrate into the world economic system, but also made it become the 
largest trading partner of most Asian countries as well as a global economic 
superpower. More importantly, the resulting growth of China’s hard power including 
its economic and military capabilities has enabled Beijing to project its power and 
influence regionally and globally and reshape the global economic and political 
landscape. It laid the material foundation for China’s rise to a global great power, the 
great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and China’s return to the Centre of the 
world.  
 
Pacifying the periphery  
 
Pacifying the periphery is essential for Beijing to ensure its security and build its 
power and influence in the surrounding regions.151 In the history, Beijing maintained 
dominance over its Asian neighbors by establishing a tributary system in its 
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periphery.152 Such a tribute system played a key role in shaping a China-dominated 
regional order in Asia, ensuring its security and consolidating its power and influence 
in the region. Since the 1980s, Beijing persistently put its periphery diplomacy at the 
top of China’s foreign policy agenda. At a Work Forum on Periphery Diplomacy and 
Foreign Affairs in 2013, Xi Jinping stressed: “strive for obtaining an excellent 
peripheral environment for our country’s development, bring even more benefits of our 
country’s development to peripheral countries, and realize common development.”153 
Indeed, China lies at the Centre of East Asia and shares a border with fourteen Asian 
states that are characterized with a diversity in economic prowess, geographic size, 
and international status. While China is surrounded by major power competitors such 
as Japan, Russia, and India, it maintains asymmetric relations with other smaller and 
weaker Asian states along its periphery. It poses a great challenge for Beijing to 
manage its complicated relations with other regional actors in a geopolitical and 
geostrategic context. As the ultimate objective of China’s peripheral strategy is to 
secure a stable and peaceful international environment for its reform, development 
and stability and build its power and geopolitical influence in its ‘backyard’, pacifying 
the periphery has remained a core priority of China’s foreign policy since the 1980s. 
 
While China’s rise provides both opportunities and challenges for all the states 
in the international system,154 China’s growing power and influence have significant 
implications for its Asian neighbors. As Beijing’s growing power and influence is 
reshaping the regional geopolitical landscape and creating a new regional order in 
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Asia, the geopolitical competition between China and other major powers such as 
Japan, India and Russia presents a major challenge for Beijing to guarantee a 
favorable strategic environment along its periphery. Since the early 2010, Sino-Japan 
relations have been increasingly strained by the territorial dispute over the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, historical resentment and geopolitical rivalry. While Beijing 
sees Tokyo and its alliance with Washington a major challenge to its rise, Tokyo also 
views Beijing’s growing military power as a challenge to regional security.155 In 
particular, Beijing’s maritime expansion in the Asian waters is perceived as a threat to 
the maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region.156 When China sought to expand its 
power and influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, India engaged in a 
geopolitical competition with Beijing for maintaining its regional dominance even if 
both states have shared interests in reshaping global governance, fostering a 
multipolar world, and deepening cooperation within a set of multilateral institutions 
such as the BRICS, the AIIB and the SCO.157 Beijing’s close strategic ties with 
Pakistan and its ongoing territorial disputes with India have also intensified the 
Sino-Indian rivalry. Although Beijing and Moscow have a close strategic alliance at 
bilateral, regional and global levels and common interests in countering the American 
hegemony, Beijing’s rising global role and its expanding influence in the former 
Soviet space have also generated anxiety in Moscow. In particular, its growing 
economic and political dependence on Beijing since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis 
and Syrian war is driving Moscow to find alternative ways to ‘symmetrize’ bilateral 
relations and preserve its traditional influence in Central Asia.158  
 
When China’s growing economic and military capabilities enabled it to 
project power and influence over other Asian neighbors to its strategic interests, some 
Asian states regarded this significant geopolitical shift with mistrust and suspicion. 
On the one hand, those Asian states adopt a proactive attitude to the rise of China as 
China’s emergence as an economic superpower has made it the most powerful 
locomotive to ensure sustainable economic growth and prosperity in Asia. On the 
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other hand, they are increasingly worried about Beijing’s aspiration for hegemony 
that may undermine their sovereignty and autonomy. That hence evoked a mixed 
response from Asian states to China’s rise in the age of American primacy.159 While 
some Asian countries desiring to share the benefits of China’s dynamic growth are 
moving to bandwagon with Beijing to advance their interests, most Asian states prefer 
a hedging strategy to maintain strategic balance between Beijing and Washington and 
prevent any single power to dominate this region. However, those Asian states that 
hold territorial disputes (for example, Vietnam and the Philippines) and geopolitical 
rivalry (for example, Japan and India) with Beijing are more prone to consolidate 
their ties with Washington to counterbalance Beijing’s rise. While China’s rising 
power is reshaping regional geopolitical landscape in a systematic way, it leads to 
rising geopolitical instability and tensions that have posed a serious threat to China’s 
geostrategic environment and national security along its periphery.   
 
As pacifying the periphery has significance for Beijing to ensure security and 
stability along the ‘contested and complicated’ peripheral regions, regional 
multilateralism provides a mechanism for Beijing not merely to manage its 
complicated relations with other regional actors and confront with emerging 
geopolitical challenges, but also advance its strategic interests in various domains. 
China’s involvement in various regional multilateral institutions in East Asia provides 
a good example on this point. Some scholars argue that China’s involvement in 
regional multilateral mechanisms is motivated by an effort not just to push for East 
Asian economic cooperation but also to expand its geopolitical clout and reshape 
regional security order in a geopolitical and geostrategic context.160 Some scholars 
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also points out that the main purpose of Beijing’s participation in regional multilateral 
mechanisms is to reassure Asian neighbors of its commitment to a peaceful rise, 
eliminate the perceptions of ‘China threat’ and prevent those states to form an 
anti-China alliance.161 Indeed, as regional multilateral regimes that interconnects 
various regional actors facilitate cooperation towards common objective and interest, 
Beijing’s constant efforts to establish and promote regional multilateral cooperation 
not only help consolidate its political commitments to regional peace, stability and 
prosperity and reduce regional anxiety stemming from the rise of China, but also 
secure a stable and peaceful international environment for its domestic reform and 
modernization process. More importantly, regional multilateralism provides a viable 
way for Beijing to institutionalize its periphery strategy, translate its economic power 
into political influence and enhance its prominence position in its periphery. 
 
Securing core interests 
 
Securing core interests remains a highest priority in Chinese foreign policy.162 The 
concept of core interests was first adopted in China's foreign policy in 2005 when 
Beijing expressed its firm stance on defending its national unity and territorial 
integrity with the Taiwan issue.163 According to the white paper “China’s Peaceful 
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Development 2011” released by the State Council, China’s core interests are outlined 
as follows: 1) state sovereignty; 2) national security; 3) territorial integrity; 4) national 
reunification; 5) China’s political system established by the Constitution and overall 
social stability; 6) basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social 
development.164 It was the first time for Beijing to define the set of core interests that 
is not only a demonstrates its growing confidence in defending and advancing its core 
interests.165 In his talk at a group study session of the Communist Party of China 
(CPC) Politburo, Xi Jinping said: “We will stick to the road of peaceful development, 
but will never give up our legitimate rights and will never sacrifice our national core 
interests. No country should presume that we will engage in trade involving our core 
interests or that we will swallow the 'bitter fruit' of harming our sovereignty, security 
or development interests.”166 Given its painful history, securing its core interests such 
as the Taiwan issue and the South China Sea issue is not only involved in China’s 
territorial right and the legitimacy of the CPC but also its national security and global 
strategy. China’s resolve to safeguard its core interests is not only a manifestation of 
its newly acquired power, but it also presents a way to assert the rise of China and its 
place in the world.   
 
From a Chinese perspective, Washington is the only rival that can challenge 
its core interests such as the Taiwan issue, the South China Sea issue and national 
security.167 In March 1996 when the PLA was conducting a military exercise in the 
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Straits against "Taiwan independence",168 US President Clinton dispatched a task fleet 
including two aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Straits in an attempt to ‘stop’ Beijing’s 
coercion and ‘fulfil’ its defense commitment to Taiwan according to the Taiwan 
Relations Act.169 Washington’s arm sales to Taiwan and its military ties with Taiwan 
are perceived by Beijing as a major challenge to Taiwan’s unification with the 
mainland. Also during the Bush Administration when the US navy EP-3 spay plane 
conducted a surveillance mission near the Chinese coast in April 2001,170 the PLA 
sent two j-8 fighters to intercept and stop the US’s spying flight that caused a collision 
between the EP-3 and the J-8 and the death of a Chinese pilot. And the EP-3 was forced 
to make an emergency landing on China’s Hainan island. This incident considerably 
heighted Sino-US tensions. In addition, Washington not only supported the 
Philippines’ and Japan’s territorial claims in the East and South China Sea disputes 
but also sent the US Navy destroyer to conduct ‘freedom of navigation operation’ 
within 12 nautical miles of the disputed islands and waters of the South China Sea 
claimed by China in order to challenge Beijing’s territorial sovereignty and maritime 
interests and its rising role. It is thus not surprising that Washington’s alliance system 
and its ‘enduring’ military presence in Asia are viewed by Beijing as a major threat to 
its national security and peaceful rise. 
 
While Beijing strives to secure its core interests and achieve a peaceful rise, it 
also undermines Washington’s vital interests in East Asia and globally.171 According 
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to Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis, China is attempting to challenge the 
American primacy, supremacy, and hegemony in eight aspects: “1) replace the United 
States as the primary power in Asia; 2) weaken the U.S. alliance system in Asia; 3) 
undermine the confidence of Asian nations in U.S. credibility, reliability, and staying 
power; 4) use China’s economic power to pull Asian nations closer to PRC 
geopolitical policy preferences; 5) increase PRC military capability to strengthen 
deterrence against U.S. military intervention in the region; 6) cast doubt on the U.S. 
economic model; 7) ensure U.S. democratic values do not diminish the CCP’s hold on 
domestic power; and 8) avoid a major confrontation with the United States in the next 
decade.”172 Those have clearly illustrated how China’s rise will undermine the US 
dominance and end its unipolar moment, and why the US has tried to do what it can 
do to reverse, delay and undermine the rise of China. It is true that as China’s growing 
economic and military power is disrupting the existing Asian security architecture and 
shaping a new regional order that erodes Washington’s power and influence in the 
region. In particular, Beijing’s increasing assertiveness in the East and South China 
seas and its global expansion is perceived as an unprecedented challenge to 
Washington’s global dominance. If China’s rising power continues to grow, it is 
predictable that this would eventually ‘end’ American hegemonic status and unipolar 
moment in the coming decades. Accordingly, there is a consensus among scholars and 
policymakers in Washington that China’s rise is one of the most dangerous challenges 
for the US to preserve its global hegemony in the 21st century.173  
 
 Confronting the China challenge, the US has adopted a more hawkish foreign 
policy to maintain and reinforce the American primacy in Asia-Pacific, posing a great 
challenge to Beijing. After President Obama took office, Washington announced a 
Pivot to Asia strategy to reaffirm its strategic interests in Asia and rebalance China’s 
rising role that signals a landmark shift in US foreign policy from ‘engaging China’ to 
‘containing China’.174  To underpin its Pivot to Asia strategy, Washington also 
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projected the economic offensive against Beijing by reshaping the global trading 
regime through the TPP and TTIP that exclude China. The US containment and 
encirclement of China posed a great threat to Beijing’s national security interests.  
 
When President Trump came into office in 2017, Washington not only 
fortified its containment strategy against China by establishing a wider anti-China 
coalition under the Indo-Pacific strategy,175 but it also sought to challenge ‘one-China’ 
principle by approving the Taiwan Travel Act176 that remains the foundation of 
Sino-US relations and Beijing’s non-negotiable core interest. More recently, the 
Trump Administration released the US national security strategy and it puts: “China 
and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode 
American security and prosperity”.177 It is the first time for Washington to officially 
label China as a competitor and adversary in every realm despite the wide-ranging 
bilateral cooperation in “safeguarding world peace and stability and promoting global 
development and prosperity”.178 In particular, Washington’s intention to revitalize 
the Quadrilateral security alliance of the US, Japan, India and Australia, which was 
first proposed in 2007 by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to promote strategic 
dialogue and military cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region in response to China’s 
growing power and expanding influence, severely endangers Beijing’s security and 
geopolitical environment.  
 
The intensifying Sino-US strategic rivalry has presented a serious security 
dilemma for China.179 How does China as a rising power tackle its security and 
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geopolitical challenges, manage its complex relations with Washington as the only 
superpower, and secure its core interests towards achieving a peaceful rise? This 
thesis contends that regional multilateralism serves as a vital means for Beijing to 
reshape the international relations inside and outside institutions, ensuring its security 
and advancing its key foreign policy objectives. Soft balancing theory suggests that as 
the traditional hard balancing is too risky and costly, secondary powers may adopt a 
soft balancing strategy to counter the pressure, coercion and threats from the hegemon 
through economic, political, diplomatic, and institutional means.180 With limited 
military capabilities to match Washington’s military primacy, it is apparently not 
optimal for Beijing to adopt a traditional hard balancing strategy such as military 
buildup, military alliances and coalition, and transfer of arm and military technology 
to US’s enemies against the American hegemony. Thus, Beijing is strongly motivated 
to pursue a soft balancing strategy to counter the perceived threat from Washington 
through institutional methods. Confronting with various security and geopolitical 
challenges, regional multilateral cooperation that helps enhance an asymmetric 
interdependence are strategically and tactically used by Beijing as a vehicle of soft 
balancing to delay, frustrate and undermine the US dominant power, reassure those 
states of the benign nature of its rising power, and deter the formation of any 
anti-China coalition and ‘all but China’. In this respect, regional multilateralism 
provides a new approach for Beijing to reshape the international relations inside and 
outside the institutions, manage its complicated relations with Washington and other 
major powers and achieve its peaceful rise.   
 
Promoting international status  
 
Promoting international status is a key to enhancing the political identity and 
normative legitimacy of China’s rising power in the global system. When an 
emerging power, like Beijing, considerably raises its economic, political and military 
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power, it becomes unsatisfied with the status quo and aspires to promote its 
international status and prestige. Legitimizing  its rising power status181 can be 
achieved through a normative or/and institutional transformation.182 Deborah Welch 
Larson and Alexei Shevchenko argue that Beijing’s and Moscow’s foreign policies in 
the post-Cold War era have been driven by a consistent objective, restoring their great 
power status.183 In an attempt to enhance their relative international standing in the 
US-led liberal order, both Beijing and Moscow, on the one side, sought to partly adapt 
to the Western norms and values in order to gain the recognition of their ‘universal’ 
identity and legitimize their prominent status in the international community. On the 
other side, they also intended to construct their ‘distinctive’ identity and enhance 
political legitimacy of their rising power through diverse methods, including 
institution building, norm diffusion, and participation in global governance. 184 
Furthermore, while engaging in a ‘social’ competition for norms, influence and 
prominent status, the desire for great power status may motivate rising powers like 
Beijing to shoulder more global responsibility and provide more public goods to 
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enhance the political identity and normative legitimacy of their rising power in the 
global order.           
 
Indeed, China has a consistent objective of restoring its great power status and 
intensified its effort to achieve that goal. It is not just because of its historic position 
in the world, but also because of its huge population, geographic size, economic 
weight and growing role in regional and global affairs. In the early 1970s, China was 
given a permanent seat in the UN Security Council (UNSC), enabling it to exert its 
power and influence regionally and globally with consequent enhancement of its 
power status in the international system. Since the end of the Cold War, China 
adopted a ‘keeping a low profile’ foreign policy and maintained a reactive stance 
towards global institutions for two reasons. First, while striving to integrate into the 
US-dominated international order, Beijing desired to maximize its material power, 
hide its true strength and downplay its role in the international arena in order to focus 
on its economic transition and reforms and avoid any conflict with Washington.185 
Second, China had neither material power nor political influence during the early 
stage of reform and opening up to assert its role in global governance. When China’s 
growing economic and military power has enabled it to play a greater role in Asian 
and global affairs, Beijing has sought ways to promote its distinctive status and 
identity in the international order. Meanwhile, Chinese foreign policy has 
dramatically shifted from ‘keeping a low profile’ to ‘striving for achievements’ in the 
era of Xi Jinping that demonstrates Beijing’s aspiration to assume a more prominent 
global leadership role and promote its international status.186 Participation in global 
governance is a feasible way for Beijing to achieve its goals. China’s UNSC 
membership and its growing material power have made it become fundamentally 
relevant to all the global multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, 
and the WTO.  
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Although Beijing has actively engaged in a number of international 
institutions, but it is too difficult to find a ‘rightful place’ in the US-dominated global 
system in which Washington remains the largest donor and provider of public goods 
and maintains dominant influence. While those global institutions are not perceived as 
a feasible way to advance Beijing’s interests and promote its power status in the 
international order, it attempted to create new regimes and institutions or strengthen 
alternatives such as the BRICS, New Development Bank (NDB), the SCO, the BRI, 
and AIIB. NDB President Kundapur Vaman Kamath said: “our objective is not to 
challenge the existing system as it is but to improve and complement the system in 
our own way”.187 Indeed, Bretton Woods institutions such as the World Bank, the 
IMF and Asian Development Bank dominated global economic order for decades. 
China’s efforts to establish new regional multilateral regimes and institutions such as 
the BRI and AIIB will not only enhance its global leadership role in the exiting 
international system and promote its great power status, but also help reshape global 
governance system towards a more inclusive and fairer international order. In his 
speech at the 2017 World Economic Forum, Xi Jinping points out: “The global 
economic landscape has changed profoundly in the past few decades. However, the 
global governance system has not embraced those new changes and is therefore 
inadequate in terms of representation and inclusiveness.” 188  It clearly reflected 
Beijing’s aspiration to play a greater role in global affairs and promote its 
international status in the existing global system.     
 
Regional multilateralism provides an alternative way for Beijing to transform 
the existing global system, enhance its global leadership role and promote its great 
power status. While Beijing becomes increasingly powerful in material power,189 it is 
attempting to change the rules and norms governing the global system to legitimize its 
identity and power status. Randall Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu argue that a peer 
competitor like China that does not possess the military capabilities to directly 
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challenge the US hegemony through hard balancing seeks to create a new 
international order by shaping a revisionist counterhegemonic coalition and 
delegitimizing the hegemon’s global authority.190 In this context,  China has strong 
incentive to forge an interest-based coalition to raise its bargaining power and to 
reshape the global governance system by either joining existing multilateral 
institutions or initiating new multilateral institutions.191 This partly provides an 
answer to the question of how China as a rising power to transform the US-dominated 
global order and system and promote its international status. As international regimes 
and institutions that help construct political identity and normative authority of power 
provides a vital instrument to contest for power, influence, and global leadership 
between great powers and realize a power transition between a rising power and a 
declining power, establish and promote regional multilateral cooperation in Asia and 
beyond provide an alternative approach for Beijing to build its distinctive identity, 
legitimize its rising power and promote international status in the global system. More 
importantly, as the rise of China as a non-western power is considered a potential 
‘threat’ to the US-dominated global system, regional multilateralism offers a new 
paradigm for Beijing to transform the US-dominated system and consolidate its global 
leadership role towards a peaceful rise. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
ASYMMETRIC INTERDEPENDENCE AND INSTITUTIONAL BALANCING: 
CHINA’S APPROACH TOWARDS REGIONAL MULTILATERALISM IN 
EAST ASIA  
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, the US has played a dominant role in East Asia, 
however, China’s rising economic and military power is shaping a new regional order 
in a way that undermines the US’s prominent position in the region.192  The 
changing balance of power in East Asia triggered a debate about whether China will 
be the next hegemon to dominate East Asia, and whether a ‘Thucydides’ Trap’ 
between Beijing and Washington will be unavoidable.193 While China’s rise is 
viewed as a serious threat to the established regional order,194 Washington has 
devised a containment strategy against China that presents a stark security dilemma 
for China as a peer-competitor on how to manage its complicated relations with the 
US and its Asian neighbors and achieve its strategy of peaceful rise. 
 
                                                
192. Victor D. Cha, ‘Powerplay: Origins of the US Alliance System in Asia,’ International 
Security 34, no. 3 (2010): 165-166. 
193. See Thomas J. Christensen, ‘Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of 
China and US Policy toward East Asia,’ International Security 31, no. 1 (2006): 81-126; 
Charles Glaser, ‘Will China’s Rise Lead to War? Why Realism does not Mean Pessimism,’ 
Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (2011): 80-91; Suisheng Zhao, ‘A New Model of Big Power 
Relations? China–US Strategic Rivalry and Balance of Power in the Asia–Pacific,’ Journal of 
Contemporary China 24, no. 93 (2015): 377-397.  
194. For example, see Robert G. Sutter, ‘Assessing China’s Rise and US Leadership in Asia: 
Growing Maturity and Balance,’ Journal of Contemporary China 19, no. 65 (2010): 591-604; 
John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia,’ The 
Chinese Journal of International Politics 3, no. 4 (2010): 381-396; Aaron L. Friedberg, ‘The 
Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?,’ International Security 30, no. 2 
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Since the mid-1990s, China has adopted a proactive attitude towards regional 
multilateralism and emerged a major actor in establishing, developing and 
institutionalizing regional multilateral cooperation in East Asia.195 Currently, China 
has embraced various regional multilateral institutions such as Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN plus Three, ASEAN 
plus One, East Asia Summit (EAS), and Trilateral Summit (China-Japan-Korea) that 
marks a major shift in Chinese foreign policy. China’s turn from bilateralism and 
multilateralism to regional multilateralism attracted wide attention among scholars 
and policymakers. What are the motivations and calculations behind China’s growing 
engagement with regional multilateral institutions in East Asia? And how successful 
is China’s approach towards regional multilateralism in dealing with the Sino-US 
competition in East Asia?      
 
There is an extensive literature on explaining China’s activism in regional 
multilateral institutions. Some scholars argue that China’s strategy towards regional 
multilateralism is strongly driven by domestic politics,196 as securing a peaceful and 
stable international environment for economic development and political stability 
remains a top priority of Chinese foreign policy.197 Some scholars contend that China 
makes use of regional multilateral institutions to strategically reassure its Asian 
neighbours of the peaceful intention of China’s rise and enhance its position in the 
Sino-US power competition in East Asia.198 Other scholars point out that China 
                                                
195. On China’s foreign policy and regional multilateralism, see Emilian Kavalski, China and 
the Global Politics of Regionalization (London: Routledge, 2016); Guoguang Wu and Helen 
Lansdowne, China Turns to Multilateralism: Foreign Policy and Regional Security (London: 
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196. Yunling Zhang and Shiping Tang, China’s Regional Strategy, in David Shambaugh, 
Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2005), pp. 48-70; Yunling Zhang, China and Asian Regionalism (Singapore: World Scientific 
Publishing, 2010).  
197. Jisi Wang, ‘China’s Search for Stability with America,’ Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (2005): 
39-48; Suisheng Zhao, ‘China’s Approaches toward Regional Cooperation in East Asia: 
Motivations and Calculations,’ Journal of Contemporary China 20, no. 68 (2011): 53-67. 
198. For example, see David Shambaugh, ‘China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional 
Order,’ International Security 29, no.  3 (2005): 64-99; Xuefeng Sun, ‘Why does China 
Reassure South-East Asia,’ Pacific Focus 24, no. 3 (2009): 298-316. 
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attempts to limit the US’s ability to project power in East Asia through the 
institutionalization of regional multilateral cooperation.199    
 
This chapter argues that China’s proactive involvement in regional multilateral 
institutions is a strategic adaption to the new power dynamics of East Asia. Its 
growing engagement with regional multilateralism is strongly motivated by a strategy 
of institutional balancing to counter the US’s dominance in East Asia, since 
deepening and broadening regional multilateral cooperation within a set of institutions 
allows it to establish asymmetric economic interdependence over other East Asian 
states, to reassure those Asian states of its benign intentions and to deter the formation 
of an anti-China coalition. According to Robert Pape, Thazha V. Paul, and Stephen G. 
Brooks and William C. Wohlforth,200 secondary states have strong incentive to 
undertake a strategy of soft balancing against the hegemon when the latter’s actions 
and intentions are perceived as hostile and pose a direct or potential threat to its 
national interests. While traditional hard balancing is too costly and risky for 
secondary states to directly challenge the US’s military preponderance, international 
institutions are used by secondary powers as a key instrument to delay, frustrate and 
undermine the US’s hegemonic power.201  
 
He Kai further illustrated how states engage in balancing against a potential or 
existing hegemon and ensure their security through establishing, utilizing and 
dominating multilateral institutions, 202  as those institutions help build 
interdependence between the states and shape common interests and demands towards 
a common objective. This particularly applies to regional multilateral institutions. 
                                                
199. See Gilbert Rozman, ‘Post-Cold War Evolution of Chinese Thinking on Regional 
Institutions in Northeast Asia,’ Journal of Contemporary China 19, no. 66 (2010): 605-620; 
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Hedging,’ International Affairs 82, No. 1 (2006): 77-94. 
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While the dynamic interaction of states inside and outside institutions can reshape the 
international relations at a regional and global level, institutional balancing can be 
undertaken inclusively or exclusively, depending on whether the hegemon is kept 
inside or outside the institutions. Given the gap in military capabilities between 
Beijing and Washington, any form of hard balancing is not optimal for Beijing despite 
its perceived threat from Washington. Hence, regional multilateralism serves as a new 
vehicle of institutional balancing for Beijing to counterbalance Washington’s 
dominant power without causing a direct military conflict and achieve its peaceful 
rise.  
 
Institutional balancing, built on the tenets of neorealism and neoliberalism, 
provides a convincing explanation for the strategic calculations behind China’s 
approach towards regional multilateralism in East Asia. This chapter argues that 
regional multilateral institutions are strategically and tactically used by China as a 
means of institutional balancing to exclusively undermine the US’s dominance. The 
logic of institutional balancing lies in establishing asymmetric interdependence over
its Asian neighbors; enhancing strategic reassurance in East Asia; and deterring the 
formation of any anti-China coalitionin the region. However, China’s search for a 
strategy of soft balancing against the US may be constrained when it involves a 
complicated power game between Beijing, Washington and other Asian states. In 
order to prevent any single power from dominating this region, most East Asian states 
pursue a hedging strategy to maintain strategic balance between Beijing and 
Washington for preserving autonomy. However, those East Asian states, holding 
territorial disputes or geostrategic rivalry with Beijing, intend to align with 
Washington to counter Beijing’s rising power, limiting Beijing’s efforts to undertake 
a strategy of soft balancing against Washington.  
 
To further explore the motivations and calculations behind China’s engagement 
in regional multilateralism in East Asia, this chapter is divided into five sections. 
Section one gives a brief overview of the main questions and arguments upon China’s 
activism in regional multilateral cooperation in East Asia. Section two illustrates the 
concept of regional multilateralism and the theoretical foundation of institutional 
balancing. Section three provides insight into China’s growing involvement in various 
regional multilateral cooperation and institutions in East Asia. Section four explores 
the rationales behind China’s use of regional multilateral institutions as a vehicle of 
institutional balancing in three dimensions: establishing asymmetric interdependence 
over its Asian neighbors; reassuring East Asian states of the benign nature of China’s 
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rise; and deterring the formation of any anti-China coalition and countering US 
influence in the region. Section five presents the conclusions by highlighting the 
success and limits of institutional balancing.  
 
 
Conceptualizing regional multilateralism and institutional balancing  
 
Regional multilateralism has emerged as a new paradigm in the contemporary 
international relations as multilateral institutions can not only affect the state’s foreign 
policy behavior but also reshape the international relations between the states inside 
and outside institutions and the balance of power in the existing international system. 
According to Robert Keohane, 203  multilateralism is defined as the practice of 
coordination, cooperation and collaboration in certain policy areas among three or 
more states through ad hoc agreements, conventions and arrangements. John G. 
Ruggie suggests that multilateralism refers to an institutional form to enhance 
coordination, cooperation and collaboration among the states on the constitutive 
principles of indivisibility, generalization, and reciprocity.204 While unilateralism 
refers to “any doctrine or agenda to support one-side action and measure” benefiting 
the unilateralists’ own ‘self’,205 multilateralism in the form of multilateral agreements, 
arrangements and institutions is set to bind various actors to collectively coordinate 
relevant policy areas towards a common objective. Accordingly, regional multilateral 
institutions provide a vital mechanism to shape preference, monitor behavior, confer 
legitimacy, and facilitate cooperation in dealing with internal challenges and external 
threats, serving common interests, common demands and common autonomy206 of all 
the involved states. The existing literatures explain the emergence of regional 
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204 . John G. Ruggie, ‘Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,’ International 
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multilateralism in three aspects: the prevailing demand of globalization; 207  the 
malfunction of the multilateral system;208 and the changing balance of power.209 
Among them, power balancing is a key element in shaping state’s preferences for 
regional multilateral institutions.   
 
In the IR theories, the balance of power is the most influential theory of the 
realist school of thought. According to Kenneth Waltz,210 balancing behaviour may 
occur when the potential or existing hegemon is perceived as a threat by weaker states 
and those states are motivated to form a balancing coalition to counter the perceived 
threat from the hegemon. However, traditional hard balancing is a too costly and risky 
option for weaker states, particularly secondary states, to achieve their goals due to 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and growing economic 
interdependence among the states. In this respect, soft balancing gained prominence 
in international politics. Instead of resorting to military means, secondary states often 
pursue a strategy of soft balancing through economic, diplomatic and institutional 
methods such as economic cooperation, diplomatic coalition and regional institutions 
to counter the coercion and threats of the hegemon.211  
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Institutional balancing as a new form of soft balancing contains two different 
forms of balancing: inclusive and exclusive institutional balancing. Inclusive 
institutional balancing may occur when the hegemon is perceived as a threat by 
weaker powers and those states form a balancing coalition to constrain the hegemon’s 
behaviour by including it within the institution. Exclusive institutional balancing may 
emerge when those states shape a balancing coalition to counter the perceived threats 
from the hegemon by excluding it from the institution. Regional multilateral 
institutions that help overcome collective action problem allow secondary states such 
as China to establish strategic interdependence and shape an interest-based coalition 
to exclusively undermine its rivals. Therefore, institutional balancing lies in a 
fundamental element that the state is able to build asymmetric economic 
interdependence over other regional actors within institutions and to turn that into 
political leverage to reassure friends and rebalance foes for advancing its strategic 
interests.  
 
While the unchecked hegemon tends to act unilaterally, small and secondary 
powers are more prone to align with each other within institutions in response to 
external threats. A shift of Chinese foreign policy from bilateralism and 
multilateralism to regional multilateralism reflects Beijing’s strategic thinking on the 
Sino-US strategic rivalry and new power dynamics in East Asia. Regional multilateral 
institutions that strengthen a nexus of economic, political and security dimensions 
provide a way for Beijing to reshape the international relations and geopolitical 
balance of East Asia to its interests. Given its limited military capability to match that 
of the US, it seems definitively unwise for Beijing to challenge the American 
hegemony through traditional hard balancing such as military buildup, military 
cooperation, creation of military alliances, and arms sales to US’s enemies. Instead, 
China pursues a strategy of soft balancing against the US through the establishment, 
promotion, and institutionalization of regional multilateral cooperation in East Asia, 
not only improving its security environment and enhancing its position in the Sino-US 
power competition but also building its power and influence in its periphery. 
 
Based on the balance of power theory (neorealism) and the interdependence 
theory (neoliberalism), regional multilateral institution provides a new approach to 
reshape the international relations and has considerably influenced China’s foreign 
                                                                                                                                      
Thompson, ‘Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally against the Leading Global 
Power?,’ International Security 35, no. 1 (2010): 7-43. 
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policy behavior. As regional multilateralism in East Asia is “still at a stage where it is 
best understood as an extension and intersection of national power and purpose,”212 
regional multilateral institutions are strategically and tactically used by China as a 
means of soft balancing against the US. Iinstitutional balancing is undertaken in three 
dimensions. First, China seeks to establish asymmetric economic interdependence 
over its Asian neighbours within regional multilateral institutions, enabling it to 
translate its economic power into political influence, gaining a greater share of power 
inside and outside those institution, and decreasing the share of power possessed by 
others. Second, China intends to reinforce its commitment to a peaceful rise by 
promoting regional multilateral cooperation towards regional prosperity and stability 
and accepting ‘self-constraint’ by complying with common rules, norms and 
principles within institutions. By doing so, Beijing reassures those Asian states of the 
benign nature of its rise, gaining recognition of its role as a responsible and peaceful 
power and increasing the US’s costs to contain the rise of China. Third, China 
attempts to deter East Asian states to form any anti-China coalition or join the US-led 
alliance to contain China, as asymmetric interdependence enables Beijing not only to 
limit any ‘hostile’ behaviour of those Asian states to endanger Beijing’s interests, but 
also to erode US’s ability to project power against Beijing and undermine its 
dominance.  
 
 
China’s engagement in regional multilateralism in East Asia   
 
Having launched the reform and open door policy in 1978, China reoriented its 
national development strategy to accelerate economic development by integrating into 
the world economic system. Since the early 1990s, Beijing nurtured ‘Good Neighbour 
Policy’ (mulin youhao zhengce) to enhance its economic and political ties with Asian 
neighbours.213 China gradually became active in regional multilateral cooperation 
when it joined the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1991. At the same 
year, China joined the Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific 
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(CSCAP) and the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) for promoting 
regional security cooperation. Also in in July 1991, China was for the first time 
invited as a consultative partner to attend an ASEAN Foreign Minister’s Meeting, 
where Chinese foreign minister, Qian Qichen, stressed China’s willingness and 
commitment to foster regional prosperity, stability and peace through the regional 
multilateral cooperation. In 1994, China joined the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as 
a founding member and formalized its relations with the ASEAN, demonstrating 
Beijing’s growing interests in engaging with regional multilateral institutions.  
 
When China’s economy started to take off in the 1990s, Beijing sought to further 
strengthen its relations with Asian neighbours by institutionalizing regional 
multilateral cooperation. After multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and 
the IMF failed to provide an effective approach to overcome the Asia financial crisis 
in 1997, there was a consensus among the East Asian states on creating their own 
regional multilateral institutions for promoting cooperation and dialogue on regional 
economic and financial issues.214 ASEAN Plus Three was launched in 1997 and 
China played a key role in establishing the first regional multilateral forum in East 
Asia. At the first ASEAN-China summit in 1997, Chinese President Jiang Zemin 
delivered a speech ‘Towards a Good Neighbouring Partnership of Mutual Trust 
Oriented to the 21st Century’215 that underlined Beijing’s political commitments 
towards regional multilateral cooperation. In November 2000, Chinese Premier Zhu 
Rongji proposed the establishment of a China-ASEAN free trade area and this 
proposal was accepted later by all the ASEAN members. China was the first country 
to conclude a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with ASEAN. China’s proactive attitude 
towards ASEAN Plus one and ASEAN Plus Three was driven by a desire to further 
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enhance its relations with Asian neighbours through the promotion of regional 
multilateral cooperation.216 
 
In 2001, the East Asian Vision Group (EAVG) called on ‘East Asia moving from 
a region of nations to a bona fide regional community with shared challenges, 
common aspirations, and a parallel destiny’.217 Chinese government stated that the 
ASEAN Plus Three was a cornerstone for promoting regional integration and 
establishing an East Asian community. 218 As former Chinese Vice-Premier Qian 
Qichen stated: “China has made endeavours to promote the cause of regional 
cooperation in East Asia, because regionalism can provide a suitable framework for 
responding to the challenges of globalisation and can pave the way for proper 
governance that can eliminate ‘beggar thy neighbour’ competition among 
nation-states”.219 In 2003, China also signed a declaration with Japan and South 
Korea to study the possibility of establishing a trilateral FTA within ten to fifteen 
years. Moreover, in September 2011, China, Japan and South Korea formally set up 
the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat, which is the first regional multilateral 
institution in Northeast Asia.  
 
Having soundly contributing to regional growth and prosperity, China’s active 
role in regional multilateral institutions helps advance its periphery strategy, 
generating goodwill among the Asian states and ensuring a stable and peaceful 
international environment. Meanwhile, China’s growing power and influence have 
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generated a great deal of anxiety and suspicion in some of its Asian neighbours and in 
Washington.220 Despite Beijing’s support for ASEAN’s leading role in East Asian 
regional integration, all the ASEAN countries except Malaysia agreed to accept three 
non-East Asian members: India, Australia and New Zealand in the first East Asia 
Summit in 2005 that was considered a move to dilute and balance China’s influence, 
reflecting those states’ wariness of China’s rising power and its aspiration for regional 
hegemony. With a ‘Pivot to Asia’ strategy, Washington sought to reaffirm its strategic 
interests and leadership in East Asia by re-establishing its alliance with Asian partners, 
strengthening its economic, military and political presence, and rebalancing China’s 
rising role. In 2010, the EAS approved US’s membership that displayed both 
Washington’s and other Asian states’ concerns about the rise of China. The 
cooperative and competitive relationship between Beijing, Washington and other 
Asian states highlighted new dynamics of international relations in East Asia. 
 
China has actively engaged in various regional multilateral institutions in East 
Asia. At the 2011 annual meeting of the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA), Chinese 
president Hu Jintao stated: 
“We will take an active part in 10+1, 10+3, the East Asia Summit and cooperation 
between China, Japan and the ROK […] China will unswervingly follow the path of 
peaceful development and the win-win strategy of opening-up. We will always place 
Asia on top of our diplomatic agenda towards building good-neighbourly 
relationships and partnerships with our neighbours, and take vigorous steps to 
advance our good-neighbourliness and mutually beneficial cooperation with Asian 
countries and deepen mutual understanding and trust with them.”221 
After Xi Jinping took power, the Peripheral Diplomatic Work Forum on China’s 
diplomacy towards the peripheral countries (zhoubian guojia) was held in October 
2013 and all the members of the Standing Committee of the Central Politburo 
unprecedentedly attended this forum. Xi Jinping stressed the significance of 
consolidating regional multilateral cooperation in advancing China’s strategic 
interests in Asia and periphery diplomacy has since then become a priority of China’s 
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foreign policy. 222  Nowadays, China has participated in all kinds of regional 
multilateral fora in East Asia and its growing enthusiasm for regional multilateralism 
has gone far beyond a pure economic agenda, but a ‘grand’ strategy of achieving its 
geo-economic, geopolitical and geostrategic goals.  
 
The rationale behind China’s engagements with regional multilateral institutions 
in East Asia can be understood in three aspects. First, regional multilateral initiatives 
promise a wide economic agenda for maintaining its rapid economic growth, which is 
essential for Beijing to preserve domestic stability and development 223  and to 
increase its capabilities to confront internal and external security challenges224. 
Second, Beijing intends to enhance political, economic and security ties with its Asian 
neighbors within regional multilateral institutions. 225  Beijing’s commitments to 
regional multilateralism can not only reassure those Asian states of the benign nature 
of the rise of China but also balance American influence in the region. Third, 
promoting regional multilateral cooperation in East Asia helps Beijing transform its 
economic power into political power, enhancing the political legitimacy of its power 
and establishing its profile as a leading power in international arena.226  More 
importantly, asymmetric interdependence enables Beijing to project power and 
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influence in deterring other regional actors to form an anti-China coalition or join the 
US alliance against China.  
 
 
Establishing asymmetric interdependence 
 
Regional multilateral cooperation in East Asia has created considerable trade and 
investment opportunities for China and its Asian partners. The mounting economic 
relations between China and other East Asian countries have not merely lead to 
economic interdependence, but also to asymmetric economic interdependence,227 
since the size and dynamism of the Chinese economy makes those relations much 
more relevant for the other East Asian countries than for China. Consequently, 
Beijing gained strategic leverage over other Asian states that can be used as a means 
of soft balancing against the US. Since the 1990s, the intra-regional trade and 
intra-regional FDI between China and its Asian neighbours have grown rapidly. As 
showed in the Table 1 (see Appendix), China’s trade with the other ASEAN+3 
countries only comprised 25% of its total trade in 2013, almost equivalent to the sum 
of China’s trade with the EU and the US, suggesting that Japan, ASEAN, and South 
Korea respectively comprise a lower share of China’s total trade than the other way 
around, and both South Korea and Japan are losing relevance as trade partners for 
China. Although China’s trade with Japan and South Korea has steadily increased in 
the past decades, the relative share of trade experienced a dramatic fall in the case of 
Japan since 1998, as China heavily diversified its exports to global markets after its 
accession to WTO. However, ASEAN’s share in China’s total trade has increased by 
3.6% since 1998, reaching 10.9% in 2013 after the China-ASEAN FTA came into 
effect in January 2010. It is derived from this figure that those East Asian states 
depend on China much more than China depends on them, as China as a great 
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economic power has diversified its economy in a global context that remain a key 
element of asymmetric interdependence.    
 
Table 2 (see Appendix) shows how China has become the largest trading 
partner of all East Asian states since 2007. The trade share also illustrates that East 
Asian states have been increasingly dependent on the Chinese economy. At the same 
time, it is observed that the US’s position as the largest trade partner of Japan, South 
Korea, and ASEAN in 1998 has been clearly replaced by China since 2007, even if 
the US still remains Japan’s second largest partner behind China, and South Korea’s 
third largest partner. US’s share in Japan’s total trade experienced a sharp decrease 
from 27.8% in 1998 to 13.3 % in 2013, whereas China’s share Japan’s trade climbed 
from 8.6% to 20%. China’s share of total ASEAN traded tripled from 4.3% to 12.1% 
between 1998 and 2007, peaking at 18.8% in 2013. South Korea’s trade with China 
jumped from 8.2% in 1998 to 22% in 2007 and in 2013 exceeded the total share of 
South Korea’s second and third largest partners: EU and Japan. The China-South 
Korea FTA, taken effect on 20 December 2015, may reinforce this trend. All the 
figures illustrate that those East Asian states become increasingly dependent on 
Beijing but less reliant on Washington. Apparently, Beijing’s efforts in enhancing 
asymmetric interdependence over East Asian states have strategic implication for the 
Sino-US power competition in the region.228    
 
China has surpassed Japan to become the world’s second largest economy in 
2011 and overtaken the US as the world’s top trading nation in 2013. The 
institutionalization of regional multilateral cooperation not only promises expanded 
market access and increased FDI for China and its Asian neighbours, but also 
enhances political, cultural and social ties among East Asian states.229 The truth is 
that regional multilateral cooperation benefits small states economically but bigger 
states politically. Through regional multilateral cooperation, Beijing sought to 
establish strategic interdependence interlocking East Asian states and to reinforce an 
asymmetric linkage, so that those states become much more dependent on Beijing in 
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economic and political terms while Beijing relies less on them. It enables Beijing to 
gain greater leverage and exert greater influence over those states to its strategic 
interests. Moreover, creating asymmetric interdependence over its Asian neighbours 
remains strategically vital for Beijing to reduce the economic and political 
interdependence between the US and those states and offset American influence in the 
region. The logic of asymmetric interdependence is rooted in a fact that it increases 
Beijing’s power and influence but limits the rivals’ ability to project power and 
influence. Even when the US increasingly engaged in regional multilateral initiatives 
such as East Asia Summit, the growing asymmetric interdependence helps enhance 
Beijing’s position vis-á-vis Washington, since it serves as a strategic leverage to 
isolate, marginalize and undermine American influence in the region. 
 
Beijing’s persistent efforts to promote regional multilateral frameworks such as 
ASEAN Plus one, ASEAN Plus three and China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Summit have 
great importance for enhancing asymmetric interdependence over its Asian 
neighbours, building its power and political influence and eroding American 
dominance in the region. At the 2003 ASEAN summit, China formally joined the 
ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and became the first non-ASEAN 
country to do so. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao emphasized the importance of 
China-ASEAN strategic partnership for regional peace and prosperity and called for 
greater economic and political cooperation. This was an unprecedented step to build 
the comprehensive cooperation between China and ASEAN. Furthermore, China 
joined the Beijing-Tokyo-Seoul Trilateral Summit which was first proposed by South 
Korea in 2004 to enhance political mutual trust, narrow differences and reduce the 
risk of confrontation among three states. The creation of a trilateral mechanism serves 
China’s interests to strengthen asymmetric interdependence over Japan and South 
Korea, as both states have become heavily dependent on trade and investment with 
China. For Beijing, trilateral cooperation can not only reduce the risk of confrontation 
among them but also weaken the US’s alliance with Japan and South Korea, since 
both states rely on Beijing economically but ally with Washington for security.230     
 
China has not only been the largest trading partner of all the East Asian states but 
also one of the most prominent investor in the region. According to China’s Ministry 
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of Commerce, China’s outward FDI reached about $103 billion in 2014 and over 68% 
of Chinese oversea investments flowed to Asia.231 As of now, China has become the 
largest foreign investors in Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Indonesia. China’s 
growing investments in the region helps to enhance an asymmetric linkage over those 
Asian states and therefore to expand its influence. In 2009 and 2010, two Chinese 
State-Owned Banks, namely China Development Bank (CDB) and Export-Import 
Bank of China (China Eximbank), granted loans for more than $110 billion to other 
developing countries, some East Asian countries are among the major beneficiaries. 
That sum exceeded that of the loans extended by institutions of the Breton Woods 
system for those years. 232  More recently, China initiated the BRICS New 
Development Bank (NDB), the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the 
Silk Road Fund (SRF) to provide loans for infrastructure development in other 
emerging economies and developing countries across the region. The launching of 
multilateral financial institutions enables Beijing not only to further propel 
asymmetric interdependence between China and other regional actors, it also can 
counter the influence of Western-based multilateral financial institutions such as the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund and establish its power and influence in 
East Asia and beyond.233  
 
 
Enhancing strategic reassurance in East Asia 
 
China’s fast growing power and influence has triggered a wide-ranging debate over 
the implications of China’s rise for East Asia, 234 causing unease and suspicions 
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among Asian states, even if Chinese leaders repeatedly voice that China does not and 
will never pursue hegemony and China’s rise will not threat regional stability and 
prosperity. The concept of China’s ‘peaceful rise’ and ‘China’s peaceful development’ 
was first proposed by Chinese scholar Zheng Bijian235 and was then reiterated by 
Chinese President Hu Jintao to rebut against the ‘China threat’ theory. Beijing’s 
emphasis on the benign nature of China’s rise implicitly reflects its growing concerns 
about its Asian neighbours’ threat perception. The perceptions on a potential 
hegemon’s intentions may determine other regional actors’ strategic choices 
(bandwagoning, hedging or balancing) and therefore can influence quite dramatically 
China’s security environment.236 If China’s rise is perceived as hostile instead of 
benign, Asian states will pursue a balancing strategy through the alliance formation to 
contain China’s rising power and influence by isolation, marginalization and 
boycotting.237 If China is perceived as a benign, peaceful and responsible power, 
Asian states will adopt a positive attitude towards China’s growing role that will 
reduce the risk and costs of achieving its peaceful rise and increase that of the US and 
its allies of containing the rise of China.   
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Confronting internal and external security challenges, Beijing seeks to enhance 
strategic assurance in East Asia through regional multilateral institutions for reducing 
the perception of ‘China threat’ and advancing its security interests. In 1990s, 
Washington sought to reorient its East Asia strategy by committing to enhance its 
alliance with Japan and Australia and to maintain 100, 000 troops in the Asia Pacific 
in response to possible ‘China threat’. That was considered a major factor leading 
China to join the ARF for diminishing its strategic pressure.238 From the western 
viewpoint, China’s participation in international institutions helps ‘socialize’ China, 
contain its expansionism and transform it into a responsible power in the international 
society.239 Also, from the Chinese perspective, participation in regional multilateral 
cooperation such as the ARF, ASEAN plus one, ASEAN plus three and EAS helps 
not only dissipate the scepticisms about China’s hegemonic aspiration in East Asia, 
but also block initiatives that would jeopardize China’s national interests and exert its 
influence over the agenda-setting process within institutions. As Wang Jianwei points 
out that “participation in multilateral cooperation could be a more effective means to 
dispel the perception of ‘China threat’ than frequent reiteration of the pledge that 
China will not pursue hegemon”.240      
 
China’s proactive engagement in regional multilateral cooperation has to some 
extent proven effective in reassuring its Asian neighbours. During the Asian financial 
crisis, China’s rejection to devaluate its currency and its role in countering financial 
crisis and creating the ASEAN plus three were highly acknowledged by all the East 
Asian states. That has greatly enhanced its profile as a responsible power. China’s 
active participation in the Trilateral Cooperation also helps to reassure Tokyo and 
Seoul, Washington’s two key allies, of its peaceful intentions that can build mutual 
trust and reduce tensions between them, promoting peace in Northeast Asia. Even 
Beijing intends to strategically reassure Washington of its aspiration for ‘peaceful 
development’ rather than hegemonic status through regional multilateral fora in order 
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to alleviate Washington’s hostility to China’s rise, ease its strategic pressure and 
ensure a stable and peaceful international environment for its modernization 
process. 241  In fact, Beijing’s active attitude towards regional multilateralism 
represented a shift of its strategic thinking from ‘self-constraint’ to ‘accepting 
constraint’ and ‘peaceful co-existence’ that not only helps eliminate the perceptions of 
a ‘China threat’ and reassure Asian neighbours of its benign nature, but also raise its 
profile as a responsible great power, one accepting the common rules, norms and 
principles within institutions and taking full responsibilities for regional stability and 
prosperity. More importantly, participating in international institutions can make 
China become a ‘normal’ member of the international society and help it strengthen 
the legitimacy of its rising power in the international system.  
 
The success of China’s attempt to reassure ASEAN countries through regional 
multilateral initiatives has been greatly conditioned by developments in the South 
China Sea, since the South China Sea disputes have been a major irritant in 
China-ASEAN relations. During the ASEAN-China summit in 2002, all the sides 
signed the Declaration on the Code of Conduct on South China Sea to establish 
mutual understanding and cooperation for a peaceful resolution of territorial disputes. 
Beijing accepted such a multilateral agreement to follow a certain amount of 
‘self-constraint’ and kept tensions between Beijing and the ASEAN claimant states to 
a relatively low level till the Scarborough shoal standoff that occurred in April 2012. 
Since then, China started to defend its territorial claims over the South China Sea in a 
more assertive way, including the building of artificial islands that began since 2014. 
Meanwhile, Beijing not only rejected any proposals on a multilateral resolution of 
disputes but also opposed the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in Hague, 
instead stressing that the bilateral negotiations is the only way to settle disputes.  
 
In this context, China’s efforts to enhance strategic reassurance through regional 
multilateralism have so far has achieved a relative success, as East Asian states’ 
stance towards China’s rise is divided into three groups.242 The first group of states, 
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mainly Laos and Cambodia, and to some extent Myanmar, which benefits mostly 
from maintaining close ties with Beijing, bandwagons with China in the international 
arena and adopts a more positive position towards China’s rise. The most significant 
exponents of the second group are Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and 
South Korea, which maintain close economic relations with Beijing. These states, on 
the one hand, appreciate China’s central role in Asia’s economy and on the other hand, 
welcome the US’s security role in region, therefore pursue a hedging strategy towards 
China for preventing any single power to dominate this region and for maximizing 
their interests. 243 The third group of states is comprised of Japan, Vietnam and the 
Philippines,244 which either have territorial disputes with China or geostrategic 
rivalry with China, intend to ally with the US to balance China’s rising power, 
advancing their security and territorial interests. 
 
ASEAN countries’ reaction to the South China Sea disputes can be a touchstone 
to underpin Beijing’s reassurance strategy in East Asia. Confronting the escalated 
tensions in South China Sea, China pursues a bilateral approach to resolve the 
disputes while Vietnam and the Philippines appeal to do so through regional 
multilateral frameworks. Those two states not only welcomed a more active role of 
the US in the disputes, but also tried to gain support inside ASEAN to take a common 
stance against China’s territorial claims. However, other ASEAN members are very 
reluctant to adopt any multilateral declarations, actions or measures to oppose 
Beijing’s assertive actions in the South China Sea. In July 2012, ASEAN´s foreign 
ministers, for the first time in its 45-year history, failed to issue a joint communiqué 
after their annual meeting, since Cambodia as the Chair of ASEAN opposed 
Philippines and Vietnamese attempts to mention the Scarborough shoal incident and 
Chinese violation of Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone in the document. 245  
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Similarly, at the end of an ASEAN summit in 2015, the ASEAN defense ministers 
failed to agree on a closing statement for their summit, due to their discrepancies over 
Chinese actions in the South China Sea. 246 Furthermore, in 2016, the US President 
Barack Obama hosted an US-ASEAN summit in Sunnylands to enhance diplomatic 
ties with the ASEAN members for countering China’s expansionist moves in the 
South China Sea but failed to make a common statement against China due to the 
opposition of Laos (then chair of ASEAN) and Cambodia. These examples have 
explicitly illustrated how asymmetric interdependence allows Beijing to strategically 
reassure other Asian states and to influence other non-claimants’ position in a way 
that favours Beijing’s interests.  
 
 
Deterring the formation of anti-China coalitions 
 
China’s embrace of regional multilateral institutions is closely linked to Sino-US 
power competition. From a Chinese perspective, the US military presence and 
dominant role in East Asia are major threats to China’s core interests such as Taiwan 
issue and territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas.247 In particular, 
Washington’s strategic containment of China is perceived as a great challenge to 
Beijing’s security interests in the periphery.248  From an American perspective, 
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China’s rising power and influence is reshaping regional security architecture and 
eroding the US power. Especially, China’s growing assertiveness is perceived as a 
serious threat to the established international order and American dominant position. 
As a result, Sino-US strategic rivalry has considerably intensified.   
 
Recognizing the US’s military superiority, China seeks to counterbalance the US 
hegemonic power through establishing, utilizing and institutionalizing regional 
multilateral cooperation. In particular, regional multilateral institutions that prompt 
asymmetric interdependence between Beijing and its Asian neighbour help deter the 
formation of anti-China coalitions in East Asia and limits Washington’s ability to 
project power in the region. However, institutional balancing has its limits. In a world 
comprising of small, secondary and great powers, when a secondary power attempts 
to counter a great power from outside the region by aligning with small powers, small 
powers often adopt a hedging strategy to maintain strategic balance between the great 
power and secondary power in order to preserve their autonomy and to avoid 
domination by a bigger power. Indeed, when China, as secondary power, seeks to 
form a balancing coalition with other Asian states through regional multilateral 
institutions to soft balancing against the US dominance, this process involves two 
stages of power contestation. In the first stage, Beijing and Washington compete for 
dominance and influence in East Asia. When Washington seeks to contain China’s 
rise for maintaining its dominance, Beijing also endeavours to counter the coercion 
and threats from Washington and undermine its dominance in search of its security 
and great power status.249 In the second stage, it involves power competition between 
China and other Asian states. When Beijing seeks to replace the US’s leadership role 
in East Asia, East Asian states tend to adopt a hedging strategy towards Beijing and 
Washington in order to prevent any single power to dominate this region, even if 
Beijing has established asymmetric interdependence over those East Asian states. In 
particular, those states that have territorial disputes or strategic rivalry with Beijing 
are more likely to ally with Washington to rebalance China’s rising power. 
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In 2011, Obama announced a ‘Pivot to Asia’ strategy to rebalance China’s rising 
power and influence in East Asia through economic, diplomatic and military 
means:250 1) re-establishing its security alliance with its Asian partners such as Japan, 
South Korea, and ASEAN; 2) consolidating the US presence and dominance in the 
region; and 3) counterbalancing China’s growing economic, political and military 
power in the region. In particular, Washington realized that Beijing’s proactive 
engagement in regional multilateral institutions significantly increases Beijing’s 
influence at the expense of American prominence in the region. Therefore, 
Washington started to lobby for joining regional multilateral institutions in East Asia 
such as the EAS and finally made it in 2011. In an attempt to rebalance Beijing’s 
rising economic power, Washington signed the Transpacific Trade Partnership with 
other 11 Pacific-Asian partners on 4th February 2016 that excludes China. Only ten 
days later, Washington launched the US-ASEAN meeting for enhancing its economic, 
political and military ties with Asian partners in response to China’s rising role in 
East Asia. Although Trump abandoned the TPP and adopted a policy of isolationism 
under the doctrine of the ‘American First’, Washington is still moving to reinforce its 
ties with Asian allies and partners in order to preserve the balance of power in the 
Indo-Pacific region, countering China’s expansion.251 In this respect, the asymmetric 
interdependence between Beijing and other Asian states can reduce the US’s leverage 
on those Asian states, limit the US ability to project power against China and deter the 
formation of any anti-China coalition.   
 
As institutional balancing involves two stages of power competition, Beijing’s 
intentions to enhance asymmetric interdependence and strategic reassurance through 
regional multilateral institutions may be frustrated when China’s rising power is 
perceived as a threat instead of an opportunity. Those states including Japan, Vietnam, 
and the Philippines which have either territorial disputes or geostrategic rivalry with 
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Beijing are prone to align with Washington in order to counter Beijing’s growing 
assertiveness, advancing their interests. On 28 April 2008, the Philippines and the US 
signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement that allows the US to rotate 
troops into the Philippines and build and operate facilities on Philippines base for both 
American and Philippine forces.252  Many scholars believe that Manila aspired to 
bolster the US-Philippine alliance for reinforcing its position over Beijing in the South 
China Sea disputes. Furthermore, the Filipino president Benigno Aquino III visited 
Japan in June 2015 in search of Japan’s support in the disputes, and received a 
convincing response from Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who stated that Japan 
would offer its ‘utmost support’ for the Philippines against China’s aggressive action. 
As a result, two states held their first joint naval manoeuvres in the South China Sea. 
Japan also sought to shape a Japan-led regional order in East Asia and challenges 
China’s rising power by reinforcing its alliance with the US.253 In April 2015, Japanese 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made a state visit to Washington and two states reaffirmed 
their common interest and objective in Asia for consolidating the US-Japan alliance 
that can be a response to China’s growing role in the region. In meanwhile, Japan also 
expressed its willingness to join the US in maritime air patrols in the South China Sea. 
Vietnam is following the same path and Japanese and Vietnamese defense ministers 
agreed in November 2015 that a Maritime Self-Defense Force vessel could make a port 
call at Cam Ranh Bay, a Vietnamese military base in the South China Sea. 254  Even 
more significant was Obama’s visit to Vietnam in May 2016 and the announcement of 
the lifting of the US arms embargo on Vietnam.255  
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The US also sought to further consolidate its military alliance with South Korea 
in order to balance China’s rising role and preserve its dominance in East Asia.  
Although Seoul has in principle accepted the US’s proposal to deploy a Terminal 
High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system in the country in response to 
military threats from North Korea, Seoul has refused Washington’s request to take a 
stance against Beijing’s assertive actions in the South China Sea.256 Tokyo’s and 
Seoul’s different approach towards this issue has in part illustrated the success and 
limits of China’s strategy of asymmetric interdependence and institutional balancing. 
Given that the THAAD poses a severe threat to Beijing’s security interests in 
Northeast Asia,257 but Beijing failed to press Seoul to abandon the deployment of the 
US’s THAAD in South Korea by leveraging its economic power even if there exists 
an asymmetric interdependent linkage between China and South Korea and the latter 
is significantly dependent on the former economically.     
 
Conclusion: the success and limits of institutional balancing   
 
China’s growing engagement with regional multilateral institutions is a strategic 
adaption to the emerging security challenges and new power dynamics of East Asia. 
As China’s rising power is altering the Asian security architecture, Washington 
adopts a containment strategy against China for preserving its hegemonic position. 
This increasingly intensifies the Sino-US power competition in East Asia. At the same 
time, Beijing also sees the US’s military presence in East Asia and its containment 
strategy as a major challenge to its core interests such as the Taiwan issue and the 
territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas. In particular, Obama’s pivot to 
Asia and Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy have considerably endangered Beijing’s 
security and geopolitical environment.    
 
With the intensifying Sino-US competition in East Asia, new strategic realities 
present a dilemma for Beijing on how to manage its cooperative and competitive 
relationship with Washington and the other Asian states and achieve a peaceful rise. 
Against this background, this chapter has explored the calculations and constraints 
behind China’s involvement in regional multilateralism in East Asia, suggesting that 
China’s growing engagement in regional multilateral institutions is strongly motivated 
                                                
256. Van Jackson, ‘The South China Sea Needs South Korea,’ The Diplomat, 24 June 2015, 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-south-china-sea-needs-south-korea/. 
257. Global Times, ‘South Korea to Antagonize China with THAAD,’ Global Times, 7 
January 2017, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1027538.shtml. 
100 
 
by a strategy of soft balancing. China has made use of regional multilateral 
institutions as a vehicle of institutional balancing to undermine the US prominence in 
three ways: establishing asymmetric interdependence over its Asian neighbors, 
enhancing strategic reassurance in East Asia, and deterring the formation of any 
anti-China coalition in the region. China’s embrace of regional multilateralism is a 
key underpinning of the ‘Diplomatic Face of China’s Grand Strategy’ to achieve the 
twin goals of security and great power status,258 as regional multilateralism provides 
a ‘smart’ way to manage its complicated relations with the US and other Asian states 
and achieve a peaceful rise. 
 
As the dynamic interactions of ideas, interests and institutions can alter the 
existing power structure and reshape the international relations of East Asia inside 
and outside institutions, regional multilateralism provides a new paradigm for Beijing 
to transform its economic power into political power, reshape the balance of power in 
East Asia, and build its geopolitical influence in the region. In particular, this strategic 
maneuver helps Beijing to establish asymmetric economic interdependence over other 
Asian countries, to reassure its neighbors of the benign nature of China’s rise, and 
hinder any containment initiatives targeting China.    
 
However, China’s intention to use regional multilateral institutions as a means of 
soft balancing against the US is constrained due to the involvement of two stages of 
power competition: between China and the US; and between China and other Asian 
states. Although Beijing’s effort to establish asymmetric interdependence has been 
quite successful, its efforts to reassure other East Asian countries about its intentions 
and the repercussions of its growing power have a mixed record. In an attempt to 
preserve autonomy and safeguard their national interests, most East Asian states have 
pursued a hedging strategy to maintain strategic balance between Beijing and 
Washington, preventing any great power from dominating this region. Only Laos and 
Cambodia have aligned more consistently with Chinese strategic interests, whereas 
Japan, Philippines, and Vietnam, which have territorial disputes and/or geostrategic 
rivalry with China, have been more prone to step up defense and diplomatic 
cooperation with the US for reinforcing their territorial claims or stance against China. 
In particular, Beijing’s growing assertiveness in the East and South China Seas can be 
a catalyst for the US and several East Asian states to embark on joint initiatives 
against China. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
SOFT BALANCING AGAINST THE HEGEMON: CHINA’S APPROACH 
TOWARDS THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
After the launching of reform and open door policy in 1978, China has achieved great 
economic success by integrating into the international system and emerged as a 
regional and global power. When the global system shifted from bipolarity to 
unipolarity at the end of the Cold War, China became a proactive actor in initiating, 
developing and institutionalizing regional multilateral cooperation in Asia, signalling 
a significant change of Chinese foreign policy. 259  Regional multilateralism is 
considered the key element in the ‘Diplomatic Face of China’s Grand Strategy’260 for 
managing its complicated relations with major powers and its peaceful rise, as China 
is confronted with the overriding security challenges arising from the shifting balance 
of global power and the growing Sino-US strategic rivalry. In particular, after 
Washington enacted a containment strategy against China for maintaining its global 
dominance,261 Beijing perceived Washington as a major threat to its security and 
peaceful rise. Regional multilateralism provides a new approach for Beijing to 
advance its regional and global strategy. In Central Asia, China initiated the 
‘Shanghai five’ multilateral mechanism in 1996 and founded the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001, which was comprised of China, Russia, 
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Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. China’s efforts to institutionalize 
regional multilateral cooperation in Central Asia triggered wide debate. What are the 
motivations and calculations behind China’s strategy towards Central Asia and the 
SCO? How is the SCO used strategically and tactically as a vehicle of soft balancing 
against the hegemon?  
 
The geopolitical significance as well as huge oil and gas resources had made 
Central Asia a theatre of Great Power politics for centuries. The collapse of the Soviet 
Union left a political vacuum in Central Asia that triggered a new Great Power Game 
in the region. China as a major player is not exceptional. To date, the SCO has 
become the most influential multilateral organization in the region and reshaped the 
geopolitics of Central Asia. With its expanding scope of cooperation and growing 
influence, China has more substantive and ambitious expectations on the SCO. Some 
scholars argue that China’s approach towards the SCO is driven by so-called new 
security concept.262 Beijing intends to secure a stable and peaceful international 
environment in its periphery and promote international norms through the 
establishment of SCO. Some analysts also point out that the Xinjiang issue and 
energy pipelines, which are given a high priority in Chinese foreign policy, are the 
primary driving force for Beijing to promote regional multilateral cooperation in 
Central Asia.263 Others suggest that China’s engagement with the SCO is rooted in 
new geopolitics of Central Asia in the aftermath of the Cold War. A still weak China 
and a declining Russia had strong incentive to align with each other through the 
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establishment of a bilateral strategic partnership and the consolidation of regional 
multilateral cooperation within the SCO, preserving the balance of power in Central 
Asia and globally.264     
 
This chapter argues that Beijing’s approach towards the SCO is strongly 
underpinned by a strategy of soft balancing against the US. According to Robert Pape, 
soft balancing may be undertaken by secondary states against the hegemon through 
economic, political, diplomatic and institutional methods when the states perceive that 
the hegemon behaves hostilely and poses a potential threat to their national 
interests. 265  While traditional hard balancing is too costly and risky for these 
secondary states to directly challenge US’s military preponderance, international 
institutions serve as a non-military means to undermine US’s hegemonic power.266 
Regional multilateral institutions such as the SCO facilitate cooperation between the 
member states and overcome the prisoner’s dilemma in balancing against external 
threats. After the Bush Administration launched the anti-terrorism war in Afghanistan, 
the US military presence was seen as a challenge to Beijing’s and Moscow’s strategic 
interests in Central Asia. With the limited military capabilities to match that of the US, 
China has a strong incentive to undertake a strategy of soft balancing against the 
hegemon through institutional means, as the SCO enables Beijing to forge a balancing 
coalition counterbalancing the US’s dominance without provoking it. However, 
China’s growing role in Central Asia may alter regional balance of power and trigger 
Sino-Russian competition that might undermine Beijing’s efforts in using the SCO as 
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a vehicle of soft balancing against the US.267 Thus the success in China’s diplomatic 
strategy heavily relies on whether Beijing can reassure Moscow over shared interests, 
constrain itself to exercise power, preserve autonomy of other Central Asia states and 
comply with the rules within the SCO.268 
 
Regional multilateralism has become a new paradigm in Chinese foreign policy. 
China’s approach towards regional multilateralism is strongly shaped by a so-called 
grand strategy in search for security and great power status, as regional multilateral 
institutions serve as a key apparat for Beijing to shape a new balance of global power 
to its interests, transform economic power into political power, and advance its 
geo-economic, geopolitical and geostrategic interests regionally and globally, all of 
which help counter the hegemon’s pressure and threat and reduce the risk and costs of 
achieving its peaceful rise. The establishment of the SCO reflected Beijing’s strategic 
calculations on the new strategic realities stemming from the intensifying Sino-US 
rivalry, the Sino-Russian strategic alliance and the changing international system. 
This chapter explores the logic of China’s growing engagement with the SCO. It 
argues that China pursued a strategy of soft balancing to counter the US hegemony 
through regional multilateral cooperation. First, China sought to build a balancing 
coalition through the SCO to counter the US’s expansion in Central Asia. Second, 
China tended to promote common norms such as ‘sovereignty’ and ‘non-interference’ 
within the SCO against the West-supported colour revolutions. Third, China pursued 
to forge a strategic alliance through regional multilateral mechanism to foster a 
multipolar world order and end the US’s unipolar moment, as regional multilateralism 
provides a new way to shape the new balance of global power and transform the 
unipolar international system towards multipolarity. However, the Sino-Russia 
competition and the complex geopolitics of Central Asia might undermine Beijing’s 
efforts in forming a balancing coalition against the US through the SCO.    
 
To further explore the strategic calculations behind China’s strategy towards the 
SCO, this chapter is divided into five sections. Section one gives a brief overview of 
China’s active role in the SCO and the main questions and arguments of this chapter. 
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Section two highlights the concept of regional multilateralism and the theoretical 
aspect of soft balancing and reviews the existing literatures. Section three illustrates 
China’s strategy towards Central Asia and its growing engagement with regional 
multilateral cooperation within the SCO. Section four examines the motivation and 
calculations behind China’s approach towards the institutionalization of regional 
multilateralism within the SCO and provides new insight into how regional 
multilateral institution is tactically and strategically used by China as a vehicle of soft 
balancing to counter the US’s power and influence in Central Asia and beyond. 
Section five presents some conclusions by illustrating the limits of using the SCO as a 
new instrument of soft balancing against the hegemon.  
 
 
Regional multilateral institution as a vehicle of soft balancing 
 
Multilateralism has been far a new phenomenon in International Relations. Although 
there are the different forms of multilateralism, this work only focuses on regional 
multilateralism. How do we conceptualize regional multilateralism? According to 
Robert Keohane, 269  multilateralism is defined as the practice of coordination, 
cooperation and collaboration in certain policy areas among three or more states 
through ad hoc agreements, conventions and arrangements under the provisions of 
international institutions, organizations and regimes. John G. Ruggie also suggested 
that multilateralism refers to “an institutional form which coordinates behaviour 
among three or more states on the basis of 'generalized' principles of conduct that is, 
principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to 
the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in 
any specific occurrence”.270 Regional multilateral institutions are built on a set of 
rules, norms and processes helps shape preference, monitor behaviour, confer 
legitimacy, and facilitate cooperation among the regional actors. More importantly, 
regional multilateralism provides a new paradigm for the states to institutionalize 
regional multilateral cooperation in adopting common positions, measures and actions 
towards common goals and interests and acting collectively to respond to the external 
threat and coercion from the existing or potential hegemon, and any other 
organization or institution outside the region.  
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In the IR theories, the balance of power theory is the heartland of both classical 
realism and neorealism.271 According to Kenneth Waltz, balancing behaviour may 
emerge when two requirements are met: the self-helped states pursue relative power 
for surviving, and the world is structured under anarchy.272 The balance of power 
strategy can be materialized either through internal balancing or external balancing. In 
an anarchic international system, small and secondary powers have a strong incentive 
to counter the hegemon’s superiority through internal balancing or external balancing 
in order to preserve the balance of power and maximize relative power for survival, 
security or interests.273 John Mearsheimar also provided the underlying explanations 
to the state’s balancing behaviour in his renowned book ‘The Tragedy of Great Power 
Politics’,274 suggesting that weaker states often seek to ally with other states against 
superior power for preserving the balance of power, countering the hegemon and 
avoiding domination and exploitation. As the distribution of material power and 
military capability in the international system is considered a key factor in 
determining power status of the states, Mearsheimer argues that the power 
competition between a rising and dominant power will inevitably lead to war when 
the former is not satisfied with its power status and seeks to reshape the existing 
international order being created and dominated by the latter that particularly applies 
to the growing strategic rivalry between China and the US.    
 
While globalization prompted interdependence between the states, traditional 
hard balancing through military means suffers problems and difficulties in today’s 
unipolar world. In recent years, soft balancing has emerged as a new concept to 
interpret the state’s balancing behaviour in international politics.275 Soft balancing 
has been a more favourable option for secondary powers such as the BRICS to 
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frustrate the US’s hegemonic power (unilateralism, primacy and domination) for 
security, interests and great power status that is materialized through non-military 
means such as economic initiatives, diplomatic coalitions, and international 
institutions and agreements. Accordingly, regional multilateral institution has been a 
new vehicle of soft balancing for a rising power against the hegemon inclusively or 
exclusively. Kai He and Weiqing Song argue that international institutions are a 
critical instrument to undertake a strategy of soft balancing by secondary powers to 
counter the pressures or threats from the US hegemony.276 Soft balancing has two 
different forms: inclusive and exclusive. In the former, small and secondary powers 
are motivated to form a balancing coalition, which includes the superpower, to act 
collectively to constrain and undermine superpower’s unilateralism and dominance 
within the institution. In the latter, small and secondary powers have incentive to 
establish a regional multilateral institution, which excludes the superpower, to isolate, 
marginalize and counter superpower’s dominant power and influence in a regional 
and global context. 
 
It is generally recognized that if China’s power continues to grow, the power 
transition is very predictable in the near future and that seems totally unacceptable for 
the US as the only hegemon. Thus, China is perceived as a revisionist power to 
challenge the status quo of existing international order that was established and 
dominated by the US.277 Even if Beijing and Washington have shared interests to 
cooperate on the main global problems and issues, some structural contradictions 
between the hegemon and emerging power remain pertinent.278Although Chinese 
officials and scholars persistently reiterated that China’s rise is peaceful and does not 
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pursue hegemony, this view is not that prevalent among western policymakers and 
scholars. John Mearsheimer asserted as early as in 2004 that China’s rise will not be 
peaceful, as the US seeks to contain China through military and non-military means 
while the latter attempts to dominate the Asia-pacific and challenge American 
dominance and unipolar international system. 279  Beijing also perceived the 
hegemon’s aggressiveness and hostility when the Bush administration sought to 
deploy the National Missile Defense (NMD) systems in Asia pacific, and when 
Obama administration devised a ‘Pivot to Asia’ to strategically contain the rise of 
China. Confronting the US’s military pre-eminence, the question of how to counter 
the American threats and achieve its peaceful rise presents a stark security dilemma 
for China’s policymakers. First, as there is a great power gap between two powers, it 
seems absolutely unwise to counter the hegemon through traditional hard balancing. 
Second, the growing interdependence embodying cooperative and competitive 
relationship makes any military confrontation catastrophic for Beijing and 
Washington. In this respect, regional multilateralism as a vehicle of soft balancing 
appears to be a feasible and ‘peaceful’ way for Beijing to counter the US threats and 
advance its strategic interests by shaping a new balance of power. 
 
Indeed, the power gap and the interdependent relationship between two rivals are 
the fundamental elements for secondary states to adopt a strategy of soft balancing, as 
those states that have only limited military capabilities are prone to align with other 
states through an institutional means to counter the unchecked hegemon’s threats. The 
institutionalization of regional multilateral cooperation in Central Asia provides a key 
mechanism to strengthen coordination, cooperation and collaboration between China, 
Russia and other Central Asian states and form a political, economic and security 
coalition towards shared interests and objectives, exclusively isolating, marginalizing 
and undermining the US hegemony in a regional and global context. The logic of 
using the SCO as a vehicle of soft balance lies in shaping a balancing coalition to 
resist the US’s expansion in Central Asia, promote common norms such as 
sovereignty and non-interference, and transform the unipolar international system 
towards multipolarity. Under certain circumstances, even the superpower also pursues 
a strategy of soft balancing against a potential peer competitor or emerging adversary 
through the coalition or alliance formation in order to maintain the status quo, 
dominance and superiority in the international system. He and Feng’s work suggests 
that even the US as a strongest power undertook a strategy of soft balancing against 
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China other than hard balancing as two states have become increasingly 
interdependent.280 It is too difficult and hazardous for Washington to hard balancing 
against Beijing through military means, even if it holds overwhelming military 
advantage over Beijing.  
 
 
China’s strategy towards Central Asia and the SCO 
 
Central Asia lies at the heart of the Eurasian landmass and has geopolitical 
importance that makes it one of the most contested regions in world politics. Soon 
after the demise of Soviet Union in 1991, China turned its attention to its Central 
Asian neighbours. China was the first country to officially recognize the Russian 
Federation and five newly independent states including Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, 
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan and rapidly established diplomatic relations 
with these states.281 Meanwhile, Beijing recognized Moscow’s dominant status in 
Central Asia and maintained a prudent stance on developing its relations with other 
Central Asian states.282 Thus, China maintained a friendly bilateral relationship with 
Central Asian states throughout the early 1990s and bilateral cooperation was only 
limited to energy and trade. 
 
The independence of former Soviet republics resulted in the territorial disputes 
on common boundary delineation and demarcation between China and those Central 
Asian countries. In April 1996, China initiated the Shanghai Five mechanism in 
Shanghai to establish a regional multilateral framework on resolving the border 
disputes among China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. It is the first 
time for China to pursue a multilateral approach to promote regional cooperation in 
Central Asia. One year later, the Shanghai Five leaders signed the Treaty on 
Reduction of Military Forces in Border Regions at the second summit in Moscow in 
order to deepen mutual trust and confidence, under which the deployment of military 
troop was limited up to 130 thousand soldiers within the border areas of those 
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countries. The political change in Central Asia led to the power vacuum and political 
disorder that favoured the growing flourishing of “three evils”, namely terrorism, 
separatism and extremism, posing a crucial threat to regional security and stability. 
China’s Xinjiang autonomous region suffered continual political unrest from ‘three 
evils’ that challenged the border security of Northwestern China. At the Shanghai 
Five summit in 1998 in Almaty, all the members agreed to reinforce regional 
multilateral cooperation on combating ‘three evils’ in Central Asia. In this respect, the 
Shanghai Five has expanded its agenda from border dispute to regional security, 
reflecting the common demand and interest in promoting regional multilateral 
cooperation.283   
 
At the Bishkek summit in 1999, the leaders of ‘Shanghai five’ states decided, 
upon Kyrgyzstan’s proposal, to establish a center of anti-terror in order to strengthen 
coordination, cooperation and collaboration in combating the growing terrorism, 
separatism and extremism in the region, as all those states were confronting 
non-traditional security issues such as arms-smuggling, cross-border crime, ethnic 
insurgency, Islamic terrorism and religious extremism in the region.284 In particular, 
Islamic Taliban movement seized power and control over Afghanistan in 1998 that 
soundly deteriorated security situation in Central Asia. The fifth summit took place in 
Dushanbe in 2000 and the Shanghai Five partners agreed to “oppose intervention in 
other countries’ internal affairs on the pretexts of ‘humanitarianism’ and ‘protecting 
human rights’; and support the efforts of one another in safeguarding the five 
countries’ national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and social stability.” 
It reflected a common desire of those states to defend ‘common autonomy’ within 
regional multilateral mechanism while sharing ‘common objective’ and ‘common 
demand’ to promote regional multilateral process towards their common interests, 
ensuring regional peace and stability. This joint statement also involved a common 
position of those states on the colour revolution and military intervention of West. 
During the 2001 annual summit in Shanghai, the five founding members accepted 
Uzbekistan in the Shanghai Five mechanism and all the heads of six member states 
signed the Declaration of Shanghai Cooperation Organization on June 15 2001. It is 
the first time for China to launch a regional multilateral organization that 
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demonstrates Beijing’s growing enthusiasm for regional multilateralism in Central 
Asia.  
 
Within the SCO, China and Russia as the leading members maintain strong 
influence in regional and global affairs. The foundation of SCO implied the 
emergence of a new great power game among Beijing, Moscow and Washington in 
the era of post-Cold War.285 The American scholar Joseph Nye argues that  
“In the 1950s, China and the Soviet Union were allied against the US. After US 
President Richard Nixon’s opening to China in l972, the balance shifted, with the US 
and China cooperating to limit what they viewed as a dangerous rise in the Soviet 
Union’s power. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, that de facto US-China alliance 
ended, and a China-Russia rapprochement began. In 1992, the two countries declared 
that they were pursuing a “constructive partnership”; in 1996, they progressed toward a 
“strategic partnership.”286  
Soon after the launching of SCO, Beijing and Moscow signed the Treaty of 
Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation in July 2001. The dramatic 
turnaround of Sino-Russian relations also reflects two powers’ aspiration to enhance 
strategic cooperation not only bilaterally but also regionally and globally. Later in 
2002, the heads of the SCO member states signed the SCO Charter in Saint 
Petersburg, which expounded on the organization’s purposes, principles, structures 
and process of the SCO as “strengthening mutual trust, good neighbourliness and 
friendship among member states; …and working together to maintain regional peace, 
security and stability and to building a democratic, just and rational international 
political and economic order”.287 As China and Russia are both strong advocates of 
multipolarity, it is thus not surprising that both states are devoted to push towards a 
multipolar world through regional multilateralism, countering the US hegemony.   
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The SCO is a key apparat for Beijing to promote regional multilateral 
cooperation in economic, energy, political and security realms. China’s approach 
towards the SCO can be grasped in five aspects: first, Beijing was faced with the 
non-traditional security threats from the three-evils across the region that affects the 
stability of its Northwest frontier.288 Second, the collapse of the Communist Party of 
Soviet Union and the interdependence of Central Asian states were perceived as a 
great threat to the ruling of the Chinese Communist Party. Accordingly, China sought 
to form a political coalition among these authoritarian states through the SCO against 
the penetration of Western democracy for ensuring regime security.289 Third, when 
the international system shifted from bipolarity to unipolarity after the Cold War, 
Beijing reoriented its foreign policy towards the US and Russia.290 In particular, 
China pursued to forge a Sino-Russian strategic alliance within the SCO against the 
only hegemon when the US’s military presence in Central Asia endangered both 
Beijing and Moscow’s security interests in the region after the 11 September terrorist 
attack. Fourth, China sought to enhance energy cooperation with Central Asian states 
through the SCO to diversify oil supplies and suppliers, reduce reliance on oil imports 
from the Persian Gulf and ensure energy security, since the growing energy demand 
played a role in Chinese foreign policy. 291  Fifth, China intended to intensify 
economic diplomacy through the SCO to expand its influence, strengthen its 
leadership role and advance its periphery strategy,292 as Central Asia has strategic 
significance for Beijing’s interests.   
      
 
Resisting American expansion in Central Asia 
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In the 1990s, the US paid little attention to Central Asia after the collapse of Soviet 
Union, excepting Washington’s concerns about the denuclearization of the newly 
independent states in Kazakhstan and Ukraine. After the terror attacks of September 
11, 2001, Central Asia soon became a major focus of US foreign policy. Having 
launched anti-terror war in Afghanistan, the US’s role in the region expanded 
dramatically. With significant economic assistance, the US signed military 
cooperation agreement with all the Central Asian states except Turkmenistan.293 
Washington was permitted to use the Karshi-Khanabad Air Base in Uzbekistan in 
October 2001 and the Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan in December 2001 respectively 
in support of combat operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. In 
2002, up to 5,000 US soldiers were stationed in Uzbekistan294 and around 2,000 
American and European troops were stationed in Kyrgyzstan.295 NATO got involved 
as an alliance in August 2003. 296  Although Beijing appreciated Washington’s 
counter-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan, the US’s and NATO’s military presence in 
the region was perceived as a serious threat to its security interests in Xinjiang and 
Central Asia. Russia also saw NATO as a major threat to its national security after the 
Cold War when this organization expanded into Eastern Europe. The US’s military 
presence in Central Asia seriously undermined Russia’s traditional sphere of 
influence and strategic interests in the region, which can be a key factor for Beijing 
and Moscow to reach a consensus on promoting regional multilateral cooperation 
within the SCO297 and forming a balancing coalition to counter the US’s power and 
influence in Central Asia and beyond. 
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Beijing persistently pursued a periphery strategy to ensure stability and security 
in its periphery.298 Xinjiang as Eurasian Continental Bridge interconnecting China 
and other subcontinents in the Eurasian space has strategic importance.299 Xinjiang is 
not only the country’s top energy producer and supplier but also a critical energy 
transport corridor that has greatly facilitated China’s energy imports via pipelines 
from Central Asia and enhanced its energy security. Xinjiang is also a core area of 
China’s Western Development Strategy and Silk Road Economic Belt for promoting 
economic development and political stability in the region.300 The US military 
outposts in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, where far-ranging reconnaissance and 
surveillance capabilities were deployed, enabled US intelligence and security 
agencies to conduct espionage and sabotage activities in Xinjiang.301 The US also 
supported the Washington-based World Uyghur Congress, which encouraged Uyghur 
Muslim Separatism in Xinjiang, through the US Congress-funded National 
Endowment for Democracy (NED).302 These factors not only pose a serious threat to 
politically fragile Xinjiang and stability and security of China’s vulnerable western 
frontier, but also endanger its economic and energy cooperation with Central Asian 
states. More importantly, the US’s and NATO’s military presence in Central Asia is 
also part of Washington’s strategic containment against China as did the US in East 
Asia. Beijing believed that the US’s grand strategy behind the War in Afghanistan is 
to dominate Central Asia and contain Beijing and Moscow for further consolidating 
its global hegemony, since Central Asia lied at the heart of the Eurasian continent 
remains crucial for its global dominance.303 In this respect, Beijing and Moscow have 
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common goals and interests in countering the US’s and NATO’s expanding influence 
in Central Asia. Given neither China nor Russia have military strength to challenge 
the US’s overwhelming power through traditional hard balancing, China has strong 
incentive to use the SCO as a vehicle of soft balancing against the US hegemony.   
 
It is thus not surprising that Beijing intensified its efforts in deepening and 
broadening its trade, energy and diplomatic ties with Central Asian states through the 
SCO. In 2003, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao proposed to set up a free trade zone 
within the SCO and the leaders signed an economic cooperation agreement for further 
facilitating trade and investment in Central Asia. At the 2005 SCO summit, Chinese 
President Hu Jintao stated that China hopes that the SCO can better deal with 
challenges, advance regional development, maintain regional stability, and fulfil 
common prosperity through deepening and expanding bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation of all forms among SCO member states. The strategic calculations behind 
China’s growing engagement with regional multilateral cooperation can be 
understood in three aspects: First, regional economic cooperation allows Beijing to 
establish strategic interdependence with Central Asian states, increase power and 
build its leadership role in the region. Second, China’s efforts to promote regional 
multilateral cooperation within the SCO cannot merely reassure Central Asian states 
of its benign nature but also eliminate strategic mistrust and suspicions between 
Beijing and Moscow, enabling Beijing to form a balancing coalition within the SCO 
against the hegemon. Third, enhancing regional multilateral cooperation within the 
SCO can not only prevent Russia from tilting towards the West, but also deter other 
Central Asian states to align with the US and form anti-China coalitions against China. 
In sum, China pursued to enlarge its circle of friends and partners towards building a 
political, economic and security coalition through the SCO to dilute the US’s power 
and influence in Central Asia and beyond. 
 
Since 2002, Beijing strongly pushed for regional multilateral cooperation in 
counter-terrorism, intelligence sharing and military cooperation within the SCO.304 
The SCO held a series of bilateral and multilateral joint military exercise that 
expanded geographically from Central Asia to the Far East region. In August 2005, 
China and Russia held the first joint military exercise ‘Peace Mission 2005’ in the 
                                                
304. Xinhua News Agency, ‘Backgrounder: PLA-related Military Exercises since 2002,’ 
Xinhua News Agency, 5 September 2004, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2004-09/25/content_2020458.htm. 
116 
 
Shandong Peninsula of China.305 It consisted of combined land, sea, and air elements 
simulating an intervention in a state besieged by terrorists or political turmoil. Nearly 
8,000 Chinese troops and 2,000 Russian troops took part in the exercise. Although 
Beijing and Moscow stated that the joint military exercise was designed to strengthen 
the two countries’ capabilities to combat terrorism, separatism and extremism in 
Central Asia and not directed at any third country, this form of military exercise has 
gone far beyond a pure act to combat the three evils in the region. Many American 
analysts believe that it symbolled a Sino-Russian strategic alliance against the US. 
When Putin was in China for the Opening Ceremony of Beijing Olympic Games in 
August 2008, the Pro-west government of Mikheil Saakashvili launched a full-scale 
military operation in South Ossetia. Later China and other SCO members signed a 
declaration at the SCO summit in Tajikistan in support of Russia’s active role in 
promoting peace in the South Ossetia conflict.306 It reflected a common position of 
the SCO towards the NATO and Beijing played a key role in dealing with common 
geopolitical challenge in the region. Despite that, Beijing refused to recognize the 
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia because of its concerns about separatist 
regions such as Xinjiang, Taiwan and Tibet. Beijing and Moscow did clearly 
understand strategic significance of forging a Sino-Russian alliance and shaping a 
balancing coalition through the SCO in response to their common threat and 
adversary, the American hegemony.   
 
In July 2005, the SCO released a joint declaration calling the US-led alliance to 
set a timetable for the withdrawal of their military bases from Central Asia. At the 
same month, Uzbekistan formally evicted the US from the Karshi-Khanabad air base 
in southern Uzbekistan despite the US’s reluctance. Upon the request of Kyrgyz 
government, the US military was also forced to vacate the Manas air base in 
Kyrgyzstan. Many scholars believe that Uzbekistan’s and Kyrgyzstan’s move 
reflected Beijing’s and Moscow’s reaction to America’s expanding military presence 
in the region, since both of them viewed Central Asia as their sphere of influence. 
Robert Pape and Thazha V. Paul, two prominent proponents of soft balancing theory, 
also argue that US’s increasingly aggressive intentions have led to a close cooperation 
between Beijing and Moscow in Central Asia. For Moscow, Central Asia remains not 
only its traditional sphere of influence but also a security buffer against possible 
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aggression from the West that involves its strategic interests.307 For Beijing, the 
NATO’s and US’s military presence in the region not only enable Washington to 
make a strategic encirclement of China, but also endanger its strategic interests in 
Xinjiang and Central Asia.308 In particular, the SCO has significance for Beijing to 
deter other Central Asian states to support the Uyghurs’ interdependence movement 
in Xinjiang and to join the US alliance or form a new coalition against China. In this 
respect, the SCO serves as a key instrument for Beijing to form a balancing coalition 
to delay, frustrate and undermine the US power and influence in Central Asia. The 
vacation of the US forces from the military bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are 
very successful examples.  
 
The SCO has become a major vehicle for Beijing to expand its strategic ties with 
Moscow and other regional actors in pursuit of its geopolitical interests. While 
accepting Mongolia (2004), Pakistan (2005), India (2005), Iran (2005), Afghanistan 
(2012) and Belarus (2015) as observers into the SCO, the SCO expanded its influence 
from Central Asia to South Asia and West Asia. Among them, India and Pakistan as 
major powers in South Asia have been formally admitted as full members in July 
2015. Iran as a regional power in West Asia has since 2008 applied for full 
membership but not admitted because of the sanctions imposed by the UN. Soon after 
the UN sanctions were lifted, Chinese president Xi Jinping announced strong support 
for Iran’s full membership in the SCO during his state visit to Iran in January 2016. 
Even Turkey as a NATO member joined the SCO as dialogue partner status in 2012. 
In particular, the emerging China-India-Russia trilateral cooperation within the SCO 
helps not only mitigate the Sino-Indian rivalry and improve its strategic environment 
along its periphery but also deter India from joining the US-led coalition against 
China,309 despite India maintaining closer ties with the US than China and Russia. 
China’s firm commitment to promote regional multilateral cooperation within the 
SCO serves as an innovative means to consolidate its relationship with Russia and 
Central Asian states in pursuit of a strategy of soft balancing against the US 
hegemony.  
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Promoting common norms  
 
Regional multilateral regimes provide a normative process not only to promote 
common ideas and norms and facilitate collective actions towards a common 
objective, but also enhance political identity and legitimacy of power in the 
international system.310 In a realist world, promoting a normative transformation in 
the international society is also a form of soft balancing as the acceptance and 
recognition of new international norms matters for a dynamic contestation of 
normative authority and political legitimacy in the international system.311  The 
transformation in international politics is defined as a competition for political 
legitimacy of power. Thus, power competition and normative contestation are two 
sides of the same coin of power politics.312 In general, there are two different forms 
of soft balancing behaviour in relation to normative contestation. First, inclusive soft 
balancing occurs when the competition for normative legitimacy exists within the 
institution, meaning that two members struggle for normative legitimacy inside the 
institution. Second, exclusive soft balancing emerges when the competition for 
normative legitimacy involves the adversaries outside the institution, meaning that 
two adversaries compete for normative legitimacy between different institutions or 
groups. However, the success or failure in undertaking a strategy of soft balancing 
against the adversaries through the promotion of new international norms highly relies 
on the acceptance or recognition of alternative norms among the states within the 
institution. In this chapter, it involves exclusive soft balancing as China seeks to 
promote common norms such as sovereignty and non-interference among several 
Central Asian states through the SCO in order to counter the Western-supported 
colour revolutions.        
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Since the early 1950s, the successive Chinese governments have enunciated the 
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as the fundamental basis of developing its 
external relations with the rest of world: mutual respect for territorial integrity and 
sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference in internal affairs; 
equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence.313 Among them, the principle 
of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries as the cornerstone of 
Chinese foreign policy is usually regarded as a policy to resist ‘hegemony’, ‘power 
politics’ and ‘western colonialism and imperialism’ in the aftermath of World War II. 
Since the Cold War, Beijing reiterated that the five principles of peaceful coexistence 
should be the basic guidelines for the new international political order and 
contemporary international relations.314 There was also a consensus among Chinese 
officials and scholars that the Western powers’ imposition of ‘Western values, norms 
and ideologies’ only served as an intellectual tool to consolidate hegemony over the 
developing world, especially targeting a rising China. After the Tiananmen Student 
Movement in 1989, China’s political elites further asserted that the spread of western 
values and norms such as democracy and human rights was merely the western 
‘Peaceful Evolution’ or colour revolution, conspiring to rid China off the socialist 
road and overthrowing the CPC regime. Since then, Beijing has realized that 
promoting norms of sovereignty and non-interference is part of power politics as it 
involves the regime security of a sovereignty nation. Accordingly, China’s attempt to 
promote common norms of sovereignty and non-interference within regional 
multilateral institutions is an opposition to western intervention in the domestic affairs 
of other countries.        
 
When Beijing and Moscow established a strategic partnership in 1996, Chinese 
President Jiang Zemin and Russian President Boris Yeltsin issued a joint statement 
that, aside from their common stance on countering “hegemonism”, emphasized the 
importance of achieving “regional and global stability, development and prosperity” 
on the basis of “the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, 
equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence”. It demonstrated two states’ 
common interest in underlining norms of state sovereignty and non-interference in the 
international relations, as both states perceived that the spread of western values and 
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norms or of so called normative power posed a threat to their regime security and 
political stability. Since the establishment of ‘Shanghai five’ mechanism in 1996, the 
principle of sovereignty and non-interference has been the fundamental of ‘Shanghai 
Spirit’ and become common norm of the SCO when it was founded in 2001. The 
Shanghai Spirit stressed that sovereignty should be respected regardless of the power 
difference and no state is allowed to impose models of social development or political 
ideology on other countries. China’s efforts to promote common norms of sovereignty 
and non-interference through an institutional process were recognized and adopted on 
a multilateral consensus among the six SCO members. Ambrosio argues that 
‘Shanghai Spirit’ is not merely a set of common norms for the SCO, but is openly 
promoted as universal value and normative basis for global politics and contemporary 
international relations,315 resisting the US’s attempt to impose western values and 
norms of human rights and democracy on the rest of world.    
 
Since the end of the Cold War, Washington has used a wide range of diplomatic 
tools to promote global democratization not only for enhancing its global leadership, 
but also for politically intervening in internal affairs of other countries. The latter 
often triggers political instability and unrest in the targeted country or region. In 
Central Asia, the Tulip Revolution arising from democratic movements in Kyrgyzstan 
overthrew President Askar Akayev and his government in April 2005. The revolution 
in Kyrgyzstan soon spread to its neighbour Uzbekistan in May 2005 and caused 
political crisis in the country. The colour revolution also arose in Georgia (Rose 
Revolution) and Ukraine (Orange revolution) that prompted a political turbulence in 
the region. China and Russia realized that the colour revolution in the former soviet 
republics supported by the US and the West was a new form of regime change 
through non-military means, as those non-democratic states have geostrategic 
importance for advancing the US’s national interests. Many Chinese scholars point 
out that the colour revolution has nothing to do with international norms of 
democracy and human rights, but a new tool of power politics. For Beijing, political 
chaos and regional instability caused by the West-sponsored colour revolutions not 
only impede regional multilateral cooperation within the SCO, but also endanger 
China’s strategic environment in Central Asia as the US may establish pro-western 
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regimes in the region against Beijing’s interests. In particular, both Beijing and 
Moscow feared that the colour revolutions in Central Asia would further spread to 
China and Russia. Thus, China and Russia stand up together to delegitimize and 
oppose regime change in Central Asia by promoting common norms of sovereignty 
and non-interference, countering colour revolutions. In this respect, promoting 
common norms of sovereignty and non-interference not only enhances the solidarity 
of regional multilateral cooperation among the SCO members; it can also be a 
strategy of undermining the US influence and of soft balancing against the hegemon.    
    
In addition, China also sought to establish its soft power in a regional and global 
context by promoting alternative ideas and norms.316 After the launching of the SCO, 
Chinese president Hu Jintao proposed a set of ideas and norms such as New Security 
Concept, New Development Approach, New Civilization Outlook and Concept of 
Harmonious World. The new security concept stressed the pursuit of common 
interests, peaceful dialogue, and common security for all regional actors and the 
discouragement of formal, hierarchical alliances. New Development Approach was 
formally clarified during a forum of the Central Committee of China’s Communist 
Party:  
“All countries should strive to achieve mutual benefit and win-win situation in their 
pursuit of development. They are encouraged to open up rather than close themselves, to 
enjoy fair play instead of profiting oneself at the expense of others.”317 
All of these concepts have reflected Chinese strategic thinking on the contemporary 
international relations, emphasizing that building a harmonious world on the basis of 
the mutual benefit, equality and consultation is the only way to safeguard the world’s 
enduring peace and common prosperity. Chinese leaders perceived that regional 
multilateral institutions could be a means of enhancing cooperation rather than 
confrontation as the increasing interdependence between the states helps reduce the 
conflict, establish trust and ensure stability and peace. At the 2015 SCO summit, 
Chinese president Xi Jinping again called for upholding ‘Shanghai Spirit’ in a bid to 
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build a community of shared destiny in the region”.318 It seems clear that the five 
principles of peaceful coexistence still remain a doctrine of Chinese foreign policy in 
developing its relations with the rest of world. Because promoting alternative ideas 
and norms through regional multilateral institutions not merely enhances China’s soft 
power but also strengthen its role as a peaceful power, one different from the US and 
the West.      
 
 
Fostering a multipolar world 
 
Since the late 1990s, the concept of multipolarity gained prominence in international 
politics. China and Russia have a common stance against the unipolar international 
system and strongly advocate for a multipolar world order. Some western Scholars 
argue that Beijing’s and Moscow’s support for multipolarity can be interpreted as 
opposition to Washington’s domination of global affairs and the American hegemony. 
After the Tiananmen event in 1989, Clinton Administration suspended arms sales to 
China and China’s most favoured nation status because of the violations of human 
rights.319 Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen remarked “The USA’s hegemonic 
stance and its attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of other states pose the 
greatest danger to socialist China” and suggested to develop relations with other 
major powers to counter the American hegemony. In 1992, Jiang Zemin’s political 
report of the14th Congress of the Communist Party of China stated that “China 
supports a multipolar world order and a fair, just and peaceful world is only possible 
through multipolarity (duoji shijie)”. Since then, the concept of multipolarity became 
a doctrine of Chinese foreign policy, as Beijing perceived that a unipolar world 
system dominated by the US is dangerous for China and the world. A multipolar 
system helps limit the US’s hegemonic power and promote world peace and stability. 
Likewise, after the collapse of Soviet Union, Russia had illusion to reconcile with the 
US and the West, but unsuccessfully. Washington decided to enlarge the NATO and 
still viewed Moscow as a major threat to the US and its allies in Europe despite 
Moscow’s strong opposition. Since then, Russia had given up its illusion upon the US 
and West. An old story tells that a rival of enemy can be a friend that is also 
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applicable to the Sino-Russian relations in the aftermath of the Cold War. Because 
Beijing and Moscow have a common objective: countering the American hegemony 
and ending the US’s unipolar moment.  
 
China and Russia established a constructive partnership in 1994 and a strategic 
partnership in 1996 that marked a shift in trilateral relations between Moscow, Beijing 
and Washington in the post-Cold War era.320 During Primakov’s visit to Beijing in 
1997, a joint statement was released to declare their support for a multipolar world 
order and opposition to American hegemony. It was the first time for Beijing and 
Moscow to jointly advocate for multipolarity of the international system. After 
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and the US’s bombing of the Chinese 
embassy in Belgrade, both states issued a joint declaration condemning the American 
hegemony, symbolling the emergence of a Sino-Russian strategic alliance against the 
hegemon.321 Since then, the Sino-Russian strategic axis remains a key pillar of 
promoting a multipolar world order and transforming the unipolar world order 
dominated by the US, counterbalancing American hegemony.322 In 2001, China and 
Russia formalized their strategic alliance by signing the Sino-Russian Treaty of 
Good-Neighbourliness, Friendship, and Cooperation. 323  A joint statement again 
endorsed their support for creating a just and fair new world order. While failing to 
gain the UN authority for use of force in Iraq, the Bush Administration launched the 
Iraq war in 2003 that demonstrated the prevailing unilateralism of unchecked 
American hegemony.324 In an effort to oppose the US’s invasion of Iraq and the 
hegemon, China and Russia jointly appealed for a multipolarity of international 
system. In the past decades, Beijing and Moscow have forged a strong strategic 
alliance by enhancing cooperation at bilateral, regional (e.g. SCO) and global level 
(e.g. BRICS) and shared a common stance towards promoting a multipolar world 
order and counterbalancing the American hegemony.   
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In essence, the idea of multipolarity has an anti-hegemon dimension, as the 
redistribution of global power among major great powers will end the unipolar world 
system dominated by US as the only hegemon.325 Therefore, the US viewed the rise 
of new powers as a major challenge to the existing international order and its 
hegemonic status. Among them, China as the most powerful competitor has become a 
top target of Washington’s containment strategy. With limited hard power, Beijing 
adopted a strategy of soft balancing against the hegemon by aligning with other major 
powers and setting up a strategic alliance through regional multilateral initiatives. The 
foundation of SCO is a new experiment to form an anti-hegemonic coalition among 
China, Russia and other Central Asian states to undermine the American influence in 
Central Asia and beyond. At the 2007 SCO Summit in Kyrgyzstan, China, Russia and 
other SCO leaders repeated their call for “strengthening a multipolar international 
system that would ensure equal security and opportunities for all countries” and Iran, 
India and Pakistan also attended the meeting. For Beijing, the SCO helps consolidate 
the Sino-Russian strategic alliance against the hegemon. The enlargement of SCO is 
an attempt to expand such an anti-hegemonism alliance from Central Asia to South 
Asia and West Asia, all of which are key elements of promoting a multipolar world. 
At the 2012 BRICS summit in New Delhi, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 
said that “we support a multipolar, equitable, democratic and just world order”,326 
implying that China, Russia and India have a consensus for fostering a multipolar 
world order. A strategic triangle among Beijing, Moscow and New Delhi will further 
strengthen such a balancing coalition against the US hegemony.  
 
On July 8 2015, Russia hosted two summits, the SCO and BRICS, at the same 
time and the leaders of two multilateral institutions attended a joint meeting that 
highlighted the emergence of new centers of power in the international system. All of 
these countries have ambitions to play a greater role in global affairs and are keen to 
gain the recognition of regional spheres of influence and legitimize their power status 
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within formal or informal multilateral institutions,327 since those share a belief that 
multipolarity involving a more balanced distribution of global power helps foster 
global stability. Many western scholars contend that the SCO and BRICS are clearly a 
new southern coalition that displayed a coordinated and cooperated willingness to 
create a multipolar world order, ending the US’s unipolar moment.328 Among them, 
China, Russia and India are the leading members of the SCO and BRICS and the 
emerging Trilateral Cooperation will be of significance to work together towards a 
multipolar world, countering the American power and influence in a regional and 
global context. From a Chinese perspective, multilateral institution is undoubtedly a 
perfect instrument to establish a strategic alliance with major great powers to 
transform the existing international system, since regional multilateral mechanism 
facilitating the convergence of interests towards common objective enables Beijing to 
reshape the balance of global power to its interests and create a more balanced system 
and global power structure. Beijing also realized that the transformation of 
international system from unipolarity to multipolarity helps not only shape a new 
balance of power to counter the US’s unilateralism and hegemony, but also enhance 
political legitimacy of its rising power in the future world order.   
 
Beijing’s efforts in promoting multipolarity through regional multilateralism can 
be a diplomatic maneuver for winning friends and undermining foes. First, while 
China, Russia and India have shared interests in promoting multipolarity and 
countering the US hegemony, the emerging strategic triangle within the SCO helps 
alleviate the level of Sino-Russian and Sino-Indian competition in association with 
the geopolitics of Central Asia and South Asia, despite the fact that China’s 
expanding role in Central Asia and Indian Ocean erodes Russia’s and India’s 
influence in the regions. Second, a multipolar world system will limit Washington’s 
capabilities to project power unilaterally and aggressively without taking into account 
other states’ interests, since the multipolarity prompts the redistribution of power in 
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the international system.329 International institutions that facilitate the collective 
action enable secondary powers to form a strategic alliance to counterbalance the 
hegemon for avoiding being dominated or exploited. Third, China’s discourse on 
multipolarity not only involves the creation of a just and fair world order being 
dominated by neither a single superpower nor Global North, but underlined the moral 
nature of the international system.330 In fact, the evolving doctrines of Chinese 
foreign policy refuted any kind of hegemony that was usually understood as an 
unequal, unjust and exploitative international relation in Chinese politics.331 Given 
that a structural transformation from unipolarity to multipolarity is a durable 
revisionist process, regional multilateralism provides a new paradigm for China to 
shape the new balance of global power to its interests that has implications for 
constructively engaging in the international system.    
 
 
Conclusion: limits of using the SCO as a vehicle of soft balancing 
 
In the past decades, we have seen a dramatic shift of Chinese foreign policy from 
multilateralism to regional multilateralism. China’s embrace of regional multilateral 
cooperation and institutions is driven by an evolving grand strategy for security and 
great power status, as regional multilateralism embodies a synthesis of neorealist and 
liberalist thoughts and can reshape the international relations inside and outside 
institutions. That enables Beijing not merely to confront with emerging security 
dilemmas arising from the Sino-US rivalry and new power dynamics, but also to build 
its power and influence regionally and globally. This chapter suggests that China’s 
approach towards the institutionalization of regional multilateral cooperation within 
the SCO was motivated by a strategy of soft balancing against the hegemon. The SCO 
serves as a key apparat to forge a balancing coalition through the institutionalization 
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of regional multilateral cooperation to resist the US’s expanding influence in Central 
Asia and beyond. Furthermore, Beijing’s efforts to promote common norms such as 
sovereignty and non-interference among the Central Asia states through the SCO not 
only help to counter the West-supported colour revolutions also enhance the political 
legitimacy of its power. Finally, Beijing intends to establish a Sino-Russian strategic 
alliance through the SCO and transform the international system towards 
multipolarity, ending the US’s unipolar moment and fostering a more inclusive world 
order.     
 
However, the Sino-Russian competition and the complex geopolitics of Central 
Asia are likely to undermine Beijing’s efforts in using the SCO as an instrument of 
soft balancing against the hegemon. First, China’s rising power and influence in 
Central Asia appeared to challenge Moscow’s geopolitical interests in the region.332 
In the early 1990s, the newly independent states in Central Asia were eager to 
enhance its political ties with Beijing for balancing Russia’s domination and 
preserving autonomy. But Beijing seemed reluctant to challenge the Russia’s role in 
the region. A major reason is that Beijing aspired to align with Moscow to mitigate its 
strategic pressure from US after the end of the Cold War. Beijing feared that its active 
engagements with Central Asia may lead to a profound strategic mistrust in Moscow. 
After the launching of the SCO, China’s growing power and influence in Central Asia 
was perceived as a challenge to Moscow’s strategic interests, even if both states have 
common interests to ally with each other bilaterally and multilaterally on countering 
the US hegemony. In particular, Beijing’s charm offensive in Central Asia and its 
prominent role in regional trade and energy cooperation generated anxiety in Moscow, 
as Beijing’s economic power enables it to establish asymmetric interdependence over 
other Central Asian states at the expense of Moscow. For example, Moscow did not 
support Beijing’s idea to create a free trade zone within the SCO, instead established a 
Eurasian Economic Union with the former Soviet republics in which China was not 
included. This is a clear response to China’s expanding role in Central Asia. 
 
Second, China and Russia have strategic divergence over the future development 
of the SCO. Russia was eager to transform the SCO to a military-political 
organization, forging a military bloc against the NATO that was but refuted by China, 
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as Beijing insisted that the SCO should be a political-economic organization, focusing 
on security, political and energy cooperation in Central Asia. From a geopolitical 
perspective, East Asia should be the primary focus of China’s power projection and 
its security threats mainly come from the Asia-Pacific, since the US’s military 
presence in East Asia is a major obstacle for solving the Taiwan issue and South 
China Sea disputes. In contrast, Moscow regarded Europe and Central Asia as its 
strategic frontiers and viewed the NATO’s eastern enlargement as a serious threat to 
its security. Furthermore, China persistently pursued a peaceful rise and rejected any 
form of military alliance under the doctrine of non-alignment policy. In 2002, Russia 
founded the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), comprising of all the 
SCO members except China, that reflects the strategic divergence between two states. 
Although Moscow recognized Beijing’s interests in Central Asia, two great powers’ 
divisive attitude towards the future development of SCO has to some extent 
constrained the role of the SCO in further deepening regional multilateral cooperation 
in Central Asia.       
 
Third, the complex geopolitics of Central Asia may undermine Beijing’s attempt 
to use the SCO as a vehicle of soft balancing against the American hegemony. In a 
geopolitical context, Central Asian states have adopted a hedging strategy to subtly 
maintain strategic balance between Beijing and Moscow to their national interests.333 
They also sought to diversify international relations by enhancing their ties with the 
US and EU in an effort to avoid overdependence on Beijing or Moscow economically 
and politically,334 preserving autonomy and sovereignty. Since Putin took power, 
Russia sought to regain the glory of its great power status and its influence in the 
former soviet region. Since the 2008 global financial crisis, the weak oil price and 
economic recession almost destroyed Russia’s worsening economy. The military 
operations in Ukraine and Syria and economic sanctions imposed by the US and EU 
has made Moscow become increasingly dependent on China economically and 
politically. The growing asymmetric interdependence between the two might not only 
undermine Moscow’s autonomy and its influence in Central Asia, but also caused 
those Central Asian states to lean closer to Beijing. Furthermore, After India and 
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Pakistan joined the SCO as full members in 2017, the territorial dispute and 
geopolitical rivalry between India, Pakistan and China 335  would damage the 
solidarity of the SCO. More recently, the US President Trump decided to return to 
Afghanistan on anti-terror war and sought to enhance stronger security ties and 
anti-terror cooperation with India while warning Pakistan against supporting 
terrorism.336 The growing strategic ties between India and the US would greatly limit 
Beijing’s attempt to use the SCO as a vehicle of soft balancing against the American 
hegemony.337   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
BEYOND BALANCING: CHINA’S APPROACH TOWARDS THE BELT AND 
ROAD INITIATIVE* 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Over the past three decades, China has considerably enhanced its comprehensive 
national strength and emerged as a regional and global power. China’s mounting 
prominence in the international arena triggered a debate about China’s rise and its 
implications for the existing international system.338 Meanwhile, Chinese foreign 
policy experienced a dramatic shift from bilateralism and multilateralism to regional 
multilateralism.339 Since the late 1990s, China has become a major actor in initiating, 
developing and institutionalizing multilateral cooperation mechanisms such as 
ASEAN Plus Three, ASEAN Plus One, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 
East Asia Summit, and Trilateral Cooperation.340 In 2013, China launched the Belt 
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and Road Initiative (BRI), namely the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century 
Maritime Silk Road, to promote regional multilateral cooperation in the Eurasian 
space. The BRI is considered Beijing’s most ambitious foreign policy initiative and is 
creating a new global geopolitical map, since the Initiative not only promises a mega 
geo-economic agenda to deepen regional economic cooperation along the Silk Road, 
but also sets up a great power strategy to advance China’s geopolitical and 
geostrategic interests in Eurasia and beyond. In particular, this diplomatic maneuver 
signals a significant shift in Chinese foreign policy from ‘Keeping a Low Profile’ 
(taoguang yanghui) to ‘Striving for Achievement’ (yousuo zuowei).341 The ideas of 
China renaissance (mingzu fuxing) and Chinese dream (zhongguo meng) introduced 
by Chinese President Xi Jinping embodied the key element of China’s global 
ambition. This chapter addresses the two main questions: Why does China as a rising 
power become increasingly enthusiastic for regional multilateralism? And what are 
the strategic calculations behind China’s BRI?   
 
The rise of China is one of the most prominent events of the 21st century. Some 
scholars argue that China’s growing enthusiasm for regional multilateralism is closely 
associated with its changing role in the international system.342 Indeed, there is a 
consensus among the scholars and policymakers in both Washington and Beijing that 
China’s rising economic and military capabilities enable it to play a greater role in 
global affairs and promote its great power status. At the same time, China’s growing 
power makes it the most credible challenger to the US’s global dominance and has 
triggered a Sino-US strategic rivalry. The intensifying Sino-US competition presents 
Beijing with a stark dilemma of how to manage its relations with Washington for 
ensuring security and achieving its peaceful rise. 
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This chapter argues that China’s embrace of regional multilateralism in Eurasia 
is not only driven by neorealist thought, but also shaped by constructivist and 
neoliberal logics that are respectively linked to power balancing, normative influence, 
and institutional transformation. In particular, regional multilateral cooperation that 
enhances the nexus of economic, political and security relations serves as a vital 
instrument for China to tackle security challenges in pursuit of its peaceful rise.343 
Accordingly, China’s approach towards the BRI is strongly motivated by a 
multifaceted grand strategy: adopting a soft balancing strategy to frustrate the US 
containment of China and undermine its power and influence, promoting China’s soft 
power and building its role as a normative power through the promotion of alternative 
ideas and norms, and reshaping global governance in a way that reflects China’s 
values, interests, and status.  
 
To further explore the motivations and calculations behind China’s BRI, this 
chapter is divided into seven sections. Section one gives a brief overview of China’s 
activism in regional multilateral cooperation and the BRI. Section two looks into the 
concept of regional multilateralism based on the three international relations theories: 
neorealism, neoliberalism, and constructivism. Section three illustrates China’s 
geoeconomic, geopolitical and geostrategic interests in promoting regional 
multilateral cooperation within the BRI. Section four explores the logic of China’s use 
of the BRI as a vehicle of soft balancing to counter the US containment strategy and 
undermine its dominance. Section five provides insight into China’s endeavor to build 
its role as a normative power and foster the legitimacy of its rising power through the 
promotion of alternative ideas and norms within the BRI. Section six deals with 
China’s attempts to forge a bargaining coalition and reshape global governance 
through the BRI and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Section seven 
presents some conclusions by highlighting the potential risks and challenges of BRI.  
 
 
Regional multilateralism and international relations theories 
 
Regional multilateralism was defined by Robert Keohane as the practice of 
coordination, cooperation and collaboration in certain policy areas among three or 
more states through ad hoc agreements, conventions and arrangements under the 
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provisions of international institutions, organizations and regimes. 344  Regional 
multilateralism as a subset of multilateralism emphasizes the common, universal and 
reciprocal norms and rules to coordinate specific policy areas within regional 
multilateral settings. At present, regional multilateral cooperation has gone far beyond 
trade and become a multidimensional mechanism encompassing economic, political, 
security and cultural aspects. Building on the existing literature, the changing balance 
of global power is identified as one of the main factors explaining the emergence of 
regional multilateralism.345 
 
From a neorealist perspective, international institutions are often viewed as 
means of statecraft of powerful states and play a vital role in shaping a hierarchical 
power structure in the international system.346 For example, the Bretton Woods 
institutions have great significance in consolidating US hegemonic status and global 
influence. However, regional multilateral institutions have different implications for a 
rising power and for an existing hegemon, since they can either be used to increase 
the power of the former at the expense of the latter or be used to socialize the former 
into the latter’s preferred regime and mechanism. Three neorealist assumptions 
provide explanations to the rationale of China’s growing engagement in regional 
multilateral institutions: bargaining power, 347  institutional balancing, 348  and 
counter-containment.349 The first argument suggests that regional multilateral settings 
enable China to take advantage of asymmetric power and raise its bargaining power 
over other regional and international actors, advancing its interests. The second 
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argument asserts that China has incentives to form a balancing coalition through 
regional multilateral institutions to counter the perceived threats. The third argument 
finds that promoting regional multilateral cooperation can be a strategic maneuver to 
frustrate the US containment of China and enhance Beijing’s position in the power 
competition.    
 
Neoliberalism argues that states pursue absolute gains rather than relative gains 
to other states and the international institutions facilitating cooperation and 
compromise between states can produce absolute gains for all their members. 
Neoliberal institutionalism assumes that states advance their overall interests with a 
commitment to strengthen cooperation within international institutions or regimes, 
since those institutions can not only reduce costs, form preferences, and monitor 
processes, but also facilitate problem-solution and achieve goals.350 Accordingly, while 
regional multilateral cooperation helps enhance strategic interdependence among the 
states and reshape the balance of power at regional and global levels, regional 
multilateral initiatives can be used strategically and tactically as a vehicle of soft 
balancing against a potential or existing hegemon.              
 
While neorealists and neoliberalists underline ‘war and power’ and ‘interest and 
cooperation’ respectively, constructivists take into consideration two key elements 
shaping the international order: identity and norm.351 Constructivist scholars have 
argued that creating political identity and promoting certain ‘normative values’ seem 
to be of primary importance for the states to establish regional multilateral regimes 
and institutions.352 The interaction between actors, states or institutions helps create, 
promote and justify political identities which legitimize the power of those actors, 
states and institutions in the existing international system. International cooperation 
amongst and between actors and states also promotes international norms as 
international institutions or regimes possess a set of rules, process, and principles to 
facilitate the convergence of interest, objective and action.353  Accordingly, we 
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contend that the interaction between Beijing and other Eurasian actors within the BRI 
helps to promote alternative ideas and norms, build Beijing’s soft and normative 
power and enhance the legitimacy of its rising power in the international society.    
 
 
China’s strategy towards Eurasia and the BRI  
 
During his state visits to Kazakhstan and Indonesia in 2013, Chinese President Xi 
Jinping proposed establishing the BRI, including the land-based and the sea-based 
Silk Roads, to promote regional connectivity and multilateral cooperation. The land 
routes start in China’s Central and Western regions, pass through Central Asia, West 
Asia, Central and Eastern Europe and end in Western Europe. The maritime routes 
connect China’s coastal regions and Europe through the South China Sea, the Indian 
Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and the Mediterranean Sea. The BRI involves 65 countries 
across Asia, Europe, and Africa354 and represents 70% of the world’s population and 
more than 40% of the world’s GDP. The Initiative offers not only a multilateral 
mechanism to enhance economic, political and cultural ties between China and other 
Eurasian countries, but also a venue to strengthen cooperation with the existing 
regional multilateral groups such as the SCO, ASEAN, European Union, Asia-Europe 
Meeting, Eurasian Economic Union, South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation, and the Gulf Cooperation Council.  
 
The BRI sets up an ambitious agenda to deepen multilateral cooperation across 
the Eurasian continent and promote prosperity and development of all countries along 
the BRI. According to a statement released by the National Development and Reform 
Commission, the BRI will enhance regional multilateral cooperation on five pillars: 
“(i) strengthen policy dialogue; (iii) strengthen trade facilitation; (iv) strengthen 
financial cooperation; (v) strengthen people-to-people exchanges.” 355 Along with the 
BRI, China created the AIIB and the Silk Road Fund to provide financial support to 
the BRI projects. In May 2017, Beijing formalized the BRI by hosting the first Belt 
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and Road Forum for International Cooperation in Beijing that resulted in a large 
number of cooperation agreements signed by more than fifty countries.356 China’s 
efforts to promote multilateral cooperation through the BRI are motivated by a desire 
to advance its geo-economic, geopolitical, and geostrategic interests in Eurasia and 
beyond. 
 
China’s geo-economic interests  
 
The BRI is strongly driven by geo-economic factors. First, the Western Development 
Strategy, which was enacted in 1999 to accelerate economic development in China’s 
western regions, is given a priority by Chinese leaders. Poor infrastructure, inadequate 
investment and development imbalance has not only impeded economic development 
but also posed a threat to political stability in China’s western regions. Second, 
China’s economic growth has suffered a slowdown since 2012 and unprecedentedly 
declined to 6.7 percent in 2016, recording a historic low level in the past 25 years. In 
this respect, the problem of how to sustain stable economic growth is placed at the top 
of Chinese policymakers’ agenda. In November 2013, the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China decided to build a more open economic system by 
deepening market integration and developing a new trade strategy, and promote 
multilateral cooperation by constructing the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 
Maritime Silk Road.357 
 
Through the BRI, China seeks to establish closer economic ties between its 
western regions and Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia by developing 
infrastructure, promoting trade, and enhancing interconnectivity. China has proposed 
to set up seven economic corridors along the BRI: China-Mongolia-Russia Economic 
Corridor; New Eurasian Land Bridge; China-Central and West Asia Economic 
Corridor; China-Indo-China Peninsula Economic Corridor; China-Pakistan Economic 
Corridor; Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor, and 
China-India-Nepal Economic Corridor. This not only creates huge investment 
opportunities for Chinese firms and tackles China’s industrial overcapacity, but also 
stimulates development of China’s western regions and revives its sluggish 
                                                
356. Xinhua News Agency, ‘List of Deliverables of Belt and Road Forum,’ Xinhua News 
Agency, 15 May 2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/15/c_136286376.htm.  
357. The People’s Net, ‘Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 
on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform,’ The People’s 
Net, 29 January 2014, http://en.people.cn/90785/8525422.html. 
137 
 
economy.358  Until May 2017, a total of 1,676 infrastructure projects involving 
highway, high-speed rail, electricity grid, port facilities, and gas and oil pipelines 
have been contracted to consolidate regional connectivity, which is clearly a 
geo-economic imperative.359  
 
With the BRI, China also intends to forge a stronger Eurasian linkage between 
Asia and Europe, two of the world’s most dynamic markets.360 As of May 2017, 
Eurasian rail network has connected 28 Chinese cities directly with 29 cities in 11 
European countries. Meanwhile, China also proposed establishing a land-sea express 
route linking the port of Piraeus, one of the largest container ports in Europe and a 
gateway between the Middle East, the Balkans, European markets, and Xinjiang. That 
enables Beijing not only to increase access to regional markets, promote Renminbi 
internationalization, diminish excessive foreign reserves, and diversify energy 
suppliers and routes, but also translate its growing economic power into political 
power.   
 
China’s geopolitical interests 
 
In 1904, the British geographer Halford Mackinder wrote a paper on "The 
Geographical Pivot of History", arguing that the country ruling the heartland of 
Eurasia would dominate the world. 361  Along the same lines, the American 
geostrategist Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote:  
“...How America "manages" Eurasia is critical. A power that dominates “Eurasia” 
would control two of the world’s three most advanced and economically productive 
regions. A mere glance at the map also suggests that control over “Eurasia” would 
almost automatically entail Africa’s subordination, rendering the Western Hemisphere 
and Oceania geopolitically peripheral to the world’s central continent. About 75 percent 
of the world’s people live in “Eurasia”, and most of the world’s physical wealth is there 
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as well, both in its enterprises and underneath its soil. “Eurasia” accounts for about 
three-fourths of the world’s known energy resources.” 362 
China, one of the two Eurasian great powers (namely China and Russia), not only has 
a stake in Eurasia but also possesses great advantage to win friends, build power and 
expand influence across the continent. As an integral part of China’s peripheral 
strategy, regional multilateral mechanism serves as a vital diplomatic tool for Beijing 
not merely to ensure access to resources and markets but also advance its key 
geopolitical objectives. By enhancing regional multilateral cooperation within the 
ASEAN Plus Three and SCO, Beijing has established its prominent role in East Asia 
and Central Asia. The BRI allows Beijing to further expand its influence in other parts 
of Eurasia such as South Asia, West Asia, Middle East, and Europe. Given China’s 
historic role in Eurasia, the fundamental purpose of rebuilding the ancient Silk Road 
through the BRI is to reaffirm its geopolitical interests in the Eurasian space, revive 
the ‘Moment of Glory’ of Chinese civilization, and regain its great power status.363  
 
The BRI is vital to advance China’s geopolitical interests in three aspects: energy 
security; geopolitical influence; and maritime interests. First, since China is heavily 
dependent on energy imports from the Persian Gulf,364 the New Eurasian Land 
Bridge and China-Central and West Asia Economic Corridor allow it to forge 
stronger energy ties with Russia and Central Asian states and reduce its reliance on 
energy imports from the Persian Gulf. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and 
Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor will facilitate China’s energy 
imports from the Persian Gulf and Africa via gas and oil pipelines and reduce its 
dependence on the Malacca Strait where the US can exert great influence. Second, the 
Land Silk Road helps expand Beijing’s geopolitical influence across the continent. 
Regional connectivity and multilateral cooperation that help enhance asymmetric 
interdependence enable Beijing not only to leverage its power and influence over 
other Eurasian partners to its strategic interests, but also to broaden its strategic 
hinterland and geopolitical space. Third, the Maritime Silk Road helps Beijing to 
build its maritime power and expand influence in the Indian Ocean for improving 
maritime security and advancing its maritime interests. For example, China’s heavy 
investment in Hambantota Port (Sri Lanka), Gwadar Port (Pakistan) and Kyaukpyu 
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port (Myanmar) allows Beijing to reinforce its naval presence in the Indian Ocean, 
ensure the security of its trade and energy routes, and foster its role as a maritime 
power.365  
 
China’s geostrategic interests  
 
The BRI is also shaped by rising geostrategic competition in Asia-Pacific. 
Traditionally, China regarded East Asia as its primary geopolitical focus and sought 
to build its power and influence in the region. When Beijing’s growing economic and 
military power was perceived as a challenge to American preponderance, Washington 
announced a ‘Pivot to Asia’ strategy to reaffirm its strategic interests in Asia and 
contain China’s rising influence.366 Washington sought to build a ‘C-shaped ring of 
encirclement’ around China by linking the East China Sea, Taiwan Strait, South 
China Sea, Malacca Strait and Indian Ocean for limiting China’s influence in the first 
island chain and constraining China’s expansion into the Indian and Pacific Oceans. 
Washington also set an aggressive economic agenda to counter China’s rising 
economic power through the conclusion of Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)367, which 
has however been abandoned by US President Trump.368 In this context, the BRI can 
be seen as a ‘Pivot to Europe’ strategy to counterbalance the US’s Pivot to Asia,369 
breaking US containment of China and undermining its dominance. Wang Jisi, a 
prominent International Relations scholar at Peking University, argued that the BRI is 
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not merely a ‘Marching West’ strategy to advance China’s geostrategic interests in 
Eurasia, but also a geostrategic rebalance to the US’s ‘Pivot to Asia’.370  
 
The BRI illustrates a profound shift in Chinese foreign policy from ‘Keeping a 
low profile’ to ‘Striving for achievement’. Throughout the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, 
Deng Xiaoping’s ‘Keeping a low profile’ was a basic principle guiding Chinese 
foreign policy and played a crucial role in fostering a favorable international 
environment for China’s modernization process. Some Chinese scholars argue that 
such a strategy has become outdated when Washington’s containment policy has not 
only endangered China’s security environment but also limited China’s ability to 
project power in its periphery.371 In particular, the decline of American power 
provided an opportunity for China to play a greater role in global affairs. After Xi 
Jinping took power, Beijing adopted a more assertive foreign policy to advance its 
regional and global interests.372 Thus, the BRI is strongly driven by three factors: first, 
China makes use of the BRI as a vehicle of soft balancing to undermine American 
power by establishing asymmetric interdependence, enhancing strategic reassurance 
over its Eurasian partners, and deterring the formation of any anti-China coalition and 
‘anyone but China’ club. Second, China seeks to promote soft power and build its role 
as a normative power, increasing the legitimacy of its rising power. Third, China 
intends to reshape global governance and transform the existing international system 
in a way that reflects its values, interests, and status.  
 
 
Soft Balancing against the US 
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Soft balancing theorists point out that secondary power may adopt a soft balancing 
strategy to counter the perceived threats from the hegemon through economic, 
political, diplomatic, and institutional means, since the traditional hard balancing is 
too costly and risky.373 As regional multilateral regimes help overcome collective 
action problem and facilitate cooperation towards common interests and objectives, 
secondary powers have strong incentive to initiate, utilize or dominate regional 
multilateral institution and cooperation to counter coercion and threat from a superior 
power. This specially applies to Sino-US competition. With limited military 
capabilities, it would be quite unwise for Beijing to undertake traditional hard 
balancing against the American hegemony. Accordingly, China is strongly motivated 
to pursue a soft balancing strategy against the US through institutional methods. 
 
While China’s rise is seen as a challenge to American dominance in 
Asia-Pacific,374 Washington’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ strategy is a direct response to China’s 
growing role.375 The TPP and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
that don’t include Beijing can be seen as an updated version of US strategic 
containment of China, since Washington attempts to build an ‘anyone but China’ club 
by forging Transatlantic and Transpacific links to interconnect East Asia, North 
America and the European Union. As China’s economy is heavily dependent on 
Asian, European and American markets, the US’s intention to reshape the global 
trading regime through the TPP and the TTIP is to limit China’s access to those 
markets, ‘choke’ its economic growth, undermine Beijing’s ability to expand its 
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influence regionally and globally, and constrain its continued rise.376 According to 
Richard Baldwin, a country or region that has been excluded from a preferential 
agreement is strongly motivated to join a similar bloc or build a new bloc to 
counterbalance the negative effect of being excluded.377  Therefore, the BRI is 
considered a response to Washington’s attempt to create new trading blocs that 
exclude China.378  
 
The BRI that goes far beyond a pure trade agenda can be seen as a bold 
geo-economic initiative to advance Beijing’s geopolitical and geostrategic goals. Thus, 
this initiative keeps its relevance even if Trump decided to withdraw from the TPP. 
As regional multilateral cooperation provides a new approach to establish an 
interests-based coalition between China and other Eurasian partners, the BRI can 
serve as a vehicle of soft balancing for Beijing to counterbalance American 
preponderance without provoking it directly. The logic of undertaking a strategy of 
soft balancing against the US through the BRI lies in establishing strategic 
interdependence, reassuring Eurasian partners of the peaceful intention of China’s 
rising power, deterring the formation of any form of anti-China coalition or 'anyone 
but China' club. 
 
China’s increasing economic power is the key to understand how the BRI is used 
by Beijing as a means of soft balancing against the US. Given the size and dynamism 
of the Chinese economy, promoting regional economic cooperation and integration 
within the BRI will enhance asymmetric economic interdependence between Beijing 
and other Eurasian countries, making those countries much more dependent on 
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Beijing economically than vice versa. Such asymmetric economic interdependence 
enables Beijing to translate its economic power into political power, leverage its 
influence over those Eurasian countries to its strategic interests,379 and undermine the 
US dominance in Eurasia and beyond. 
 
Figure 1 shows how China’s trade volume with 65 BRI countries has risen much 
more dramatically than US’s trade volume with them. The share of China’s trade with 
the BRI countries in its total trade jumped sharply from 19% to 26% between 2005 
and 2014, whereas the share of US’s trade with those countries in its total trade only 
experienced a small increase from 13% to 15%. In the meanwhile, China has replaced 
the US as the world’s largest trading nation in 2012 and almost become the largest 
trading partner of all the BRI countries. The picture is quite similar when looking at 
the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). According to the World Investment Report 2016 
by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), China 
became the world’s second largest investor in 2015.380 Figure 2 indicates that 
China’s outward FDI into the BRI countries has constantly risen from only 9.08 
billion in 2006 to 109.77 billion in 2015, constituting 75% of its total outward FDI for 
that year. After the launching of the BRI, China’s outward FDI into the BRI countries 
has increased from 75.94 billion in 2013 to 109.77 billion in 2015 while its outward 
FDI into the rest of world almost remained unchanged during the same period. 
 
Despite its repeated commitment to peaceful rise, China’s growing power and 
influence has generated a great deal of mistrust, anxiety and fear in the region. Those 
who perceive China’s rise as a threat are more likely to shape a balancing coalition or 
‘anyone but China’ club to contain China’s expanding influence through isolation, 
marginalization and boycotting.381  In this context, Beijing’s efforts to enhance 
                                                
379. See Kai He, ‘Institutional Balancing and International Relations Theory: Economic 
Interdependence and Balance of Power Strategies in Southeast Asia,’ pp. 489-518; Miles 
Kahler and Scott L. Kastner, ‘Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement 
Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait,’ Journal of Peace Research 
43, no. 5 (2006): 523-541; Paul A. Papayoanou, Power Ties: Economic Interdependence, 
Balancing, and War (Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan University Press, 1999). 
380. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment 
Report 2016 (Geneva: United Nations, 2016), 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2016_en.pdf.  
381. On the dynamic relations between Beijing, Washington and other Asian states, see 
Evelyn Goh, ‘Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional 
144 
 
regional multilateral cooperation within the BRI can not only reassure Eurasian 
countries of the peaceful nature of its rising power but also deter those countries to 
form an anti-China coalition or join US-led alliance against China. Therefore, the BRI 
provides a pragmatic way for China to reassure its partners, deter its rivals, and 
undermine the US power and influence without stirring up a war.       
     
The South China Sea issue offers a good example of how the BRI serves as a 
means of soft balancing for China to undermine US power and influence. In July 2016, 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) issued a ruling in favor of a US-backed 
Philippine challenge to China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea despite 
strong opposition from Beijing. Meanwhile, Washington’s Asian and European allies 
who have close economic ties with Beijing are unwilling to endorse the PCA ruling. 
For example, the EU failed to issue a timely statement on the ruling as Athens and 
Budapest blocked such a EU statement criticizing Beijing.382 These two countries’ 
growing dependence on Chinese investment and their eagerness to play a pivotal role 
in the BRI caused them reluctantly to annoy Beijing. Although the EU finally reached 
a common position after three days of difficult negotiation, but Brussels only issued a 
vague and neutral statement acknowledging the PCA ruling without direct reference 
to Beijing.383 Similarly, ASEAN failed to issue a joint statement upholding the PCA 
ruling384 as the stance of ten ASEAN countries were deeply divided: 1) Laos and 
Cambodia opposed the ruling; 2) Thailand, Myanmar, Malaysia (as one of claimants), 
Brunei (as one of claimants), Indonesia (as one of claimants), and Singapore (as US’s 
ally) maintained a neutral position; 3) the Philippines and Vietnam supported the 
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ruling. After Rodrigo Duterte took power, the Philippines’ stance on the South China 
Sea disputes experienced a stunning reversal. While Manila desires to gain Chinese 
investment and aid and join the Maritime Silk Road for improving infrastructures and 
boosting growth, Duterte not only decided to suspend the PCA ruling but also agreed 
to resolve disputes through a bilateral dialogue,385 accommodating Beijing’s strategic 
interests at the expense of Washington.  
 
 
Building soft and normative power  
 
As China’s rapid economic growth has facilitated a dramatic increase in its military 
might and international security presence, its growing hard power has fueled the 
perceptions of the ‘China Threat’ that make it difficult to expand its influence 
regionally and globally. Chinese policymakers realized that China’s rise to great 
power status relies not only on formidable hard power but also on soft power.386 Thus, 
Beijing is keen to promote its soft power through various means, including not only 
culture and public diplomacy but also economic and diplomatic levers such as aid, 
investment and participation in or creation of regional multilateral organizations.387 
Enhancing soft power through regional multilateral cooperation not merely assists 
Beijing in increasing its global image and international prestige as a peaceful, benign 
and responsible power,388 but also helps persuade others to accept and recognize its 
rising power status in the international community, facilitating its peaceful rise.389 
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Jay Jackson defined normative power as the potential influence over others’ 
activity and behavior through the power of norms and stressed the ‘domain and range’ 
of legitimate behavior.390 While power shifts often prompt normative transformation 
in the international system, China, as a rising power, has a strong motive to promote 
political identity and legitimacy of its rising power and build its role as a normative 
power through the promotion of alternative ideas, rules and norms in international 
fora.391 More importantly, Beijing’s efforts to construct its identity as a normative 
power will increase its normative authority and legitimacy at the expense of 
Washington and consolidate its role as a great power in the international system.392    
 
Regional multilateral initiatives such as the BRI are essential to produce common 
rules, promote alternative norms, and socialize ideas of interactive cooperation for 
bolstering Beijing’s soft power and building its role as a normative power. In 
November 2014, at the Central Conference on Work on Foreign Affairs, Xi Jinping 
emphasized the importance of building the BRI in the following terms:  
“We should seek other countries' understanding of and support for the Chinese dream, 
which is about peace, development, cooperation and win-win outcomes. What we 
pursue is the wellbeing of both the Chinese people and the people of all other 
countries … We should make more friends while abiding by the principle of 
non-alignment and build a global network of partnership. We should increase China's 
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soft power, give a good Chinese narrative, and better communicate China's message to 
the world.” 393 
 
Since the end of World War II, the principle of Westphalian sovereignty has 
become the cornerstone of contemporary international relations and the liberal 
international order. However, the norms of Westphalian sovereignty were eroded by 
the global competition between US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. These 
norms have also been undermined in the post-Cold War era when Washington sought 
to create an American-led liberal hegemonic order and undergone a normative shift in 
international relations from a Westphalian to a post-Westphalian model. The Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence that China initiated together with India and 
Myanmar in 1954 are not only a basic norm governing China’s foreign policy and 
international relations,394 but also a major source of China’s normative power. At the 
60th anniversary of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, Chinese President Xi 
Jinping stressed that:  
“These five principles, as an integrated, interconnected, and indivisible concept, 
capture the essence of today’s international relations, and can apply to relations among 
all countries regardless of their social system, stage of development or size. Principles 
have effectively upheld the rights and interests of the developing world and have 
played a positive role in building a more equitable and rational international political 
and economic order.”395 
 
Promoting the Five Principles of Peaceful coexistence is not only an effort to 
oppose any imposition of norms and values on others and interference in other 
countries’ domestic affairs, but also an attempt to enhance China’s role as a normative 
power that champions an international order based on the concept of Westphalian 
sovereignty and peaceful coexistence. Establishing and enhancing regional 
multilateral cooperation within the BRI is part of Beijing’s efforts to diffuse those 
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norms and ideas across the continent. The vision and action plan for the BRI upholds 
the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and adds:  
“The Initiative is harmonious and inclusive. It advocates tolerance among civilizations, 
respects the paths and modes of development chosen by different countries, and 
supports dialogues among different civilizations on the principles of seeking common 
ground while shelving differences and drawing on each other's strengths, so that all 
countries can coexist in peace for common prosperity”.396 
More recently, in his speech at the opening ceremony of the Belt and Road Forum for 
International Cooperation in Beijing, Xi Jinping underlined the importance of 
upholding the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in implementing the BRI:  
“China will enhance friendship and cooperation with all countries involved in the Belt 
and Road Initiative on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. We are 
ready to share practices of development with other countries, but we have no intention 
to interfere in other countries' internal affairs, export our own social system and model 
of development, or impose our own will on others. In pursuing the Belt and Road 
Initiative, we will not resort to outdated geopolitical maneuvering. What we hope to 
achieve is a new model of win-win cooperation. We have no intention to form a small 
group detrimental to stability, what we hope to create is a big family of harmonious 
co-existence.” 397    
 
The BRI provides Beijing with great opportunities to promote those norms among 
countries and regions along the Silk Road. In a joint statement issued by Chinese and 
Serbian leaders in June 2016, the two countries not only agreed to promote regional 
connectivity between China and Central and Eastern European countries (CEEs) 
within the BRI, but also “pledged to respect and support each other in choosing 
development paths and policies according to their national conditions, and in issues of 
core interests and common concern, based on the principles of mutual respect, 
equality and non-interference in internal affairs”.398 One week later, at a trilateral 
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meeting of leaders of China, Russia and Mongolia in Tashkent, Xi Jinping, Vladimir 
Putin and Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj agreed to boost trilateral cooperation within the BRI 
and construct the China-Russia-Mongolia Economic Corridor. And Putin said: 
“Russia, China and Mongolia are friendly neighbors based on equality, respect and 
mutual benefit”399 that certainly conforms the spirit of the Five Principles. Also 
during Aung San Suu Kyi’s visit to Beijing in August 2016, the two leaders issued a 
joint statement,400saying that the two sides agreed to push forward China-Myanmar 
"Paukphaw" friendship, China-Myanmar comprehensive strategic cooperative 
partnership, and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor within the 
BRI on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.  
 
In line with the Five Principles, China also proposed new ideas and concepts 
such as Peaceful Rise, Peaceful Development, Harmonious World, and Community of 
Common Destiny to enhance its soft power. The concepts of peaceful rise and 
peaceful development were first proposed by Chinese scholar Zheng Bijian401 and 
then reiterated by Chinese President Hu Jintao to rebut against the ‘China Threat’ 
theory. Hu Jintao also proposed the idea of building a harmonious world to enhance 
Beijing’s normative narrative and its role as a peaceful power.402 Along with the BRI, 
Xi Jinping proposed the concept of a community of common destiny, underlining that 
“the world has increasingly grown into a community where one’s destiny is 
interwoven with that of another” and China is working to promote common 
development and prosperity of all countries towards building a community of shared 
interests, destiny and responsibility. 403 
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Reshaping global governance 
 
Robert Gilpin argues that “as its relative power increases, a rising state attempts to 
change the rules governing the system”.404 Indeed, while China grows more powerful, 
the country becomes increasingly dissatisfied with the status quo. As a result, Beijing 
seeks to reshape global governance and transform the existing international system in 
a way that reflects its values, interests and status. Many realist scholars believe that 
the Sino-US power competition will inevitably lead to a war and thus China cannot 
rise peacefully.405 This chapter will challenge this viewpoint by illustrating how 
China attempts to transform the US-dominated global system and promote its 
international status in a peaceful way, which is embedded in regional multilateralism. 
Randall Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu contend that a peer competitor that does not possess 
the military capabilities to directly challenge the US hegemony through hard 
balancing seeks to create a new international order by shaping a revisionist 
counterhegemonic coalition and delegitimizing the hegemon’s global authority.406 
Therefore, China has strong motive to forge an interest-based coalition to reshape the 
global governance system by either joining existing multilateral institutions or 
initiating new multilateral institutions.407 
 
Since the end of World War II, the Western-dominated global multilateral 
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the 
World Trade Organization have played a central role in global governance. However, 
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the Bretton Woods system has become increasingly problematic when the balance of 
global economic power is shifting from established powers to emerging powers. The 
creation of the G-20 after the 2008 global financial crisis not only symbolized a 
relative decline of US global economic power, but also reflected a growing consensus 
on reshaping the existing global governance system. China and other emerging 
powers have a strong desire to promote the fundamental transformation of the 
US-dominated global system towards a more inclusive and equitable international 
order.408 At a work conference on China’s foreign affairs in November 2014, Chinese 
President Xi Jinping said: “We should strengthen unity and cooperation with other 
developing countries and closely integrate our own development with the common 
development of other developing countries. We should advance multilateral 
diplomacy, work to reform the international system and global governance, and 
increase the representation and say of China and other developing countries”.409 
 
Given that China is still too weak to challenge the US’s global leadership alone, 
the BRI spanning 65 countries across Asia, Europe and Africa allows Beijing to form 
a bargaining coalition and shape a ‘community of shared interests’ towards reshaping 
the global governance system. As an integral part of the BRI, the AIIB has offered a 
good example of how China seeks to reshape global financial governance through the 
creation of new multilateral institution. In 2013, China announced plans to launch the 
AIIB in order to meet enormous investment demand in BRI infrastructure projects, 
making it the first developing country seeking to create a multilateral financial 
institution. While Washington heavily lobbied its allies not to join the bank, George 
Osborne, British Chancellor of the Exchequer, surprisingly announced in March 2015 
that the UK would join the AIIB. That astonished the whole world including 
Washington and triggered a domino effect. When the AIIB started operations in 
January 2016, the bank had 57 founding members, including Washington’s closest 
allies such as the UK, Germany, France, Australia, Israel, and South Korea. After 
only six months, Canada as the US’s closest ally also announced its decision to join 
the AIIB. Currently, the AIIB has expanded its membership to 80 and become the 
world’s third largest multilateral financial institution after the IMF and the World 
Bank.  
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For a very long time, western countries have dominated the agenda-setting, veto 
authority and discourse in global financial institutions. Beijing persistently pushed for 
quota reforms of the IMF and the World Bank for giving China and other emerging 
economies more voting power to better reflect the changes in global economic power, 
but failed. Soon after the launching of the AIIB, everything began to change. In 
December 2015, the IMF conceded to include the Renminbi as the fifth currency in its 
Special Drawing Rights basket. Two weeks later, the US congress finally approved 
the IMF quota reform after five years of blocking. As a result, China’s voting power 
in the IMF increased from 2.98 percent in 2006 to 6.11 percent in 2016 and ranked 
the third place after the US (16.53%) and Japan (6.16%).410 Meanwhile, China’s 
voting power in the World Bank also increased from 2.77 percent  to 4.64 percent in 
2016 and ranked the third place after the US (16.63%) and Japan (7.19%).411 The 
AIIB is not merely a response to the poor governance of global financial institutions, 
but also a catalyst for shaping a new global financial order, enabling Beijing to play a 
greater role in the global financial system. 
 
The AIIB is the first multilateral financial institution created and ruled by 
emerging and developing countries. Although the environmental and social 
framework of the AIIB is inspired by best practices of the multilateral institutions 
such as the World Bank and the IMF, there exists a difference in norms and rules 
between them. At the 2015 China Development Forum in Beijing, China’s Finance 
Minister Lou Jiwei commented on the governance and operational rules of AIIB, 
saying that “the AIIB is a multilateral institution led by developing countries. We 
need to consider their needs and sometimes the West puts forwards some rules that 
we don't think are optimal”.412 Indeed, the Western-dominated multilateral financial 
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institutions have long been criticized for imposing additional conditions such as 
privatization and liberalization on loans to developing countries.413 The China-led 
AIIB not only provides an alternative to the existing Western-dominated multilateral 
institutions, but also serves as a promising instrument to shape a bargaining coalition 
to transform the existing global governance system and boost Beijing’s global role 
from rule-taker to rule-maker.414  
 
While Obama stressed the importance of the TPP by stating: “we can’t let 
countries like China write the rules of the global economy”,415 China is playing a key 
role in shaping a new international economic order. As a rule-taker, China has 
benefited enormously from the existing international order and its rules and norms. 
When China’s interests become global, China desires to play a greater role in global 
governance. As the US-dominated global system has no space left for any emerging 
power which might challenge its hegemonic status, it presents Beijing with a real 
dilemma on how to advance its global interests, transform the existing international 
system, and establish its role as a global rule-maker. Establishing the BRI and AIIB is 
part of Beijing’s efforts not only to reshape global governance and strengthen its 
global leadership role, but also to delegitimize the US-dominated system and create a 
fairer and more inclusive international order. Thus, China is neither a pure status quo 
power nor a revisionist power, since Beijing, as the largest beneficiary of the existing 
international order, has no intentions or capabilities to replace the US hegemonic 
position and overthrow the existing order. Instead, China struggles for a revision of 
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the US-established international order through the transformation of global 
governance system, achieving its peaceful rise to great power status.  
 
 
Conclusion: big ideas, great opportunities, and potential challenges 
 
China’s approach towards the BRI is strongly motivated by a multifaceted grand 
strategy in search for security, influence, and status. As regional multilateral 
cooperation provides a peaceful way to transform the existing international system 
and avoid a classic ‘Thucydides Trap’, the BRI serves as a strategic maneuver for 
Beijing to advance its foreign policy goals. First, the BRI is strategically and tactically 
used by Beijing as a vehicle of soft balancing against the US, as regional multilateral 
cooperation allows Beijing to establish asymmetric interdependence over other 
Eurasian partners, to reassure those partners of the peaceful nature of its rising power 
and to deter the formation of any anti-China coalition or ‘anyone but China’ club. 
Second, China seeks to promote alternative ideas and norms and build its role as a 
normative power through the BRI for enhancing the legitimacy of its rising power at 
the expense of US normative authority and legitimacy. Third, China attempts to form 
a bargaining coalition through the BRI and AIIB for reshaping the global governance 
system and enhancing its global leadership role in the existing international order.  
 
Although the BRI will significantly strengthen China’s role on the world stage, 
this ambitious initiative faces potential challenges including geopolitical rivalry, 
security threats, territorial disputes and political risks. First, the geopolitical rivalry 
arising from China’s expanding global role may pose a potential challenge to the BRI. 
New Delhi’s negative position towards the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and its 
boycott of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation illustrates this 
point.416 Second, potential security threats might impair regional connectivity and 
cooperation in the Eurasian space as the BRI covers unstable regions such as the 
Middle East and Central Asia. Third, territorial disputes, especially in the South China 
Sea, could undermine Beijing’s efforts to promote regional multilateral cooperation 
                                                
416 . Ministry of External Affairs, ‘Official Spokesperson's Response to a Query on 
Participation of India in OBOR/BRI Forum,’ Ministry of External Affairs of the Government 
of India, 13 May 2017, 
http://www.mea.gov.in/mediabriefings.htm?dtl/28463/Official_Spokespersons_response_to_a
_query_on_participation_of_India_in_OBORBRI_Forum. 
155 
 
among the countries along the BRI.417 As the South China Sea is at the core of 
Maritime Silk Road, overlapping sovereignty claims over the disputed islands and 
waters might pose a great obstacle to multilateral cooperation between China and 
other Asian countries. Fourth, political turbulence in the conflicted and failed states 
along the BRI brings out political risks and uncertainty to the implementation of the 
BRI projects. 
 
While the world order is undergoing a dramatic change, the recent Belt and Road 
Forum for International Cooperation, attended by more than 1,500 representatives 
from over 130 countries and 70 international organizations, demonstrates Beijing’s 
ambition for a more prominent global leadership role. As the Trump Administration’s 
anti-globalization sentiment and ‘America first’ doctrine have raised doubts about the 
US’s leadership role in the liberal economic order, the BRI provides the impetus for a 
new wave of globalization that enables China to play a greater global role in the new 
international economic order. The BRI that aims to promote common development 
and prosperity of all the countries not only manifests China’s commitment to peaceful 
rise, but also presents a Chinese vision for a new world order based on the 
harmonious and peaceful co-existence.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
CONCLUSION: REGIONAL MULTILATERALISM: AN ALTERNATIVE 
PATH TO CHINA’S PEACEFUL RISE 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
No single issue has attracted so much attention in the study of International Relations 
than China’s rise and its impact on the existing international system. Not only is 
China moving to replace the US’s position of the world’s largest economy in the 
coming decade, but the military modernization of the People’s Army of Liberation 
(PLA) has also enabled it to expand its global reach from the Asian to African and 
Latin American continents, and from the Indian to Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. When 
China’s rising economic and military power is reshaping the balance of power 
regionally and globally, there is a little doubt that the awakened dragon will recover a 
central place on the world stage. Most of the literature has predicted China’s rise to 
great power status, but little has been done to further explain: how can China as a 
rising power overcome stark security dilemmas arising from the Sino-US strategic 
rivalry? How can China as a non-western power transform the US-dominated global 
system? And how can China use its formidable material power to promote its power 
status and achieve a peaceful rise? When many scholars believe that China can’t rise 
peacefully,418 this thesis tries to challenge this viewpoint by illustrating the role of 
regional multilateralism in China’s foreign policy, arguing that regional 
multilateralism presents an alternative path for China to achieve its peaceful rise.   
 
Regional multilateralism has become a new paradigm in the international 
system as it offers a more intensive and multidimensional process interconnecting 
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various actors not only to facilitate dialogue, build cooperation, and reach consensus 
on regional and global issues, but also effectively remedy the increasing imperfection, 
uncertainty and inefficiency of unilateralism, bilateralism and multilateralism. This 
dissertation has tried to provide new insight into the role of regional multilateralism in 
international relations by exploring the logic of China’s engagement in regional 
multilateralism. In particular, this work has tried to examine the growing role of 
regional multilateralism in Chinese foreign policy, and illustrate how China as a rising 
power attempts to ensure its security, promote its power status, and transform the 
US-dominated global order and system towards a peaceful rise by establishing, 
developing and institutionalizing regional multilateral cooperation in East Asia, 
Central Asia and the Eurasian landmass. To present the main conclusions of this 
thesis, this chapter is divided into three sections. Section two provides the main 
findings of the three case studies by focusing on the motivations and calculations, the 
relevance and significance, the success and limits of China’s approach towards 
regional multilateralism in East Asia, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the 
Belt and Road Initiative. Section three discusses if regional multilateralism as a new 
paradigm in Chinese foreign policy presents an alternative way to a peaceful rise and 
highlights the limited role of regional multilateral institutions in international 
relations.    
 
 
Main findings of the thesis 
 
Regional multilateralism has been a new paradigm for Chinese foreign policy as it 
provides a new approach not only to enhance cooperation, coordination, and 
collaboration among the involved actors towards common interests, demands and 
autonomy but also reshape the international relations inside and outside regional 
multilateral institutions at regional and global levels. Built on the neorealist, 
neoliberal and constructivist perspectives, the present thesis has examined the logic of 
China’s engagement in regional multilateralism by conducting three case studies 
involving the APT, the SCO and the BRI in order to address the three main research 
questions: (1) What are the motivations and calculations behind China’s evolving 
foreign policy towards regional multilateralism in East Asia, Central Asia and 
Eurasia? (2) What are the relevance and significance of regional multilateralism in 
managing the cooperative and competitive relationship between China and other 
major powers and its peaceful rise? And (3) what are the success and limits of 
China’s embrace of regional multilateralism in achieving its key foreign policy 
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objectives? The main findings are provided to shed some light on the role of regional 
multilateralism in international relations, enlightening how ideas, interests and 
institutions influence the country’s foreign policy behavior, and how the dynamic 
interactions of states reshape the international relations inside and outside the 
institutions at regional and global levels. 
 
Since reform and opening up in 1978, China’s evolving foreign policy in 
regional multilateralism is a strategic adaptation process to the changing domestic, 
regional and international environment.419 It is divided into four stages. In the first 
stage, when China initially reoriented its national development strategy, China 
adopted a passive and prudent stance to regional multilateral cooperation as Beijing 
suffered the diplomatic and political isolations in the international community during 
the Cold War and feared the infringement of the sovereignty by regional multilateral 
organizations. In the second stage, when the global system shifted from bipolarity to 
unipolarity at the end of the Cold War, China desired to reintegrate itself into the 
US-led global economic order, enhance its political, economic, diplomatic ties with 
rest of the world and hasten its transition and reforms through regional multilateral 
cooperation in order to bolster its economic growth and modernization process. In the 
third stage, when Chinese economy started to take off after its accession into the 
WTO, China growingly engaged in various regional multilateral mechanisms in an 
effort to advance its geo-economic, geopolitical, geostrategic interests in Asia and 
globally. In the fourth stage, when China emerged as a regional and global power, 
Beijing has been a major actor to establish and promote regional multilateral 
cooperation as it provides a new way for Beijing to confront with emerging security 
and geopolitical dilemmas, build its soft and normative power and reshape the global 
governance system.  
 
The Chapter Three has examined the motivations and calculations behind 
China’s approach towards regional multilateral institutions in East Asia by using the 
concept of institutional balancing, it finds that China’s activism in regional 
multilateralism in East Asia is strongly motivated by a strategy of institutional 
balancing to delay, frustrate and undermine the US’s dominant power. In East Asia, 
Washington’s hub-and-spoke system of bilateral military alliances and its 
forward-deployed military forces have played a vital role in preserving the US 
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primacy in the region since the Cold War.420 As China’s rising power is altering the 
Asian security architecture, Washington adopts a containment strategy against China 
for preserving its hegemonic position. This increasingly intensifies the Sino-US 
power competition in East Asia. At the same time, Beijing also sees the US’s military 
presence in East Asia and its containment strategy as a major challenge to its core 
interests such as the Taiwan issue and the territorial disputes in the East and South 
China Seas. In particular, Obama’s pivot to Asia and Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy 
have considerably deteriorated Beijing’s security environment. Furthermore, China’s 
expanding power and influence arouse serious concerns in other Asian countries 
about its hegemonic aspiration even if Beijing reiterated its commitments to peaceful 
rise.421 Its growing assertiveness in the South China Sea has not merely increased the 
perceptions of China’s threat in the region but also worsened geopolitical 
environment in its periphery. 
 
In an effort to manage its complex relations with Washington and other Asian 
states and tackle its emerging security dilemmas, China has made use of regional 
multilateral cooperation and institutions as a vehicle of institutional balancing against 
the US. Regional multilateral cooperation allows Beijing to establish asymmetric 
economic interdependence over other Asian countries, reassure those countries of the 
peaceful nature of its rising power, and deter those countries from forming any 
anti-China coalition or join a US-led alliance against China. First, regional 
multilateral cooperation enhances asymmetric economic interdependence between 
China and other Asian neighbors that enables Beijing to translate its economic power 
into political power, building its leadership role in East Asia at the expense of 
Washington’s influence. Second, Beijing’s proactive engagement in regional 
multilateral cooperation serves as a ‘self-restraint’ strategy to reassure its Asian 
neighbors that China’s rise is not a threat instead of an opportunity to regional 
prosperity and stability, enhancing its role as a peaceful and responsible power and 
increasing the US’s costs to contain the rise of China. Third, regional multilateral 
cooperation that enhances asymmetric interdependence allows Beijing to leverage its 
power and influence to its strategic interests and deter the formation of anti-China 
coalitions, not only limiting any ‘hostile’ behaviour of those Asian states to endanger 
Beijing’s interests but also eroding US’s ability to project power against Beijing. 
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Accordingly, regional multilateral institutions provide a creative way for Beijing to 
reshape the international relations of East Asia, reassuring friends, balancing foes, and 
undermining the US dominance.   
 
Regional multilateralism provides a ‘smart’ way for Beijing to manage its 
complicated relations with the US and other Asian states and achieve a peaceful rise. 
However, China’s intentions to undertake a strategy of soft balancing to delay, 
frustrate and undermine the US’s dominant power by strategically and tactically 
engaging in regional multilateral cooperation and institutions in East Asia are 
constrained, since it involves two stages of power competition: power competition 
between China and the US; and between China and other Asian states. Although 
Beijing’s effort to establish asymmetric interdependence has been quite successful, its 
efforts to reassure other East Asian countries about its intentions and the 
repercussions of its growing power have a mixed record. In an attempt to preserve 
autonomy and safeguard their national interests, most East Asian states have pursued 
a hedging strategy to maintain strategic balance between Beijing and Washington, 
preventing any great power to dominate this region. Only Laos and Cambodia have 
aligned more consistently with Chinese strategic interests, whereas Japan, Philippines, 
and Vietnam, which have territorial disputes and/or geostrategic rivalry with China, 
have been more prone to enhance their security ties with the US for reinforcing their 
territorial claims or stance against China. In particular, Beijing’s growing 
assertiveness in the East and South China Seas can be a catalyst for the US and 
several East Asian states to embark on joint initiatives against China.  
 
The Chapter Four has analyzed the rationales behind China’s strategy 
towards the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) by using the concept of soft 
balancing, it concludes that China approach towards the SCO is driven by a strategy 
of soft balancing against the American hegemony. After the fall of Soviet Union, the 
geopolitical landscape in Central Asia underwent a profound change. Poor 
governance and economic deterioration of the former Soviet republics led to regional 
instability in Central Asia since the 1990s. The spreading of three evils and the color 
revolutions sponsored by the West posed a great challenge to the security and stability 
of the western frontier of China. Moreover, Russia adopted a very pro-Western 
foreign policy in the era of Boris Yeltsin that caused serious concerns in Beijing. The 
Chinese policymakers believed that Russia’s leanings towards the West might reshape 
the strategic balance of trilateral relations among Washington, Moscow and Beijing 
and undermine China’s strategic environment regionally and globally. In particular, 
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after the terror-attack of 11 September, the US-led NATO expanded its military 
presence in Central Asia that severely damaged geostrategic interests of both Moscow 
and Beijing. Having abandoned the Obama Administration’s decision to withdraw the 
military force from Central Asia, the Trump administration decided to continue 
anti-terror war in Afghanistan after taking office in 2017. The military presence in 
Central Asia enables Washington not only to threat Beijing’s energy security but also 
to shape strategic containment and encirclement of China.    
 
While facing security and geopolitical challenges, Beijing’s efforts to establish, 
promote, and institutionalize regional multilateral cooperation in Central Asia are 
driven by a desire to manage its competitive and cooperative relationship with 
Moscow, Washington, and other Central Asian states and advance its geo-economic, 
geopolitical, and geostrategic interests. The SCO is strategically and tactically used by 
Beijing as a vehicle of soft balancing to isolate, marginalize and undermine the US 
power and influence in Central Asia and beyond. First, Beijing seeks to form a 
balancing coalition through the SCO to resist the US’s and NATO’s expansion in 
Central Asia as the institutionalization of regional multilateral cooperation provides a 
mechanism to collectivize demand, interests and autonomy of all the SCO members. 
Second, Beijing intends to promote norms and values of the ‘Shanghai spirit’ such as 
‘sovereignty’ and ‘non-interference’ within the SCO in all efforts to counter the 
Washington-supported ‘Color Revolutions’ in Central Asia, ensuring regional security 
and stability. Promoting common norms within the SCO is clearly an opposition to 
increasing American intervention in the region, including ‘interference in other 
countries’ internal affairs’ and ‘export of models of social development’.422 Third, 
Beijing desires to establish a Sino-Russian strategic alliance through the SCO and 
promote the transformation of the international system from unipolarity to 
multipolarity, counterbalancing the American hegemony and unilateralism and 
fostering a more inclusive world order.     
 
However, the Sino-Russia competition and the complex geopolitics of Central 
Asia might undermine Beijing’s attempt to use the SCO as an instrument of soft 
balancing against the US hegemony. First, although Moscow and Beijing have shared 
objective and interest in countering the US hegemony, Beijing’s expanding power and 
influence in the former Soviet region have generated anxiety in Moscow that might 
undermine the Sino-Russian strategic alliance and Beijing’s efforts to promote 
                                                
422 . Phunchok Stobdan, ‘Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Challenges to China's 
Leadership,’ Strategic Analysis 32, no. 4 (2008): 532. 
162 
 
regional multilateral cooperation within the SCO. Second, the complex geopolitics of 
Central Asia may undermine Beijing’s attempt to use the SCO as a vehicle of soft 
balancing against the hegemon. Central Asian states have not only adopted a hedging 
strategy to maintain strategic balance between Beijing and Moscow, but also sought 
to diversify their relations with the EU and US, avoiding overdependence on Beijing 
and Moscow economically and politically and preserving the state sovereignty and 
autonomy. Third, after India and Pakistan joined the SCO as full members in 2017, 
the territorial dispute and geopolitical rivalry between India, Pakistan and China423 
could damage the solidarity of the SCO. When India, Japan, the US and Australian 
move to shape a Quadrilateral alliance in the Indo-Pacific region against China, the 
growing strategic ties between India and the US could greatly limit Beijing’s attempt 
to use the SCO as a vehicle of soft balancing to undermine the US power and 
influence across the region. 
 
The Chapter Five has explored the strategic calculations behind China’s Belt 
and Road Initiative. It suggests that China’s efforts to enhance regional multilateral 
cooperation across the Eurasian space through the BRI are strongly motivated by a 
multifaceted grand strategy in search for security and great power status. China’s idea 
of revitalizing the ancient Silk Road through the BRI is shaped by complex 
interaction of domestic and international forces with a combination of economic, 
political and strategic dimensions. On the domestic level, China’s economy has 
entered a ‘new normal’ status since 2012 because of a decline of global demand and 
domestic overcapacity. Beijing also attempted to promote the ‘Western Development’ 
strategy and ‘Go Out’ strategy for eliminating developmental imbalance and boosting 
overseas investment. Thus, the Chinese policymakers sought to set up a mega 
geo-economic agenda across the continent to promote economic development of its 
western regions, create new investment opportunities for Chinese firms, and stimulate 
its economic growth by establishing the BRI.  On the international level, when the 
shift in the global power balance continues, the international system is undergoing a 
fundamental transformation. The changing balance of global power has intensified the 
Sino-US rivalry in Asia and beyond as Beijing is ‘targeted’ by Washington as a peer 
competitor seeking to replace its global leadership role. Following the Obama 
Administration’s pivot to Asia strategy, the Trump Administration has devised an 
Indo-Pacific strategy to contain China’s expansionism by establishing a wider 
anti-China alliance across the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, the relative decline of 
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US global power and the ongoing change of international system are also viewed by 
Chinese leadership as a period of strategic opportunity for China to reshape global 
governance system and enhance its global leadership role in the international 
economic and political order. 
 
In an attempt to manage its complex relations with Washington and other 
major power and promote its power status in a changing world, the BRI serves as a 
strategic maneuver for Beijing to avoid a classic ‘Thucydides Trap’ between rising 
and established powers and advance its key foreign policy objectives. First, the BRI is 
strategically and tactically used by Beijing as a vehicle of soft balancing to frustrate 
the US containment and encirclement of China, and undermine its dominance in 
Eurasia and beyond, as regional multilateral cooperation allows Beijing to establish 
asymmetric interdependence over other Eurasian partners, to reassure those partners 
of the peaceful and benign nature of its rising power and to deter the formation of any 
anti-China coalition or ‘all but China’ club. Second, China’s intends to promote 
alternative ideas and norms and build its role as a normative power through the BRI, 
fostering the legitimacy of its rising power and illegitimating the US normative 
authority and legitimacy in the international system. Third, China seeks to form a 
bargaining coalition through the BRI and AIIB, reshape global governance, and 
transform the existing international system in a way that reflects its values, interests, 
and status. Overall, the BRI serves as a decisive strategic maneuver for China to 
ensure security and promote power status in the international order, moving from a 
rule-taker to rule-maker. 
 
Although the BRI has great significance for advancing Beijing’s role in the 
international arena, this ambitious initiative faces potential challenges including 
geopolitical rivalry, security threats, territorial disputes, and political risks. First, the 
geopolitical rivalry arising from China’s expansion poses a potential challenge to the 
BRI. As the BRI will boost Beijing’s geopolitical influence and reshape the 
geopolitical balance in Eurasia, it will trigger a geopolitical competition between 
China and regional powers. For example, India’s negative position towards the CPEC 
and its boycott of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation undermines 
Beijing’s efforts to promote interconnectivity and regional multilateral cooperation 
across the continent.424 Second, potential security threats might impair regional 
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connectivity and cooperation in the Eurasian space as the BRI covers unstable regions 
such as the Middle East and Central Asia that lie at the core region of the land Silk 
Road. Third, territorial disputes, especially in the South China Sea, could undermine 
Beijing’s attempts to promote regional multilateral cooperation within the BRI.425 
While the South China Sea is at the core of Maritime Silk Road, overlapping 
sovereignty claims over the disputed islands and waters might pose a great obstacle to 
regional multilateral cooperation between China and other Asian countries. Fourth, 
political turbulences in the conflicted and failed states along the BRI bring political 
risks and uncertainty to the implementation of the BRI projects. 
 
The evidence derived from the three case studies suggests that regional 
multilateralism, enhancing a nexus of economics, politics and security426, offers a way 
to reshape the international relations inside and outside the institutions and the 
balance of power regionally and globally. As regional multilateralism involves a 
dynamic interaction of domestic and international forces with a combination of 
economic, political and strategic dimensions, the rising role of regional 
multilateralism in Chinese foreign policy is strongly driven by an evolving grand 
strategy for the rise of China. In particular, the four dimensions, including 
maximizing material power, pacifying the periphery, securing core interests, and 
promoting international status, significantly shaped China’s foreign policy behavior in 
growingly engaging in regional multilateral cooperation in East Asia, Central Asia 
and the Eurasian landmass. Regional multilateral cooperation offers a viable 
mechanism for Beijing not merely to increase access to regional markets and ensure a 
peaceful international environment, but also institutionalize its periphery strategy and 
advance its geo-economic, geopolitical and geostrategic interests in a regional and 
global context. Furthermore, regional multilateral cooperation and institutions serve as 
a vital instrument for Beijing to manage its complicated relations with Washington and 
other major powers and confront with emerging security and geopolitical challenges 
that arise from the changing balance of global power and the transformation of the 
international system. Finally, regional multilateral regimes provide an alternative path 
for China as a non-western power to construct the political identity and normative 
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legitimacy of its rising power, transform the US-dominated global order and system 
and promote its great power status towards a peaceful rise.  
 
 
The limited role of regional multilateralism  
 
As China’s rising economic and military power is eroding American predominance, 
many scholars have predicted that China as a dissatisfied revisionist power will 
overthrow the existing international system. Through the prism of ‘offensive realism’, 
John Mearsheimer pointed out that China’s rise will be the most dangerous challenge 
to the US in the early 21st century and Washington must do what it can to reverse or 
slow the rise of China.427 The intensifying Sino-US strategic rivalry will inevitably 
lead to a hegemonic war coming from a classic ‘Thucydides Trap’ and China’s rise 
cannot be peaceful. However, such a prediction has ignored some facts. First, as the 
nuclear balance of power remains the cornerstone of strategic nuclear deterrence,428 it 
will deter any war between two nuclear powers. China remains the world’s third 
largest nuclear power behind the US and Russia with a three-branched nuclear 
capability, including strategic bombers, land-based intercontinental ballistic 
missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, it enables Beijing to 
counterbalance the US nuclear primacy with mutually assured 
destruction.429 Moreover, the modernization of the PLA largely strengthened China’s 
conventional military deterrence capabilities that can offset US military predominance 
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in the Western Pacific.430 Thus, it is also too dangerous for Washington to fight a 
direct war with Beijing despite the US global military primacy. During the Cold War, 
the US-Soviet global competition had not eventually lead to a hegemonic war as both 
superpowers possessed enough nuclear weapons with the clear capability of mutually 
assured destruction. This also applies to the Sino-US strategic competition in which 
neither Beijing or Washington has willingness and resolve to head for a nuclear war 
because no side can win and no side can survive.   
 
Second, as the wave of globalization after the end of Cold War has 
significantly enhanced economic interdependence of countries and delivered 
persistent prosperity and peace to the world, such a complex interdependence will 
deter any war between two global economic superpowers. In the past decades, the 
economic ties between Beijing and Washington have become increasingly 
interdependent and shape current Sino-US relation.431 Common interests derived 
from economic interdependence serve to deter both Beijing and Washington to move 
towards a dangerous and costly war.432 The US and China remain the largest trading 
partners each other. For Washington, China is not simply one of the largest 
destination of the US’s FDI but also one of the largest export markets of American 
agricultural and industrial products that has strongly promoted its economic growth 
and prosperity in the post-Cold War era. For Beijing, the US is one of the largest 
export markets of Chinese products that has significance for maintaining its stable 
economic growth and speeding up its modernization process. According to a report 
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released by US Department of Treasury,433 China owned $ 1.2 trillion of the US debt 
until December 2017 and remained the largest holder of the US treasury securities. 
China also has one of the largest foreign exchange reserves that allows China to exert 
great influence over the US dollar’s value and the global financial markets. When 
such a close economic interdependence implies mutually assured economic 
destruction,434 neither Washington nor Beijing can bear the brunt of any costs and 
risks of loss arising from any form of military conflict between the two economic 
superpowers.   
 
Third, China has neither ability nor intention to overthrow the existing 
international order, since Beijing is one of its largest beneficiaries. Instead, Beijing is 
striving to consolidate the existing global system towards a more inclusive and fairer 
international order. The BRI offers a good example of how China tries to reinforce the 
existing global order and system rather than overthrow it. When Trump is moving to 
dismantle globalization and retreat from the current global trading system under the 
doctrine of ‘American First’, Washington is destroying the ruled-based international 
order established by itself,435 whilst the BRI provides a new version of globalization 
to strengthen international cooperation in Eurasia and globally, boost global economic 
growth and prosperity and create a more inclusive international economic order. In 
May 2017, Beijing successfully hosted the Belt and Road Forum for International 
Cooperation and a joint communique of the leaders was formally issued, it puts: “We 
reaffirm our shared commitment to build open economy, ensure free and inclusive 
trade, oppose all forms of protectionism including in the framework of the Belt and 
Road Initiative. We endeavor to promote a universal, rules-based, open, 
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non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system with WTO at its core”.436 
Beijing’s endeavor to promote the inclusive globalization through the BRI will fortify 
the rule-based global trading system that is at the crossroads. Accordingly, China is 
neither a pure status quo power trying to preserve the unipolar system nor a revisionist 
power attempting to reset the existing international system or create a new system,437 
rather a reform-minded status quo power aspiring to create a more inclusive and fairer 
international order and boost its global role from rule-taker to rule-maker.  
 
Kenneth Waltz argues that “The structure of power in the international system 
determines the role of institutions. NATO’s continued existence conveniently 
illustrates how international institutions are created and maintained by stronger states 
(e.g. the US) to serve their perceived and misperceived interests.”438 Indeed, the 
global multilateral institutions such as the UN, the World Bank, the IMF, and the 
WTO established and dominated by the US played a crucial role in consolidating its 
global domination and sustaining its unipolar moment.439 In the past decades, China 
has expanded its regional multilateral ties from East Asia to Central Asia and the 
Eurasian continent, since regional multilateralism provides a new paradigm for China 
as a rising power not only to confront emerging security and geopolitical dilemmas, 
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but also to build its power and influence in the age of American primacy. More 
importantly, as the nuclear balance of power and the economic interdependence has 
considerably limited the use of military force in contemporary international politics, 
international regimes and institutions that help construct political identity and 
normative authority of power not only offer a more feasible instrument to contest for 
power, influence, and global leadership between great powers, but also provide a 
peaceful way to realize a power transition between a rising power and a declining 
power through the normative and institutional transformation. This enables Beijing to 
transform the existing global system without falling into a classic ‘Thucydides Trap’ 
and causing a hegemonic war.  
 
While many scholars predict a hegemonic war between Beijing and 
Washington and China’s ‘unpeaceful rise’, this thesis challenges this viewpoint by 
contending that regional multilateralism presents an alternative path for Beijing to 
achieve a peaceful rise. The evolving role of China in the international arena has 
reflected the importance of regimes and institutions in constructing its political 
identity and legitimizing its power status. Since the PRC replaced the ROC to recover 
its seat at the UN Security Council in 1971 and launched its economic reforms in 
1978,440 Beijing has demonstrated an impressive capacity to learn and adapt to global 
rules and norms, socialize in and integrate into the liberal international order through 
the embrace of the US-established global multilateral institutions such as the UN, the 
WTO, the IMF and the World Bank. Nevertheless, with its rise to a regional and 
global power, Beijing has sought to enhance the political legitimacy of its power 
status through normative and institutional transformation. China’s proactive 
engagement in regional multilateral cooperation and institutions since the end of Cold 
War is part of its persistent efforts to ‘reconstruct’ the identity and legitimacy of its 
great power status in the existing international system. Establishing multilateral 
cooperation within a set of institutions helps Beijing not only to build its soft and 
normative power and enhance the political legitimacy of its rising power through the 
promotion of alternative ideas and norms, but also transform the US-dominated global 
system and reinforce its global leadership role in the new world order through the 
establishment of new international rules and institutions, rather than through the 
initiation of force, coercion, or violence.  
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As international regimes and institutions not only embody the status hierarchy 
but also construct the normative authority of power in the international system,441 
regional multilateralism provides a new paradigm for Beijing to transform the existing 
global system, promote its great power status, and achieve a peaceful rise.  When the 
relative decline of US global power and the rise of new powers continue, the world 
order is saluting the coming of the post-American era. In particular, when Trump 
wants to make America great again and quit from a set of global multilateral 
agreements such as the TPP, the UNESCO, the WTO, and the Paris Climate 
Agreement, Washington is breaking the values, rules and norms of the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ underpinning the neoliberal international order. Therefore, these actions 
significantly undermine the normative authority and legitimacy of US’s global 
leadership in the existing international system. Meanwhile, Beijing is not only 
assuming a more prominent global leadership role in establishing and promoting 
regional and global multilateral cooperation within the BRI, the AIIB, the BRICS, the 
WTO, the G-20, the UN, but also is shouldering global responsibility to promote 
common development and prosperity and reshape the global governance system 
towards a more inclusive, equitable and rule-based international order. Not only will 
this will greatly strengthen the normative legitimacy of China’s global leadership in 
an emerging world order, but it will also promote a profound transformation of the 
global system and eventually bring the American unipolar moment to an end. 
 
However, regional multilateralism has a limited role in reshaping the 
international relations inside and outside the institutions and advancing China’s key 
foreign policy goals in three aspects. First, geopolitical competition between China 
and other major powers will limit regional multilateral cooperation and constrain 
China’s expanding influence in a regional and global context. When the 
institutionalization of regional multilateral cooperation allows Beijing to expand its 
influence and outreach from East Asia and Central Asia to the Eurasian space, it 
reshapes the geopolitical balance and triggers a geopolitical competition between 
China and regional powers that constrain the role of regional multilateral institutions. 
The BRI offers a good example of how it serves as a geo-economic agenda to bolster 
Beijing’s economic and political influence across Eurasia and has resulted in a 
geopolitical competition between China and other regional powers, such as India. 
Despite the huge economic benefits of the BRI, India views the BRI as a geopolitical 
maneuver to expand Beijing’s influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean at its 
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expense that has resulted in an intensifying geopolitical competition and Delhi’s 
boycott of the BRI Forum for International Cooperation. For instance, China’s heavy 
investment in ports along the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal and its expanding 
presence are perceived as a threat to India’s regional dominance. Those ports 
facilitating the naval presence of the PLAN are considered a part of the String of 
Pearls strategy to encircle India and constrain its ability to project power in the region. 
Thus, India has tried to resist the BRI and Beijing’s expansion through boycott, 
balancing and marginalization.  
 
Similarly, Beijing’s expanding influence in the former Soviet region has 
triggered the Sino-Russian competition, weakening the Sino-Russian strategic alliance 
to some extent and limiting the role of the SCO in promoting regional cooperation in 
Central Asia. Also in Europe, China’s huge investments in the former communist 
states within the BRI and multilateral cooperation with Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) countries within 16+1 mechanism have caused growing concerns of the EU 
about Beijing’s ambition in the Balkans and Mediterranean, since Brussels sees the 
BRI a geopolitical and diplomatic offensive to divide the EU, weaken its position 
vis-à-vis China, and undermine its dominance over the neighborhood.442 In June 
2017, Greece unexpectedly vetoed a EU statement condemning China’s human rights 
record at the United Nations Human Rights Council that was the first time for the EU 
failed to criticize Beijing on this occasion. 443  Because Greece has become 
increasingly reliant on Chinese investment after the EU-debt crisis and is keen to play 
a key role in the BRI, it is reluctant to annoy Beijing. China’s expanding role in 
Europe resulted in a subtle shift of the EU’s attitude towards the BRI, turning from a 
strong supporter into a sceptic. More recently, at the 2018 Munich Security 
Conference, German Foreign Minister Gabril Sigmar accused China of “constantly 
trying to test and undermine the unity of the European Union and seeking to influence 
individual states with sticks and carrots” in his criticism on the BRI.444 This reflected 
the EU’s growing concerns about China’s geopolitical offensive.  
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Second, the territorial disputes among the states inside institutions will largely 
limit regional multilateral cooperation and constrain Beijing’s attempt to achieve its 
foreign policy goals. In Asia, China has territorial disputes with Japan in the East 
China Sea, with Vietnam and the Philippines in the South China Sea, with India and 
Bhutan in the Himalayan borders. As the territorial issue not only involves the state 
sovereignty but also national security, it would not be easy neither for Beijing nor for 
other claimants to make concessions in the territorial disputes because of domestic 
nationalism and political legitimacy. The mutual distrust and tension stemming from 
the territorial disputes between China and those states have considerably impeded the 
ongoing process of regional multilateral cooperation. Given China’s growing 
economic and military capabilities, its assertive actions in the territorial disputes will 
not merely fuel the perceptions of China threats but also legitimize the US’s military 
presence in Asia. The South China Sea disputes between China, Vietnam and the 
Philippines have provided a good example on this point. When Beijing sought to 
enhance its territorial and maritime claims by expanding its civil and military 
presence in the South China Sea, it led Vietnam and the Philippines to forge a 
stronger security tie with Washington in order to counter Beijing’s assertiveness in 
the disputed islands and waters. Even if the South China Sea issue has cooled after 
Duterte took power in 2016, Manila has neither abandoned its sovereignty claim nor 
has renounced its defense cooperation agreement with the US. That would potentially 
influence the future Sino-Philippine relations and regional multilateral cooperation 
within the APT and BRI.  
 
Along the same lines, the territorial disputes between Pakistan and India, and 
between China and India have significantly affected the establishment of the 
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar 
Economic Corridor within the BRI. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) 
connecting Xinjiang and Gwadar port with various infrastructure projects and special 
economic zones and passing through the disputed Kashmir region has caused serious 
concerns in India. In particular, the CPEC is located at a strategic nexus between 
South Asia and Central Asia and is thus perceived as a great challenge to India’s 
sovereignty claims over Kashmir and its ‘Connect Central Asia’ initiative, even if 
Beijing repeatedly assured India of its neutral position in the Kashmir issue. A day 
ahead of the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, External Affairs Ministry spokesperson 
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Gopal Baglay said: “No country can accept a project (CPEC) that ignores its core 
concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity.”445 Furthermore, China’s territorial 
disputes with India along the Himalayan Mountains is also a major reason for India to 
have adopted a negative attitude towards the proposed China-Nepal-India Economic 
Corridor and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor. Because India 
perceives that those corridors would pose a threat to its sovereignty and security. For 
example, in 2017, the Doklam standoff between Indian armed force and the PLA in 
the disputed border area of China, Bhutan and India escalated to a dangerous level. 
 
Third, the balance of power will limit the role of regional multilateralism in 
international relations and undermine China’s attempt to build its dominant power and 
influence through establishing, utilizing and dominating regional multilateral 
cooperation and institutions. The balance of power theory in international relations 
assumes that national security can be strengthened when the military capability is 
distributed and dispersed in an anarchic system so that no state is strong enough to 
dominate all others.446 If a state becomes much stronger than others, it will take 
advantage of its might and attack or dominate weaker states. This provides a strong 
incentive for those weaker states to form a defensive coalition in order to shape a new 
balance of power against stronger state for security and survival. This specially 
applies to new power dynamics between the US, China and other regional actors. 
When China’s mounting economic and military might enable it to coerce other Asian 
states to concede to its strategic interests via economic and military means, those 
Asian states has strong motive to form a balancing coalition against China by either 
allying with Washington or establishing a new anti-China coalition. For example, 
since the BRI will greatly enhance China’s power and influence in South Asia and the 
Indian Ocean, Indian foreign policy has shifted from non-alignment to alignment with 
Washington and Tokyo to contain Beijing’s expansion on land and sea. More recently, 
US, Japan, Australia, India have recovered the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue that 
                                                
445. Jayanth Jacob, ‘Can’t Accept Project that Ignores Core Concerns: India on China’s Belt 
and Road Forum,’ The Hindustan Times, 16 May 2017, 
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446. Sir Esme Howard, ‘British Policy and the Balance of Power,’ The American Political 
Science Review 19, no. 2 (1925): 261; Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, World 
Politics: Trends and Transformation (10th ed.) (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 
2005), p. 503. 
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was established in 2007 to counter China’s expanding role in the Indo-Pacific 
region.447  
 
When China pursues a soft balancing strategy against the US by establishing 
asymmetric interdependence over other regional actors within the institutions, those 
Asian states are also motivated to establish new regional multilateral regimes to hedge 
against China’s growing prominence, preserving sovereignty and autonomy and 
avoiding to be dominated by any single power. In East Asia, when Beijing sought to 
build its dominant influence through the promotion of regional multilateral 
cooperation within the APT, most ASEAN countries and Japan included India, 
Australia, and New Zealand as founding members of the East Asia Summit in 2005 in 
order to offset Beijing’s rising role. In Central Asia, when Beijing considerably 
expanded its influence through regional multilateral cooperation within the SCO, 
Russia and other Central Asian countries then founded the Eurasian Economic Union 
in order to reduce their overdependence on Beijing economically and politically. In 
the Eurasian continent, when Beijing sought to rebuild the ancient Silk Road, India 
and Japan initiated the Asia-African Growth Corridor jointly to promote multilateral 
cooperation between South Asia, Southeast Asia, West Asia and Africa, countering 
Beijing’s growing power and influence. Japan also devised a Free and Open 
Indo-Pacific Strategy that was rapidly backed by the US and India. All the evidence 
shows that Beijing’s attempts to reshape the international relations inside and outside 
the institutions have its limits as weaker states always seek to maintain the 
equilibrium of power for security and survival. This not just allows Beijing to delay, 
frustrate and undermine Washington’s dominance through initiating, promoting and 
institutionalizing regional multilateral cooperation, but also enables other regional 
actors to counterbalance Beijing’s rising power and influence through establishing 
new regional multilateral mechanism.  
 
Since the World War II, international regimes and institutions have been used 
by stronger states as a means to consolidate their power and influence and shape the 
existing power structure of international system. While the globalization process 
shifted the balance of global power, regional multilateralism has emerged a new 
paradigm in the international relations. As regional multilateral regimes provide a 
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rule- and norm-based mechanism to reduce costs, form preferences, monitor process, 
facilitate problem-solution, and achieve common goals, establishing, promoting and 
institutionalizing regional multilateral cooperation allows stronger states to translate 
its material power into political influence, construct its political identity and 
legitimacy of power, and promote its power status in the international order. Having 
examined the role of regional multilateralism in international relations and explored 
the logic of China’s engagement in regional multilateral cooperation, the three cases 
studies have provided evidence that regional multilateralism has been a new paradigm 
for Chinese foreign policy as it offers a new approach to reshape the international 
relations inside and outside the institutions and the geopolitical balance at regional 
and global levels for ensuring security, building influence, promoting great power 
status. More importantly, regional multilateral regimes and institutions provides a 
peaceful way for rising power like China to compete for power, influence and global 
leadership, transforming the existing global system and achieving a peaceful rise. 
However, the geopolitical competition, the territorial disputes, and the balance of 
power has limited the role of regional multilateralism in international relations. 
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Chart 1: The Evolution of Chinese Foreign Policy in Regional Multilateralism 
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Chart 2: The Hypotheses of China’s Approach towards Regional Multilateralism 
 
 
Source: the author’s compilation. 
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Table 1: China’s Trade with Major Partners in 1998, 2007 and 2013 
 
Ranking Major partners 
Share (%) 
1998 
Share (%) 
2007 
Share (%) 
2013 
1 European Union* 18.4% 17.3% 13.4% 
2 United States 16.9% 15.0% 12.4% 
3 Japan  17.9% 11.4% 7.5% 
4 ASEAN 7.3% 9.7% 10.9% 
5 South Korea 6.6% 7.8% 6.6% 
 
Source: DG Trade Statistics (2008 and 2014), European Commission, 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade. 
Note: * European Union refers to the EU 27 member states. 
 
 
Table 2: Top Trading Partners of East Asian States in 1998, 2007 And 2013 
 
Country 
Top partners & share 
1998 
Top partners & share  
2007 
Top partners & share 
2013 
Japan (1) US 27.8% (1) China 18.6% (1) China 20.0% 
 (3) ASEAN 12.9% (2) US 17.1% (2) US 13.3% 
 (4) China 8.6% (3) EU 13.4% (3) EU 9.7% 
South Korea (1) US 19.2% (1) China 22.0% (1) China 21.3% 
 (3) Japan 12.9% (2) EU 12.4% (2) EU 9.8% 
 (5) China 8.2% (3) Japan 12.0% (3) US 9.7% 
ASEAN (1) US 16.1% (1) China 12.1% (1) China 18.8% 
 (2) Japan 15.3% (2) EU 11.8% (2) EU 13.0% 
 (4) China 4.3% (3) Japan 11.4% (3) Japan 12.6% 
 
Source: DG Trade Statistics (2008 and 2014), European Commission, 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade. 
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Figure 1: China and US Trade with BRI Countries and World during 2005-2014 
(in billion USD) 
 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, http://data.stats.gov.cn; The International 
Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, http://www.trade.gov. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: China’s Outward FDI into BRI Countries and World during 2006-2015 
(in billion USD) 
 
Source: 2015 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
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